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HE most basic relationship in law is the relationship between the
attorney and client. The dynamics of this relationship are always
of great theoretical concern.' Similarly, continual interest exists
concerning the practical aspects of bringing the relationship into exist-
ence. 2 This interest has intensified recently, particularly because of the
increasing competition for financially able clients3 caused in part by the
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1. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974); Blaustein,
What Do Laymen Think of Lawyers? Polls Show the Need for Better Public Relations, 38
A.B.A. J. 39 (1952); Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015
(1981); Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public.- AnA.A.LS Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272
(1938); Drinker, Laymen on the Competency and Integrity of Lawyers, 22 TENN. L. REV. 371
(1952); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
2. See, e.g., G. ROSSMAN & R. STRINGHAM, INCREASING A LAW PRACTICE (1965); C.
ROWE, HOW AND WHERE LAWYERS GET PRACTICE (1955); N. STEVENSON, HOW TO BUILD
A MORE LUCRATIVE LAW PRACTICE (1967); J. TRACY, THE SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF LAW
(1947); Bar Attitudinal Study. Use of Lawyers at All Time High but Serious Knowledge Gap
Exists, 34 TEX. B.J. 105 (1971).
3. Because of "increased competition, sophisticated firms are coming to the realization
that they must market their services . . ." Reed, Future of the Practice.- Survival of the
Fittest, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 25, 1983, at 16, col. 3. The use of the word marketing "in an article
prepared for lawyers reflects the astounding change over the last five years." Id. at 17, col. 1.
Evidence that aggressive marketing has become even more acceptable in the past four years
can be found in the fact that some 900 firms have either been represented at or purchased
written and audio materials from Georgetown's continuing legal education seminar on mar-
keting and selling legal services. Vilkin, Firms Turn to Selling Themselves, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
25, 1983, at 1, col. 4, at 30, col. 1 (includes marketing history of several medium to large
firms); see also Attorneys Spend $6.15Mfor TVAdvertisements, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at
2, col. 3 ("The nation's lawyers spent a total of $6.15 million on television advertising in
1981, more than six times the total for 1978, the first full year in which advertising by law-
yers was permitted."). In 1980 the American Bar Association published a 162-page manual
for the marketing of services by lawyers: L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION (1980).
The need for more clients is spawned by a myriad of factors including profit squeeze
resulting from the increase in office overhead due to automation, inflation, and the competi-
tive restraints on what a lawyer can charge for his or her services, not to mention the persis-
tent economic sluggishness in the United States and corresponding decline in specific
categories of legal work. Reed, supra, at 16.
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almost exponential increase in the number of lawyers4 and by attempted
encroachments by nonlawyers who perform legal tasks. 5 Much of the
seemingly endless public debate centers on whether and in what forms
lawyers may advertise.6
Typical lawyer advertising provides information about the attorney or
the firm, with details as to the availability and terms of routine legal serv-
ices provided in order to entice the potential client to contact that specific
firm or attorney. The lawyer referral service is a related but much less
visible mechanism for establishing contact between the potential client and
a qualified attorney or firm. Lawyer referral services generally focus, how-
ever, on the need of the consumer and potential client for access to compe-
tent legal services, rather than on any specific attorney's or firm's need for
4. Since 1970 there has been a 50% increase in the number of lawyers in the United
States with 535,000 attorneys reported for 1980, roughly one lawyer for every 410 persons
and approximately twice the number of lawyers per capita as in 1960. The distribution of
attorneys and the concomitant competition, however, is uneven; over 50% of the attorneys
are concentrated in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, andWashington, D.C. Seminarsfor ABF Fellows Include Preview of Data from 1981 Lawyer
Statistical Report, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J., Summer 1981, at 7 [hereinafter cited as
1981 Lawyer Statistical Report Preview]; Coblentz, A Glut of Lawyers, NEWSWEEK, June 27,
1983, at 17 (too many young people going to law school rather than becoming engineers,
artists, and other producers); cf. Bok, Law and Its Discontents, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr.
1983, at 21-22 ("Japan boasts a total of fewer than 15,000 lawyers, while American universi-
ties graduate 35,000 every year.").
5. See generally Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Em-
pirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1981)(prevalence of unauthorized practice of law). A 1962 constitutional amendment in Arizona
gave real estate brokers and salesmen the right to draft documents connected with real estate
transactions. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVI, § 1; see also Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977) (state bar ruling that only lawyers may make
real estate title searches violated Sherman Act), vacated, 571 F.2d 205, 208 (10th Cir.) (fed-
eral court must withhold decision until state supreme court rules on disputed question in
ending state action), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978). But see Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quin-
and & Tyson, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771, 774 (1966) (suit to enjoin real estate brokerage
firm from completing certain contracts; court held drafting or completing blanks of deeds
and other legal instruments constituted unauthorized practice of law). Consumers and envi-
ronmentalists have brought challenges to unauthorized practice rules in at least three states.
Will Consumers Be Next to Challenge UPL Rules?, 65 A.B.A. J. 685, 685-86 (1979). The
practice of persons doing their own divorces is reportedly spreading across the country. See,
e.g., Doing It Yourself, 69 A.B.A. J. 433, 443 (1983) (roughly half of all divorces in Maricopa
County, Arizona, which includes Phoenix, are filed with self-help packets); Up Against the
Bar in Florida, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 69 (detailing the saga of secretary Rosemary
Furman who has been filling out divorce petitions since 1972); see also Sylvester, The People
vs. Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 7 (describing "hatred" of attorneys and grow-
ing public acceptance of self-help legal publications).
6. See Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising.- A Good Beginning but Not Enough, 62 A.B.A. J.
735, 735-36 (1976). The ABA's ban on broad public advertising has a long tradition. In
1908 the first ABA ethical canons banned advertising to eliminate billboards and street solic-
itation. The printing of business cards in newspapers, however, was tolerated until 1937.
The roots of the prohibition lay in fears of loss of professional dignity, service, and enforce-
ment problems. Id; see also Sprecher, Ethical Advertising and Solicitation: Law Lists, 53
A.B.A. J. 121 (1967) (guidelines for determining what is a reputable law list in which attor-
ney may publish his professional card); Code Amendments Broaden Information Lawyers
May Provide in Law Lists, Directories, and Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A. J. 309 (1976) (amend-
ments adopted by ABA House of Delegates in Feb. 1976); Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674 (1958) (analysis of some evils
traditionally believed to be caused by lawyer solicitation).
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more clients. Thus, most services are generally sponsored or operated by
bar associations and refer clients only to lawyers who meet certain qualifi-
cations and standards. The American Bar Association has for many years
considered bar sponsorship essential to lawyer referral services, 7 and most
state codes of professional conduct currently require it.8 Most state codes
contain rules prohibiting attorneys from participating in private lawyer re-
ferral services and some even have rules that inhibit competition between
local bar sponsored lawyer referral services.9 The essential requirement of
bar sponsorship and the ethical rules complementing those requirements,
however, are presently being challenged within the bar 0 and by a verita-
ble explosion of various forms of private referral services."I
While questions concerning the deceptiveness and/or legality of a given
nonbar sponsored legal referral service may be subject to debate and must
be resolved on a case-by-case basis, certainly the mere participation of at-
torneys in such a service seems to violate the spirit of the bar sponsorship
requirement. With increasing competition for paying clients, even attor-
neys themselves are operating nonbar sponsored services in ways that may
defeat the central purpose and benefit of lawyer referral services, which is
putting clients who are able to pay in touch with attorneys who are quali-
fied to handle those potential clients' specific legal problems. Additionally,
the traditional fee arrangements common to lawyer referral services are
now under fire. The routine lawyer referral service practice of enforcing a
low fixed ceiling of ten to twenty dollars on the initial consultation fee paid
by the referred client to the attorney, though of obvious benefit to the pub-
lic, is questioned as anticompetitive. Similarly, questions arise about the
propriety of fees charged to the participating attorneys by the lawyer refer-
ral services to defray administrative expenses. These combined circum-
stances create a crisis atmosphere in which fundamental questions arise
about the future feasibility of lawyer referral services. 12
Advocates of bar sponsored lawyer referral services will find no easy
cure for the alleged plague of private lawyer referral services in state bar
7. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE OF THE A.B.A., HANDBOOK ON
THE LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE 7 (5th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
8. See infra notes 90, 167, and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(C) (1980)
(discussed infra note 154 and accompanying text).
10. See Podgers, New ABA rules may end private LRS ban, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb.
1980, at 3; infra note 162 and accompanying text.
11. Telephone interview with Constance E. Berg, Staff Liaison to the ABA Standing
Committee on Lawyer Referral and Information Service (June 27, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Berg Interview]. A private lawyer referral service is one that is not sponsored by a bona fide
bar association; that is, an association that has a variety of professional programs and pur-
poses other than lawyer referral. A description of a nationwide private service is contained
in Vilkin, Lawyer Referral Service Plans Nationwide Network, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 2,
col. 1. The author notes: "Private referral services are not new. There are some in various
parts of the country that are operated as franchises or are limited to specific specialized
areas, like civil rights or women's rights. These are also normally limited to localities or
regions." Id
12. See Podgers, Is Lawyer Advertising Killing LRS?, BAR LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at
22, 23.
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grievance committees because the committees either tackle the problems
indirectly, challenging one attorney at a time, or are reluctant to tackle the
problem at all so as not to be accused of anticompetitive behavior.' 3 For
several years the Federal Trade Commission has questioned whether cer-
tain organized bar practices dilute competition in violation of the antitrust
laws.14 Such scrutiny has contributed to the reticence of bar officials, who
are reluctant to move against lawyer referral services that are not bar spon-
sored. These growing problems expose the heretofore unnoticed regula-
tory wasteland and the conflicting policies and guidelines that surround
lawyer referral services.
This Article examines the plethora of problems confronting lawyer re-
ferral services. Commencing with a brief history of the genesis of the law-
yer referral service movement, it probes the policy rationales for such
services. The Article explores the requirement of bar sponsorship to deter-
mine if it is justified in light of current realities and today's law. Similarly,
ways in which alleged illegal or unethical private lawyer referral services
can be eradicated are assessed for their feasibility and impact on the goals
of lawyer referral services. The Article also considers potential antitrust
problems such as fee arrangements, which have received little if any atten-
tion in the context of lawyer referral services. Assuming that violations or
unethical behavior do occur, the Article also assesses suggested mecha-
nisms for cure to determine whether they do in fact solve the problem
while still furthering the goals of lawyer referral services. Finally, this
Article deals with the question of whether efforts to stifle communication
by these private referral services are permissible under the first amend-
ment right to freedom of speech, and if so, under what conditions. In dis-
cussing these problems particular emphasis is placed upon the situation in
Texas.
I. THE GENESIS AND OPERATION OF BAR SPONSORED LAWYER
REFERRAL SERVICES
State and local bar associations in this country have operated lawyer
referral services for the past forty-six years. 15 The first decade was one of
limited growth for the concept. The Los Angeles County Bar established
the first lawyer referral service in 1937; during the next ten years Chicago,
St. Louis, and New York followed suit. 16 In 1946 the ABA moved from a
position of implicit approval of the concept to strong encouragement of the
13. See Podgers, supra note 10, at 3. In the opinion of a former chairman of the ABA
Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral Service, "enforcement of the prohibitions [against
private referral services] would raise restraint of trade issues resulting in constitutional ques-
tions for integrated bars and antitrust questions for non-integrated bars." Id
14. See Winslow, Regulating the Profession.: The FTC Approach, BAR LEADER, July-
Aug. 1983, at 23-24.
15. Gallantz, Lawyer Referral-A Brief History, 45 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 306, 306
(1972).
16. Id. at 306-07; see also ABA Annual Report, Proceedings of the 69th Annual Meeting,
71 A.B.A. REP. 77, 110 (1946) (Committee on Low-Cost Legal Services Bureaus report on
latest developments) [hereinafter cited as ABA 69th Annual Meeting].
1102 [Vol. 37
LAWYER REFERRAL SER VICES
formation of bar sponsored lawyer referral services. By 1953 one hundred
services were functioning in the United States.' 7 This number had nearly
doubled by 1961.18
The ABA created a Special Committee on Legal Clinics in the same
year that the Los Angeles County Bar Referral Service began operating.' 9
Although the committee was initially oriented toward the provision of le-
gal services at low cost, it went through several transitions involving
changes in policy as well as name, and in 1951 the present Standing Com-
mittee on Lawyer Referral Services succeeded that committee.20 The 1942
report of the committee recommended endorsement by the ABA of local
referral services, and specified that such services should be under the aus-
pices of local bar associations. 2'
The legitimacy of bar sponsored lawyer referral services was assumed
from the beginning. ABA Opinion 227, issued in 1941, presented the ques-
tion of whether lawyer referral services may advertise their services. 22 An-
swering in the affirmative, the ethics committee outlined a lawyer referral
service similar to those of today, including a requirement of a certain max-
imum charge for the initial client interview. 23 The ethics committee fur-
ther stated that operational and advertising costs could properly be
defrayed by charging an annual registration fee.24 Fifteen years later, in
1956, the ethics committee again directly addressed the question of
whether a bar association may require members of the panel to assist in
the financing of the service and approved this practice.25
Although the ABA was aware of and condoned the operation of bar
association lawyer referral services from their inception, not until 1946 did
the ABA begin a formal policy of encouraging and promoting lawyer re-
ferral services. At the ABA convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in
October of 1946, the House of Delegates of the ABA approved the estab-
17. Gallantz, supra note 15, at 308.
18. Cottingham, A Survey of LegalAid, Lawyer Referral and Public Defender Facilities in
Texas, 24 TEX. B.J. 389, 458 (1961); Madden & Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: 4
Sensible Approach to a Djicult Problem, 49 A.B.A. J. 965, 966 (1963). Today there are over
300 services. 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY IL-13L (112th ed. 1980) lists 299
services in the United States and is the latest edition in which lawyer referral services are
listed.
19. Gallantz, supra note 15, at 306.
20. Id at 307.
21. Report of the Special Committee on Low-Cost Legal Service Bureaus, 67 A.B.A. REP.
290, 292-94 (1942).
22. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 227 (1941), re-
printed in ABA OPINIONS 520 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA Formal Op. 227]:
[The canons of ethics do] not prohibit the employment of advertising facilities
by an organized bar association to acquaint the lay public with the desirability
of securing legal services promptly when a legal problem arises and to apprise
the public of the maintenance of a Lawyers' Reference Service [embracing a
plan of low-cost legal service], the plan under which it operates, and the avail-
ability of the service.
23. Id at 520-21.
24. Id. at 524.
25. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances Formal Op. 291 (1956), re-
printed in ABA OPINIONS 644 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA Formal Op. 291].
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lishment of lawyer referral plans by state and local bar associations. 26 The
realization that great numbers of Americans were not taking their legal
problems to lawyers because their incomes were too high to qualify for
legal aid and because they feared they could not afford expensive attor-
neys 27 had spread since the 1942 report by the Special Committee on Legal
Clinics. Interest in facilitating practical training for young lawyers also
existed,28 but World War II gave the greatest impetus to the spurt in the
growth of lawyer referral services.
A. The Fear of Socialism
Two factors resulted from the war experience and compelled the ABA to
take a firm affirmative stance concerning lawyer referral services. The
Army and Navy had found their legal assistance plans to be great morale
builders for the troops. 29 Resolution of legal problems helped the soldiers
and sailors to concentrate on the job at hand. 30 At the end of the war the
Army and Navy asked the ABA to create a national referral system for the
benefit of members of the armed forces. 31 So pressing was the problem of
access to suitable attorneys by returning troops and other persons of mod-
erate means that the ABA realized that if the organized bar did not quickly
take responsibility for solving the problem, another well-organized entity
would, namely, the United States Government. 32 The fear engendered by
the war was that socialism would sweep the legal profession. One writer of
the day, considering the problems of entrusting legal services offices to
government bureaus, feared the loss of independence of the profession. 3
3
This commentator contended that the lack of an independent bar would
lead to the disappearance of habeas corpus, which in turn "leads to the
totalitarian state, which necessarily denies that a human being has an im-
mortal soul." 3
4
26. ABA 69th Annual Meeting, supra note 19, at 110.
27. Niles, Report ofthe Special Committee on Legal Service Policies, 71 A.B.A. REP. 240,
242 (1946); see Comment, The Lawyer Referral Service-A Blueprintfor Texas, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 614, 618 (1960).
28. Smith, Legal Service Officesfor Persons ofModerate Means, 31 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'Y 37, 44-45 (1947).
29. Id at 38.
30. Id
31. Id. at 38-39.
32. Here May Be "Operation Cross-Roads," 33 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Operation Cross-Roads]. Legal Service Policies, 32 A.B.A. J. 866 (1946), mentioned the
report of the Special Committee on Legal Service Policies that was presented at the 1946
Atlantic City gathering of American lawyers. That report dealt inter alia with the organiza-
tion of legal service for persons of moderate means and presented the profession with an
early choice as to whether it would "maintain its historic prerogatives and position by itself
fulfilling the new needs, or will stand by while these essential forms of legal service are taken
over by institutions, by labor organizations, or by bureaus of government." Id
33. Smith, supra note 28, at 47.
34. Id The ABA Committee on Lawyer Referral Service echoed these sentiments as
late as 1965 when it asserted in its handbook that:
[L]awyer referral service heads off the evil consequences likely to follow from
too much government domination of the profession. Socialism would destroy
the independence of the bar and create among the lawyers a loyalty above that
[Vol. 371104
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Thus at the time the ABA was moving formally to approve and en-
courage the formation of lawyer referral services, the debate over who
should operate such services appeared to address the question of the bene-
fits of organized bar sponsorship versus the likelihood of government oper-
ation of law offices in the event that the organized bar did not move
quickly enough to answer the public need for lawyer referral.
B. The Unmet Needs of the Middle Class and
Underutilization of Attorneys
While the general concern about government intrusion into the legal
profession certainly continues, 35 the historic and sometimes hysteric para-
noia over government-run law offices for middle income persons dissi-
pated.36  That fear coexisted with another less urgent but enduring
concern, the genuine need to provide legal services to persons of moderate
incomes with undetermined legal needs who had not formerly utilized at-
torneys. Early studies indicated that substantial numbers of persons failed
to consult lawyers about legal problems. 37 Although some dissenters ques-
tioned the view that real demand existed, 38 important bar officials such as
Barlow F. Christensen of the Idaho Bar expressed the view that lawyer
referral offered a sensitive approach to a difficult problem.39 Some persons
identified the problem as the paradox inherent in the fact that because
which is owed to the individual client. Already the bar is faced with the prob-
lem of combatting the efforts of government agencies to discourage consulta-
tions with lawyers by citizens who have to deal with such agencies and are
urged to accept the government's interpretation of the law. They will be less
likely to accede when aware that through a referral service they may obtain
individual and independent legal advice at moderate cost.
HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 64.
35. Say regulation major issue facing the bar in 1980s, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at
i.
36. The 1982 fiscal year budget for the federally funded Legal Services Corporation was
drastically reduced to $241 million, a 25% cut from fiscal year 1981. Middlebrook, Corporate
Law Departments. .4 Source ofPro Bono Publico Services, 68 A.B.A. J. 924, 924 (1982). Ten
percent of the reduced budget will be spent on private bar involvement. Id. at 925; see 46
Fed. Reg. 61,017 (1981). Nonetheless, whether the private bar will be able to satisfy the
increased demand for legal services by those who would have turned to the Legal Services
Corporation is unclear. Middlebrook, supra, at 924.
37. A 1948 study embracing 4000 families disclosed that 40% of 843 middle-income
families with legal problems did not consult a lawyer. Porter, Answers to Objections to the
Lawyer Reference Service, 31 OR. L. REV. 15, 17 (1951) (discussing E. Koos, THE FAMILY
AND THE LAW 5 (1949)).
38. One lawyer was quoted as saying:
"I want some proof that there is a long-felt desire by the public and I want
some proof that that desire has been frustrated in the past for competent legal
advice at moderate cost. . . . There is nobody running around the streets of
my city saying, 'My kingdom for a lawyer, where can I get one?' It sounds
asinine to me."
Porter, supra note 37, at 16. In 1954 Theodore Voorhees, former chairman of the ABA
Committee on Lawyer Referral Service, acknowledged that at "one time" lawyers in New
York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, as well as lawyers in the smaller communities, insisted that
there was no need for a referral service. Voorhees, The Lawyer Referral Service: The Me-
dium-Size and Smaller Communities, 40 A.B.A. J. 663, 663 (1954).
39. Madden & Christensen, supra note 18, at 956.
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society was becoming more and more complex even ordinary activities
were subject to more and more legal consequences; thus a commensurate
growth in the demand for legal services and a concomitant improvement
in the economic condition of the bar and the esteem in which attorneys
were held could be expected.40 Christensen, however, wrote in 1963:
[Q]uite the opposite appears to be the case. Members of the Bar gen-
erally seem to enjoy less public esteem than they would like, and their
incomes compare unfavorably with those of members of other profes-
sions. At the same time, the unauthorized practice of the law appears
to be flourishing, despite the profession's vigorous efforts to stop it.41
This quote was later adopted and set forth in an early brochure of the
ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral and Information Service.
(LRIS)42 The desire to aid the public coexisted with the concern for im-
proving the economic condition of underutilized attorneys by inhibiting
the unauthorized practice of law and inducing those able to pay reasonable
fees to bring their problems to attorneys. The financial rewards from par-
ticipating in lawyer referral were reported with pride. 43
Almost from the beginning, the advocates emphasized that the goal of
referral services was to encourage those persons who had never used a
lawyer to begin doing so.44 Early efforts revealed that in fact uninitiated
potential clients comprised the majority of persons served by the referral
services, 45 thus diminishing fears that referral services would simply redis-
tribute the existing supply of clients. The need for a more efficient way to
meet the potential needs of those with moderate incomes was also aggra-
vated by the trend away from the traditional model of the small town solo
40. The expectation that complexity will spawn more work for lawyers has been con-
firmed by recent observers. Law has gone beyond being primarily the concern of just those
with businesses and property. With the expansion of law and the role of lawyers in ordering
human conduct, the "involvement of the lawyer must increase." Breitel, The Paradox of the
Profession of Law, BAR LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 14, 15; see also Why Everybody is Suing
Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1978, at 50-55. Some of the blame for the
current explosion of litigation, however, is put on the alleged glut of lawyers. Why Every-
body is Suing Everybody, supra, at 51; Ashby, Ifit weren 'for lawyers, we wouldn't need them,
Hous. Post, Aug. 14, 1981, at BI, col. 1; Ashby, Lawyers'domain: Is it too eminent?, Hous.
Post, Aug. 2, 1981, at BI, col. 1 ("[Tlhe more lawyers we have, the more laws, the more
lawsuits, the more courts.").
41. Christensen & Madden, supra note 21, at 965; see also Voorhees, The Outlook for the
Lawyer Referral Service.- Much Remains to Be Done, 38 A.B.A. J. 193, 194 (1952) ("All
lawyers are aware of the broad increase in the complexity of mere existence in this country
during the last twenty-five years; few would assert that the number of our clients or the
volume of legal business has shown a comparable increase."). Compare, however, the recent
assertion that "the very growth and complexity of our society has increased the role of legal
institutions and . . . the stature of the lawyers." Breitel, supra note 40, at 16.
42. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYER REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERV., LAWYER
REFERRAL SERVICE: A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.
43. A Banner Yearfor Lawyer Referral, LAW. REFERRAL BULL., Jan. 15, 1964, at I (not-
ing that it was "not surprising, then, that more lawyers than ever before ... are now taking
part" since attorneys participating in lawyer referral during 1963 earned "better than haifa
million dollars in legal fees" (emphasis in original)).
44. HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 17-18 (referral service not designed to help clients who
already have lawyers or who have lawyers as acquaintances).
45. More than 80% of the persons making use of the lawyer referral services were meet-
ing the lawyers for the first time. Id at 17; see Voorhees, supra note 38, at 663.
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practitioner who knew his neighbors and acquired business through a rep-
utation for competence and integrity.46
The ABA considered the lawyer referral service to be the ideal way to
reach those needing legal service because it attempts to eliminate the rea-
sons for the perceived reluctance to use attorneys. Those reasons include
distrust of attorneys 4 7 fear of excessive fees, 48 inability to recognize
and/or categorize a legal problem,49 ignorance about how to select a law-
yer,50 and the belief and fear that lawyer involvement means extended
controversy and inevitable litigation.5' In addressing these problems the
ideal lawyer referral service would utilize what the ABA considered essen-
tial components, including (1) local bar association sponsorship and super-
vision, (2) a panel of practicing attorneys who agreed to serve potential
clients referred to them by the service, (3) a person, preferably a lawyer,
with whom the prospective clients could discuss their problems and who
could refer them to appropriate lawyers on the panel, (4) a moderate fixed
fee for the client's first consultation with a panel attorney, (5) a system of
collecting and preserving records, and (6) continuous and effective public-
ity to educate the public about the existence of the lawyer referral service,
the legal significance of many seemingly unimportant problems, and the
need for a lawyer's expertise in solving those problems.5 2
This last component was especially important and presented a task for
which the bar association was perhaps uniquely suited. Contemporaneous
writing on the issue certainly contained no suggestion that lawyer referral
services might be set up by groups other than bar associations.5 3 Due to
the ban on attorney advertising at the time, 54 individual attorneys could
46. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 6 n.5 (1970). The
percentage of sole practitioners is steadily declining. In 1948 61.2% of all lawyers were solo;
in 1966 only 39.1%. Id In 1980 only 33% were solo practitioners. 1981 Lawyer Statistical
Report Preview, supra note 4, at 7.
47. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 229, 231-32 (1977).
48. Madden & Christensen, supra note 18, at 965; Searcy, supra note 27, at 618 (many
laymen do in fact believe legal services are actually prohibitive in cost); see Cottingham,
supra note 18, at 458.
49. L. ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 1; Voorhees, supra note 43, at 664.
50. L. ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 1; Cottingham, supra note 21, at 458. Eighty-three
percent of the respondents agree with the statement that "[a] lot of people do not go to
lawyers because they have no way of knowing which lawyer is competent to handle their
particular problem." B. CURRAN, supra note 47, at 228.
51. Madden & Christensen, supra note 18, at 966. In the Curran study 59% felt that
lawyers are not prompt about getting things done and 30% felt that lawyers needlessly com-
plicate the client's problems. However, 87% felt that lawyers try hard to solve their clients'
problems without having to go to court. B. CURRAN, supra note 47, at 229.
52. HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 7-8; Madden & Christensen, supra note 18, at 966.
53. See Smith, supra note 28; Operation Crossroads, supra note 32; see also Legal Service
Policies, supra note 32.
54. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908) provided that solicitation of
business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. Canon 27 was amended in 1937, 1942,
1943, and 1951 to provide for the use of law lists. These changes were incorporated into the
new Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, which continued the prohibition against
advertising: "A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display
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not publicize the nature or terms of their services. Lawyer referral services,
however, could advertise the importance of consulting attorneys55 as well
as the low maximum fee set for the initial interview, which would en-
courage the public to investigate the lawyer referral services and, through
services, to consult an attorney, knowing that the risk would be only a few
dollars. This authority of referral services to advertise overcame their "es-
sential problem," which was to find some "ethical means of inducing [peo-
ple] to bring their legal problems to lawyers."' 56 One commentator, in
addressing the question of the necessity of bar sponsored lawyer referral
services, rested his support of lawyer referral services in part on the prohi-
bition against lawyer advertising.57 Arguably, the objectives of lawyer re-
ferral services could be obtained through extensive bar association
advertising stating the value of legal counselling and the willingness of
most attorneys to charge only a nominal fee for initial consultations, and
the authorization of specialty advertising in the classified section of tele-
phone directories. 58 The fact that "[sipecialty advertising to laymen [is]
now absolutely prohibited" presented a practical difficulty, however.59
Since lawyers now may advertise their specialties and fee arrangements, 60
one justification for the very existence of lawyer referral services may no
longer be valid. Indeed, one writer has expressed concern that the increas-
ingly liberal advertising rules may all but eradicate the need for lawyer
referral services. 61 Nevertheless, over three hundred services operate
today.62
C The Operation of Lawyer Referral Services
The operation of a lawyer referral service is relatively uncomplicated. 63
The prospective client responds to publicity by calling at the service office.
A staff person, who usually is but may not be an attorney, determines the
nature of the legal problem and arranges an appointment between the po-
tential client and a qualified attorney selected from the panel of attorneys,
usually on a rotation basis. At the lawyer's office an initial consultation
takes place for a moderate fixed fee of usually ten to twenty dollars. The
traditional lawyer-client relationship is thus established, with further fee
payment to be arranged between the lawyer and client. Most of the over
advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity
. .. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1969); see also In re
McCallum, 64 N.E.2d 310 (Il1. 1945) (attorney disbarred for using "investigators" to solicit
business).
55. See ABA Formal Op. 227, supra note 22.
56. Madden & Christensen, supra note 18, at 966.
57. Comment, supra note 27, at 614.
58. Id at 623. The author admitted that such a plan "except for serious practical diffi-
culties appears to obviate the need for Lawyer Referral." Id.
59. Id at 624.
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1980).
61. Podgers, supra note 12, at 23.
62. Id
63. See generally Carlin, The Advancing State of the Art of Lawyer Referral Service, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 643 (1978).
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three hundred services are local bar association sponsored, are open to all
qualified attorneys in the respective local geographical area, and make re-
ferrals in all subject areas of the law.
The Texas Lawyer Referral Service (TLRS) functions similarly to the
above description. 64 The State Bar of Texas, to which all Texas attorneys
must belong, operates this service, created in 1951. Over one thousand 65 of
the state's 36,368 attorneys66 participate in the TLRS. The service is listed
in over one hundred Yellow Pages and the public is informed of its exist-
ence through radio and television campaigns as well as through
brochures. 67 Eligible attorneys who participate must carry malpractice in-
surance and pay annual dues of twenty dollars.68 Clients are charged a ten
dollar initial consultation fee, which the attorney returns to the service to
help defray costs. 69 The TLRS receives an average of over two thousand
calls monthly with about half of those resulting in referrals. 70 Over
$31,000 in consultation fees were returned to the service by participating
attorneys during the first six months of 1983. 7 I Generally, the TLRS
serves every city in Texas except the eleven with local referral services:72
Dallas, San Antonio, Arlington, El Paso, Fort Worth, Pasadena, Corpus
Christi, Beaumont, Irving, Wichita Falls, and Houston. 73 These local serv-
ices receive about seventy calls a month from the TLRS.74
An example of one of the Texas local services is the Houston Lawyer
Referral Service, Inc. (HLRS). It operates in the Houston metropolitan
area, where nearly one third of all Texas attorneys reside; accordingly, it
probably experiences most of the problems that a lawyer referral service
can encounter.75 HLRS is a committee of the Houston Bar Association, 76
64. See State Bar of Texas Reply to Sunset Staff Report, 41 TEX. B.J. 1031, 1044 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as State Bar Reply].
65. Id.
66. As of June 14, 1983, there were 36,368 licensed attorneys in Texas. Telephone inter-
view with Jackie Miller, Membership Department, State Bar of Texas (June 29, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as Miller Interview].
67. See State Bar Reply, supra note 64, at 1044.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Telephone interview with Dorothy Guderian, TLRS, State Bar of Texas (Aug. 3,
1983). From January through June 1983 TLRS received 13,716 calls resulting in 7023
referrals.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see Referrals Expected to Double as Service Adds W4TS Line, 40 TEX. B.J. 804
(1977).
73. See State Bar Reply, supra note 64, at 1044.
74. Id;see Lawyer Referral Reportfor Month of October, 1977, 41 TEX. B.J. 32 (1978).
75. Clearly, attorneys and competitive pressures are not evenly distributed. While
seven Texas counties have no lawyers at all and 13 have only one each, Harris County has
roughly 11,013 licensed Texas attorneys within its borders (one of the highest concentrations
of attorneys in the country), Miller Interview, supra note 66. In 1970 Harris County had one
attorney for every 319 county residents and in 1977 it had one for every 260 residents. Mun-
neke, 1977,4ttorney Population Statistics, 41 TEX. B.J. 31 (1978). By 1980 Harris County had
approximately 2.5 million persons. Hous. CITY PLANNING COMM'N, HOUSTON-YEAR
2000 11-16 (1980) (Population Projections, Harris County 1970-2000); Nelson, Population
studyfor H-GA4C shows area to grow by 2 million by year 2000, Hous. Post, June 26, 1983, at
B I, col. 1. Thus, Harris County has roughly one attorney for every 227 persons. For per-
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the largest bar group in the Houston area with over 6500 members; 77 the
service is a nonprofit corporation78 with a board comprised in part of rep-
resentatives from smaller, local bar associations. 79 HLRS was established
in 195880 and uses procedures similar but certainly not identical to those of
other services. It advertises through various media and through the Yel-
low Pages, 8 and restricts the fee the participating attorney may receive for
the first one half hour of consultation to no more than fifteen dollars. 82 To
participate an attorney must, of course, be licensed in the state, practice
law on a full-time basis, and maintain an office suitable to receive clients
during normal business hours.83 Additionally, the attorney must maintain
professional liability insurance in a minimum amount of $100,000.84 The
participating attorneys, who number over 450 each year,85 must pay an-
nual dues on a graduated basis according to their years of practice. 86 They
must also contribute varying and graduated amounts to HLRS when they
receive payment for performing legal services for clients referred. 87 These
funds are used to defray the cost of administering the service, which aver-
ages 1700 calls a month.88 HLRS also uses experience panels that are
groups of lawyers who have experience in designated areas of law. 89
spective this can be compared to the range for 1980 among the states where West Virginia
had one attorney for every 833 persons and the District of Columbia had one attorney for
every 224 persons. G. MUNNEKE, OPPORTUNITIES IN LAW CAREERS 131-32 (1981). Many
of these lawyers have followed the national trend toward advertising by attorneys. Moran,
Growing number of attorneys cash in on advertising bonanza, Hous. Chron., Oct. 25, 1981, § 2,
at 15, col. 4. To the extent that competition for clients exacerbates the problems confronted
by lawyer referral services, Houston appears to be a good place to find such problems.
76. See HBA Committee Reports, Hous. LAW., Dec. 1981, at 10, 20.
77. Telephone interview with Regina Feale, Houston Bar Association, June 18, 1983.
78. HLRS, 1982-1983 Application for Renewal of Membership I [hereinafter cited as
HLRS Application].
79. Bylaws of Houston Lawyer Referral Service, Inc., A Nonprofit Corporation § 2.02.
80. Telephone interview with Tricia Horgan, Executive Director, HLRS (June 28, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Horgan Interview].
81. 1d.
82. HLRS Application, supra note 78, at i.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. HLRS, WE CAN HELP (Pam. 1980).
86. HLRS Application, supra note 78, at 1. Houston Bar Association members partici-
pating in the HLRS must pay annual dues to HLRS according to the following schedule:
$50 with less than three years of practice; $75 with three to eight years of practice; and $100
with nine or more years of practice. Id
87. Id If the fee received by the participating attorney is between $0 and $249, only the
initial consultation fee is forwarded by the attorney to HLRS; if the fee is between $250 and
$499, then $20 are sent; $60 are sent if the fee is between $500 and $999; and $110 are sent if
the fee is between $1000 and $4999. Id If $5000 or more have been earned, then the HLRS
receives 10% of the fee in addition to the initial consultation fee. Id
88. Horgan Interview, supra note 80.
89. See HLRS Application, supra note 78, at 1. Experience panels are available in the
areas of child custody, title and boundary disputes, international law, commercial litigation,
bankruptcy-debtors, bankruptcy-creditors, securities, felony, criminal appeals, administra-
tive law-social security, immigration, patent and trademark, copyrights, personal injury, ad-
miralty, workers compensation, tax, will contests, and entertainment, athletics, and the arts.
Id at 5-6. Typical example of experience panel criteria are those for child custody:
Board Certification in Family Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specializa-
tion will qualify an attorney for membership on the Child Custody Experience
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HLRS refers problems in a particular area first to attorneys who comprise
the experience panel for that designated area of law. For example, a child
custody problem will be referred to an attorney who is a member of the
child custody experience panel. TLRS and HLRS both maintain extensive
public information programs involving the use of radio, television, and
brochures.
II. REGULATION OF LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICES
Few, if any, federal or state statutes expressly regulate the overall opera-
tion of a lawyer referral service. 90 Standards and rules that establish pa-
rameters within which lawyer referral services function are essentially
indirect or advisory. The ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral
and Information Service, like its predecessors, promulgates and maintains
standards for lawyer referral services. This committee has for more than
thirty years zealously promoted the concept of lawyer referral services and
the standards through the publication not only of the standards, but also of
periodic bulletins, handbooks, surveys, directories, and reports, as well as
through meetings.91 The standards, though not binding on lawyer referral
services, are influential.
The other source of ABA guidance is quite indirect; it is the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility adopted by the ABA on August 12, 1969,
and amended on several occasions. 92 A majority of the states have
adopted the Model Code though many have modified various parts of it.93
The Model Code is not binding on a state; rather, the state version, as
adopted by either the respective state legislature or state supreme court,
Panel. Otherwise, an applicant must have participated, during his or her ca-
reer, in: (1) three or more trials conducted under the Texas Family Code,
including at least one involving child custody; and (2) two or more contested
show cause hearings.
Id at 5.
90. Cf., e.g., STATE BAR OF CAL., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR A LAWYER REFERRAL
SERVICE IN CALIFORNIA (1982). Rule 2 of the minimum standards states inter alia that
"[a]uthorization" to establish and operate a lawyer referral service shall be granted only on
the basis of a written application and after certain detailed standards have been met. Id.
Rule 2. 1. Though noncomplying services are not prohibited, they may not publish that they
are approved by the State Bar of California. Id. Loss of certification may result in the loss
of tax exempt status. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23734d (West Supp. 1983). Effective
since May 14, 1976, this comprehensive set of minimum standards was promulgated by the
unified State Bar of California and later adopted by the California Supreme Court. Tele-
phone interview with Lyle C. Wing, Lawyer Referral Program, State Bar of California
(Sept. 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Wing Interview].
91. See, e.g., Rubin, Lawyer Referral-The Generation Gap, LAW. REFERRAL BULL.,
Apr. 1970, at 1. The Bulletin was published by the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer
Referral Service. The article describes a project entitled "Target Cities" by which the com-
mittee planned to establish lawyer referral services in certain cities of 100,000 persons or
more where no such service was available. Id.
92. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE]. The Preface provides a brief history of the Model Code.
93. The various state codes of professional responsibility are compiled in A.B.A. NAT'L
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
STATE (1980).
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actually governs an attorney's behavior in a specific jurisdiction.94 The
Model Code is comprised of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Discipli-
nary Rules (DRs).95 None of these expressly bind lawyer referral services;
the disciplinary rules, however, are most significant because should an at-
torney violate a DR, he or she may be subject to disciplinary action that
could entail the loss of the license to practice law.96 For example, an attor-
ney could be disciplined for accepting referrals from a nonbar sponsored
lawyer referral service.97 Thus, Model Code disciplinary rules that define
and circumscribe the activity of attorneys in regard to lawyer referral serv-
ices indirectly impose definite limits on the lawyer referral services within
the jurisdiction governed by those disciplinary rules.
Several questions arise concerning these ABA lawyer referral standards
and the Model Code disciplinary rules. Do they impede or further the
goals of lawyer referral? If they advance the goals, are any other legal
policies infringed in the process? The answers to these questions bear on
the question of whether bar sponsored lawyer referral services should con-
tinue to exist as we know them. These questions are stimulated primarily
by the controversy over bar sponsorship and the concern over the various
fee arrangements administered by lawyer referral services, two areas that
this Article examines closely. While these areas are central sources of ten-
sion, however, they arise in the context of a structured set of standards.
The ABA standards for lawyer referral services, the Model Code provi-
sions, and the recent modifications that have an impact on lawyer referral
services are explored. This examination reveals the inconsistencies and
uncertainties in the rules used to determine how lawyer referral services
should operate.
A. ABA Standards
Several versions of the ABA's standards for lawyer referral services ex-
ist. Of most relevance are the February 1978 Statement 98 and the 1982
proposed Standards,99 which are scheduled for possible ratification by the
94. MODEL CODE n.12 ("The Model Code seeks only to specify conduct for which a
lawyer should be disciplined by courts and governmental agencies which have adopted it.").
95. Id Preamble.
96. Note, Disbarment- Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 489, 495 (1958) ("There is generally no prescribed discipline for any par-
ticular type of improper conduct. The disciplinary measures taken are discretionary with
the courts, which may disbar, suspend, or merely censure the attorney as the nature of the
offense and past indicia of character may warrant.").
97. State Bar of Tex. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 371 (1975), reprinted in
38 TEX. B.J. 461 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Tex. Formal Op. 371].
98. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAW. REFERRAL SERV., STATEMENT OF STANDARDS
AND PRACTICES FOR A LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
STATEMENT].
99. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAW. REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERV., STATE-
MENT OF STANDARDS AND PRACTICES FOR A LAWYER REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERV-
ICE (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS]. These were amended in April
1983 by adding a comment to § 5.2 and making changes in the first and last paragraphs of
§ 8.3 [hereinafter cited as AMENDMENTS TO 1982 STANDARDS].
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ABA House of Delegates in 1984. I°° The 1978 Statement begins with a
four-part statement of the purposes of a lawyer referral service; the first
purpose is, of course, to provide a way for a person to find an able and
interested attorney. 10 The last three parts relate to the goal of informing
the public about the availability of legal services, where to seek such serv-
ices, and general legal information useful to the public.10 2 The 1982 pro-
posed Standards expand upon these purposes. Subpart (a) of section 1. 1 of
those standards states as a goal referral to a qualified lawyer rather than to
just an interested and able lawyer and elaborates on the basis for making
that referral. '0 3 Another stated purpose is referral to appropriate govern-
ment and consumer agencies when that is in the best interest of a client. 0 4
Finally, the 1982 version adds as a purpose the referral of attorneys to
practitioners qualified to advise other lawyers in particular areas. 0 5
The Statement and Standards next enumerate broad policies. Section
1.2 of the 1978 Statement specifies that the service should be sponsored
and supervised by a state or local bar association. '0 6 The disciplinary rules
governing most attorneys indirectly endorse this requirement. 0 7 The 1982
proposed Standards, however, make a fundamental break with the history
of lawyer referral service guidelines by striking the requirement that law-
yer referral services necessarily be sponsored by state or local bar
associations. 10 8
Section 1.5 of the 1978 Statement underscores the need for adequate
funding and expressly describes, as effective means of financing services,
attorney registration fees and the remittance of initial consultation fees.10 9
Section 1.6 emphasizes that the service should be operated for the benefit
of the public."10 Toward that end the Statement specifies that funds re-
ceived by the service should be used to promote and develop the service,
educate the public, improve justice, or support other activities in the public
100. Berg Interview, supra note 11.
101. 1978 STATEMENT § 1.1:
The purposes of a Lawyer Referral Service ... are:
(a) to provide a way in which any person may be referred to a lawyer who
is able to render and interested in rendering needed legal services;
(b) to provide information about lawyers and the availability of legal serv-
ice which will aid in the selection of a lawyer;
(c) to inform the public when and where to seek legal services; and
(d) to provide general and legal information needed by the public.
102. Id § 1.1(b)-(d).
103. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS § 1.1(a) ("to make legal services readily available to
the general public by providing a way in which any person may be referred to a qualified
lawyer on a basis which takes into consideration the person's financial circumstances, spo-
ken language, geographical convenience, and the type and complexity of the legal problem
presented").
104. Id § 1.1(d).
105. Id § 1.1(e).
106. 1978 STATEMENT § 1.2.
107. See infra notes 167, 180, and accompanying text.
108. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS § 1.2.
109. 1978 STATEMENT § 1.5 ("Use of attorney registration fees and remittance of initial
consultation fees to the Service are effective means of financing a Service.").
110. Id. § 1.6.
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interest. ' '
Part II of the 1978 Statement specifies that a plan of organization with
written rules should govern the service and recommends that a committee
be set up to operate the service and that a nonlawyer be a member of that
committee." 12 The 1982 proposed Standards add to section 2.2 a statement
that a majority of the members of the supervising committee should be
licensed in the jurisdiction covered by the service." 13
Part III of the 1978 Statement specifies general requirements for partici-
pation by lawyers. Each service is directed to provide a panel or panels of
lawyers to whom referrals can be made.' 14 Lawyers may be required to
participate in pro bono panels in order to participate in the full fee gener-
ating panels. 15 Naturally, only lawyers in good standing who are licensed
to practice by the jurisdiction in which the service operates may partici-
pate. 16 Participation should not be restricted to the sponsoring bar associ-
ation members, but should be extended to all lawyers practicing in the area
served by the service.' 17 The 1982 proposed Standards do not include this
last requirement, which suggests that the maintenance of an office in the
service area may not be a requirement for participation, though the license
requirement was retained." 18
Part IV of the 1978 Statement details specifications for a directory
and/or registry with information about participating attorneys.I 9 Of spe-
cial interest is section 4.5, which specifies that "[n]o rating of lawyers nor
endorsements or commentary about the listing lawyer's skill shall be per-
mitted or authorized by the Service," though client references may be in-
cluded. 120 This provision is paradoxical because section 5.2 directs the
service to establish panels representing different fields of law whose mem-
bership has experience, special education, or training. 121 Panel member-
ship in a designated field, which connotes specialized qualification, seems
an implicitly higher rating in comparison to membership generally.12 2
Ill. Id. §8.3.
112. 1d. §§ 2.1-.2.
113. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS §§ .2.
114. 1978 STATEMENT § 3.1.
115. Id § 3.3.
116. Id. § 3.4.
117. Id; cf. ABA Formal Op. 291, supra note 25. The opinion states:
The Committee does not deem it proper to lay down any hard and fast
requirements as to whether the panel shall or shall not be confined to mem-
bers of the bar association. In the case of some bar associations such a provi-
sion would be reasonable; in the case of other associations it might not. This
matter is within the reasonable discretion of the bar association ....
118. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS § 3.4.
119. 1978 STATEMENT part IV.
120. Id § 4.5.
121. Id § 5.2.
122. The trend in the profession is toward specialization. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 403 n.13 (1977) ("[Plerhaps the strongest trend in the profession is toward
specialization.") (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At least 10 states
(Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina,
Utah, and Texas) have formal specialization programs. Winter, Say renewed interest in spe-
cialization plans, BAR LEADER, May-June 1982, at 24. See generally 8 ALI-ABA CLE RE-
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Perhaps the authors of the standards did not view panel membership as a
rating or, alternatively, purposely excluded all ratings except for panel
designation. 123
Part V of the 1978 Statement deals with referral panels. Section 5.2, as
stated above, encourages services to establish panels representing different
fields of law and expresses a preference that experience, special education,
or special training be required for participation on such panels.' 24 The
1982 proposed Standards substitute an entirely new paragraph for section
5.2; this new version makes mandatory the establishment of "special quali-
fication panels."' 125 This requirement accords with one of the bar's pri-
mary justifications for the exclusive right to sponsor lawyer referral
services, which is its capacity and commitment to ensure the competence of
the counsel to whom persons are referred.126 The addition in April 1983 of
a lengthy comment to section 5.2 detailing how competence ought to be
determined underscores the importance of this task. 127 Applicants may
VIEW, Nos. 39-44 (1977). The Texas program of specialization commenced in 1975. The
Texas Board of Legal Specialization certifies special competence in such fields as family law,
estate planning and probate law, criminal law, labor law, civil trial, and personal injury.
Recertification is required every five years. See Smith, Beck & Price, The Legal Profession &
the Competency & Availability of Legal Services in 1978, in STATE BAR OF TEX., HOW TO
AVOID THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE TRAP H-l, -20, -26 (1978); Legal Specialization Comes to
Texas, 38 TEX. B.J. 235, 235 (1975).
123. In comparison the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility requires that an ad-
vertising attorney specify whether or not she or he is board certified in any specialty. TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 app., Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, art. XII,
§ 8, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(C) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), as
amended July 21, 1982, by Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and effective Sept. 1, 1982,
reprinted in 45 TEX. B.J. (Sept. 1982).
124. 1978 STATEMENT § 5.2.
125. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS § 5.2. The comment following § 5.2 added in April
1983 stresses the importance of the attorney's being qualified:
The ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral and Information Service
believes that the public has a reasonable expectation that LRIS's will use their
best efforts to match clients with attorneys competent to handle the matters
referred. In order to meet this expectation, LRIS's should refer clients only to
attorneys who have demonstrated to the LRIS that they have the necessary
training, experience and motivation to handle the matter which is to be
referred.
AMENDMENTS TO 1982 STANDARDS § 5.2 comment.
126. Barlow F. Christensen, Senior Research Attorney at the American Bar Foundation,
has challenged the efficacy of using certificates of special competence to determine the suita-
bility of an attorney for a particular client. First, he says, certification often does not go
beyond the minimum level deemed necessary for recognition as a specialist. The absence of
a graduated ranking system coupled with the dearth of specific information on an attorney's
performance make it difficult for a consumer to select an attorney above the minimum com-
petence level. Second, the certification omits other data equally significant to the prospec-
tive client such as fees charged by specific attorneys beyond the initial consultation fee.
Christensen, Toward Improved Legal Service Delivery: A Look at Four Mechanisms, 1979
A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 277, 280-83.
127. AMENDMENTS TO 1982 STANDARDS § 5.2 comment:
In determining whether an attorney is competent to handle a given matter,
consideration should be given to the definition of legal competence employed
by the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Con-
tinuing Professional Education. The ALI-ABA definition provides:
"Legal competence is measured by the extent to which an attorney (1) is
specifically knowledgeable about the fields of law in which he or she prac-
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demonstrate substantial compliance with the criteria by showing
equivalent qualifications.128 Participation in such a panel under the 1982
proposal shall not be based solely upon years of practice, and applicants
shall be allowed to demonstrate substantial compliance with the criteria.
The admonition in section 5.3 of the 1978 Statement implicitly indicates
that one goal of the ABA standards is to increase the referral service clien-
tele beyond the universe of middle class Americans who can make reason-
able payments. That section encourages services to "establish other
separate panels including, but not limited to: a no-fee-to-indigents panel; a
reduced-fee panel . . . ; an in-court referral panel; an inmate assistance
panel; a legal services for the aged panel; and a lawyer-to-lawyer
panel."' 129 This suggestion is not mandatory. In practice many, if not
most, services leave the establishment of these other panels to other bar
association committees.' 30 The 1982 proposed Standards change the ad-
monition in section 5.3 to a requirement that separate panels be estab-
lished. The in-court referral panel and the inmate assistance panel were
struck from the list, however. Both the 1978 and 1982 versions also urge
services to refer potential clients to lawyers within the client's same geo-
graphical vicinity and to accommodate non-English speaking clients.
Section 6.4 of the 1978 Statement addresses the impact of experience
panels on newly admitted attorneys. The ABA committee points out that
"sympathetic consideration should be given to . . .recently admitted and
less experienced attorneys . . . .,,3' The ABA does, however, want refer-
ral services to refer competent attorneys. Toward that end section 6.3 rec-
ommends that each applicant be evaluated for professional qualifications
tices, (2) performs the techniques of such practice with skill, (3) manages
such practice efficiently, (4) identifies issues beyond his or her competence
relevant to the matter undertaken, bringing these to the client's attention,
(5) properly prepares and carries through the matter undertaker, and (6) is
intellectually, emotionally, and physically capable. Legal incompetence is
measured by the extent to which an attorney fails to maintain these
qualities."
In order to accomplish this end, LRIS's should maintain sufficient subject
matter panels and qualification standards for panel members as are necessary
to meet the needs and reasonable expectations of the community served. Nat-
urally, the LRIS's should also maintain a staff sufficiently trained and quali-
fied to make the determinations necessary to make the referrals only to
competent attorneys.
Consideration should also be given to the panel member's experience with
particular kinds of cases within each subject matter panel. For example, by
virtue of a panel member's experience, he or she may be competent to handle
a criminal misdemeanor case and considered incompetent to handle a crimi-
nal felony case. In order to guard against the loss of competency once ob-
tained, consideration should be given to requiring a certain amount of recent
actual experience. Consideration should also be given to requiring recent con-
tinuing legal education courses. In addition, LRIS's should maintain a viable
mechanism through which panel members may be suspended or removed for
failing to handle referred matters appropriately.
128. Id
129. 1978 STATEMENT § 5.3.
130. This practice is followed by the Houston Lawyer Referral Service, Inc.
131. 1978 STATEMENT § 6.4.
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and that mere possession of a license to practice should not necessarily be
deemed sufficient to qualify an attorney for enrollment on a panel.'
32
Part VII of the 1978 Statement deals with procedures of the service.
"[Ejach client-applicant should be interviewed by a lawyer or other trained
interviewer."' 33 The 1982 proposed revisions do not alter this provision
though section 2.8 of that proposal emphasizes that the service should em-
ploy a full-time attorney director.' 34 Section 7.8 of the 1978 Statement
provides that a panel lawyer may not refuse a referred case except for ethi-
cal or personal reasons.' 35 Other sections deal with records and follow-up
procedures. 136
Part VIII of the 1978 Statement discusses operating fees and the use of
proceeds. Generally, the assessment of fees against participating attorneys
are permitted.' 37 The only restraint on this power states that "no Service
may require any fee . . . which is in conflict with statutory or other legal
prohibitions against the award of attorney's fees or which is unreasonable
whether those fees be required of client-applicants, panel members or
both."' 38 Section 8.3 of the 1978 Statement specifies the uses to which the
proceeds from lawyer referrals should be restricted. 139 The 1983 proposed
amendment to section 8.3 adds the admonition that proceeds shall likewise
be used consistent with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.'
40
The implications of this incorporation by reference are not entirely evi-
dent; clearly, however, the contours of permissibility shift with the modifi-
cations of the ABA rules of conduct. Thus, inasmuch as the recently
adopted ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct eliminate the bar
sponsorship requirement, a bar association cannot be faithful to section 8.3
and expend referral proceeds to shut down a competing lawyer referral
service simply because the competitor is not bar sponsored.' 4'
Part IX of the 1978 Statement addresses the issue of publicity and re-
quires that a referral service develop active publicity programs.' 42 Section
9.2 specifies the form and content of any publicity.' 43 Section 9.3 further
132. Id. § 6.3.
133. Id § 7.4.
134. 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS § 2.8.
135. 1978 STATEMENT § 7.8.
136. Id. § 7.9.
137. Id. § 8.1.
138. Id. The test for the reasonableness of such fee or fees is whether it "increases the
client-applicant's cost for legal services beyond that which he or she would normally pay or
decreases the quantity or quality of services which he or she otherwise would have received,
but for the involvement of the Service." Id.
139. Id § 8.3.
140. AMENDMENTS TO 1982 STANDARDS § 8.3.
141. See infra note 166 and accompanying text (new ABA rules); see also infra notes 402-
34 (attempts by bar-related organizations to stymie development of private lawyer referral
services).
142. 1978 STATEMENT § 9.1.
143. Id § 9.2: "The form and content of all publicity regarding the Service must be dig-
nified and consistent with recognized principles of legal ethics within the applicable state or
jurisdiction and shall not be false, deceptive or misleading. All advertising shall identify the
sponsor(s) of the Service."
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states that no publicity shall identify a particular lawyer participating in
the service though an attorney may act as spokesman for the service if so
authorized by the supervisory committee.144
B. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The fate of the various proposals for amending the ABA standards for
lawyer referral will remain unknown until 1984.145 In contrast, the ABA
culminated six years of study and debate over standards of ethical conduct
with the adoption on August 2, 1983, in Atlanta, of new ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. 146 This odyssey began in 1977 when ABA Presi-
dent William B. Spann, Jr., appointed the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards and charged it with assessing anew the problems
and ethics of the profession.147 The Kutak Commission, so called after its
recently deceased chairman, Robert Kutak, issued a Discussion Draft of
the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct in January 1980.148 In
May 1981 the Commission released its Final Draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 149 The ABA House of Delegates debated parts of
the Final Draft in August 1982 in San Francisco and again in Atlanta in
February 1983.150 The House Committee on Drafting and Rules and Cal-
endar, pursuant to direction from the ABA House of Delegates, met and
proposed additional amendments prior to submitting the revised Final
Draft' 15 to the House of Delegates at the August 1983 annual convention
in Atlanta. The ultimate impact of the new ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct will depend on changes in state codes based on the new
model. The adoption of the ABA Model Rules by a majority of the states,
though expected, is by no means automatic; indeed, representatives of the
New York Bar Association, the California State Bar, and the Florida State
Bar opposed adoption of the new ABA Model Rules. 52 In light of the
144. Id § 9.3.
145. The 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS were withdrawn from consideration at the ABA
midyear conference in February 1983. ABA SUMMARY ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 4 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA SUMMARY]. All proposals for modifying the
lawyer referral standards will be considered in 1984. Berg Interview, supra note 12.
146. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA
MODEL RULES], reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1-27 (1983). For a report on the vote adopting the
Rules, see Taylor, Bar Group Adopts Model Ethics Code, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1983, at Yl,
col. 1.
147. Chairman's Introduction, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Proposed Final
Draft, May 31, 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT].
148. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter
cited as DISCUSSION DRAFT].
149. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 147.
150. See ABA SUMMARY, supra note 145, at 3; Memorandum to Members of the House
of Delegates, Section and Committee Chairmen, and Other Interested Parties from L. Stan-
ley Chauvin Jr., June 1, 1983).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft revisions, June
1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as REVISED FINAL DRAFT].
152. See Slonim, Kutak commission ethics draft draws earlyfire, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr.
1980, at 2, 3 (quoting Massachusetts Bar official: "'The days are over when the ABA pon-
tificates and everybody blindly accepts.' "); ABA delegates approve new model ethics code,
Hous. Post, Aug. 3, 1983, at A3, col. 3 (New York Bar Association representative remarked:
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prospect for diversity in the foreseeable future and the historic influence of
the Model Code in effect prior to the August 2, 1983, vote, this Article
explores the Model Code as well as the various proposals for its modifica-
tion, including those incorporated into the new ABA Model Rules.
The Model Code addresses the issue of lawyer referral services under
Ethical Consideration 2-15 I53 and DR 2-103. Section (C) of DR 2-103
prohibits a lawyer from requesting an organization or person to recom-
mend him as a private practitioner unless the service is sponsored, ap-
proved, or operated by a bar association. 154 Section (D) complements this
section by specifying that a lawyer "may be recommended, employed or
paid by, or may cooperate with" organizations promoting the use of his
services including "[a] lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or ap-
proved by a bar association."' 155 The Model Code, after which so many
"'What we've done today is destroy the national consensus that existed .... Adoption by
the states may not be easy ... there will be no rubber stamp,' .
153. MODEL CODE EC 2-15:
The legal profession has developed lawyer referral systems designed to aid
individuals who are able to pay fees but need assistance in locating lawyers
competent to handle their particular problems. Use of the lawyer referral sys-
tem enables a layman to avoid an uninformed selection of a lawyer because
such a system makes possible the employment of competent lawyers who have
indicated an interest in the subject matter involved. Lawyers should support
the principle of lawyer referral systems and should encourage the evolution of
other ethical plans which aid in the selection of qualified counsel.
(Emphasis added.)
154. MODEL CODE DR 2-103(C)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not request a person or
organization to recommend or promote the use of his services. . . except that (1) He may
request referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association and may pay its fees incident thereto." A bar association may require participat-
ing attorneys to assist in the financing of the service either through a flat fee or by a sliding
scale charge based on the fees derived by the attorneys from the cases referred. ABA For-
mal Op. 291, supra note 25.
The earlier version of DR 2-103(C) modified the term bar association: "He may request
referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar associa-
tion representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists
and may pay its fees incident thereto." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-103(C)(1) (1974) (emphasis added). The corresponding definition of "a bar associa-
tion representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association ex-
ists" was:
[A] bar association, the membership of which is open to any lawyer in good
standing in the geographical area and which has a membership at least equal
to the lesser of three hundred members or twenty percent of the lawyers li-
censed to practice in the geographical area. A bar association of specialists as
referred to in DR 2-105(A)(1) or (4) is a "bar association representative of the
general bar" even though it does not meet the test of the preceding sentence.
Id. at Definitions (7).
Notwithstanding this language there is no DR 2-105(A)(4) in the 1980 Model Code. For-
mer DR 2-105(A)(1) authorized the patent, trademark, and admiralty specialty designations
while subsection (A)(4) restricted the manner in which an attorney could hold himself out as
a specialist to rules prescribed by the state jurisdictional authority certifying the specialty.
Compare id at Definitions (7); with id. at Definitions (9): " 'Lawyers representative of the
general bar of the geographical area in which the plan is offered' are lawyers in good stand-
ing numbering not less than the greater of three hundred or twenty percent of those licensed
to practice in the geographical area." The new ABA Model Rules supra note 146 do not
have a definition of bar association since bar sponsorship is not required.
155. MODEL CODE DR 2-103(D).
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state codes are patterned, seems to endorse attorney involvement and par-
ticipation in bar sponsored lawyer referral services, and thus is consistent
with the 1978 version of the ABA standards of lawyer referral services and
many state bar codes. 156 The Model Code, however, also authorizes serv-
ices "operated" or "approved" by a bar association. 157 Theoretically,
under DR 2-103(C) and (D) a lawyer could participate in a referral service
operated by private persons if it were approved by a bar association. The
only major impediment to this conclusion seems to be the prohibition
against sharing fees with nonlawyers; 58 the conflict could be resolved,
however, by operating the service so that no fees are paid by the client to
the service. In particular, the practice of remitting to the referral service
all or part of the initial consultation fee could be eliminated. The pro-
posed modifications under the Final Draft are interesting in that so very
little is said specifically about lawyer referral services. Ironically, given the
acknowledgement by the Kutak Commission that the need of middle in-
come people who are less experienced in the use of legal services is acute,
the modifications under the Final Draft address lawyer referral services
only briefly. 159
Rule 9.2 of the 1980 Discussion Draft deals with advertising. The com-
ments specifically state that "[a] lawyer should be allowed to pay for ad-
vertising permitted by this Rule; for example, media charges or the cost of
participating in a lawyer referral service."' 160 Rule 9.3 of the Discussion
Draft deals with solicitation and provides that a lawyer may initiate con-
tact with a prospective client under the auspices of, inter alia, "a public or
charitable legal services organization .. . or trade organization whose
purposes include. . . recommending legal services." 161 Thus the payment
of fees to a lawyer referral service as well as a lawyer's participation in a
referral service seems authorized, although the lawyer's participation in a
commercial for-profit type of referral service seems indirectly proscribed.
The Final Draft is even less instructive because the term lawyer referral
service is not used at all. The lawyer's participation in a private or nonbar
sponsored lawyer referral service is endorsed by the elimination of the
prior language from the Model Code that expressly limited lawyer partici-
pation in lawyer referral services to those that are bar sponsored, operated,
or approved.162 Another commentator has also reached this conclusion.163
On the question of allowing attorneys to pay services to recommend them,
the Final Draft comment no longer tracks that in the earlier Discussion
Draft. Whereas the Discussion Draft comment expressly mentioned law-
156. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
157. See MODEL CODE DR 2-103(D)(3).
158. Id. DR 3-102(A).
159. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2 comment.
160. DISCUSSION DRAFT rule 9.2.
161. Id rule 9.3.
162. Compare MODEL CODE DR 2-103(C)-(D); with PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2;
and ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2.
163. Podgers, supra note 10, at 3.
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yer referral services, the Final Draft comment does not. 164 The change
from the Discussion Draft is not explained. Rule 7.2(c) of the Final Draft
states that "[a] lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for rec-
ommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reason-
able cost of advertising .... ,16- To the extent that fees paid by a lawyer
to a lawyer referral service represent the cost of advertising, they are of
course permitted under the Final Draft. The difference in language be-
tween the Discussion Draft and the Final Draft on this point can be
viewed as a simple stylistic editing change rather than a substantive modi-
fication since the change is nowhere explained. The revised Final Draft as
submitted and ultimately adopted as the new ABA Model Rules by the
ABA House of Delegates directly confronts the issues of fees, augmenting
rule 7.2 with language stating that a lawyer may pay the usual charges of a
"not-for-profit lawyer referral."' 166 This modification obviates the need for
subtle interpretations necessitated by the vagueness of the Discussion and
Final Drafts. Fee payments are clearly authorized, but only to noncom-
mercial lawyer referral services. Accordingly, private lawyer referral serv-
ices that are not bar sponsored are sanctioned by the new ABA Model
Rules if such services operate on a not-for-profit basis.
C State Rules on Lawyer Referral- A Focus on Texas
The key provisions concerning lawyer referral services are generally set
forth under DR 2-103 of the respective state disciplinary rules. With the
exception of the codes of Maryland and California the state codes of pro-
fessional responsibility require bar sponsorship of lawyer referral serv-
ices.167 DR 2-103(B) has long carried a prohibition against the giving of
compensation by a lawyer to anyone for the procurement of clients.168 An
express exemption authorizing the attorney to pay fees or dues incident to
the operation of a lawyer referral service exists in practically every state
code. 169
164. See DISCUSSION DRAFT rule 9.2 comment:
A lawyer is permitted to pay for advertising by this Rule [7.2 of PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFT], but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for chan-
neling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or
person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's
services. Thus, a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may pay to
advertise legal services provided under its auspices.
165. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2(c).
166. REVISED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2 comment; ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2 comment.
167. A typical provision is the Texas version quoted infra note 180. For the Maryland
exception, see MD. ANN. CODE VOL. 9C, app. F (Supp. 1983). In California bar sponsorship
is encouraged but not required. See supra note 90.
168. MODEL CODE DR 2-103(B).
169. An example is the newly revised Virginia Code, which under DR 2-103(D) states
that "[a] lawyer ... may pay . . . the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer
referral service .... " See Revised Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-
103(D), reprinted in 31 VA. BAR NEWS, June 1983, at 36. The effective date of the revised
Code is Oct. 1, 1983; there are significant differences between it and the PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT. The Codes of Professional Responsibility of Texas, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, and Nevada do not expressly provide that a lawyer may pay fees to a lawyer referral
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The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility 170 amply illustrates regu-
latory confusion and inconsistency when its rules are compared to those
already explored. Following the 1977 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 17 1 de-
cision, which held unconstitutional state prohibitions on certain forms of
advertising, 72 Texas Code disciplinary rules DR 2-101 and 2-102 on law-
yer advertising were suspended, 173 and confusion reigned. 174 In June 1978
and April 1980 the state bar held referendums on proposed amendments to
the disciplinary rules relating to advertising. 175 Although the majority of
those bar members voting accepted the proposals, they failed to pass be-
cause less than fifty-one percent of the registered membership voted. 176
The Texas Supreme Court, in the exercise of its inherent and statutory
power over Texas attorneys, 177 issued an order on July 21, 1982, to resolve
service. This does not mean that the payment of fees is prohibited in those states. For
example, rule 2-103(d) of the Illinois Code prohibits a lawyer from giving anything of value
to a person to solicit a prospective client. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, rule 2-103(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1983). Illinois rule 2-103(b) permits a lawyer to "initiate contact with a prospective
client . . . under the auspices of. . . a bonafide . . . charitable . . . organization whose
purposes include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services." Id rule
2-103(b). The phrase "under the auspices" could encompass the paying of usual fees of such
a charitable organization to defray its expenses.
Though usually found under DR 2-103(B), the express language in some state codes is
found in other sections. The Codes of the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming contain the language in DR 2-103(C). Minnesota and Alabama have in-
stalled the language in DR 2-104, and Maine has it in DR 3.9(F)(2).
170. The current nine canons and the accompanying disciplinary rules were promulgated
by the Texas Supreme Court by Order dated Dec. 20, 1971, and are located at TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 app., Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, art. XII, § 8
(Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1982-1983) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS CODE]. Prior to that time
attorney conduct was measured by 43 canons. See Zunker, Introduction to the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 46 TEX. B.J. 90 (1983); see also Jones, The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. the Texanization of the ABA Code, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 689 (1972); Smith, The
Texas Canons of Ethics Revisited, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 183, 188-90 (1966).
171. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
172. Id. at 357.
173. See Order of the Texas Supreme Court (Dec. 13, 1978); see also Zunker, Lawyer
Advertising, Solicitation and Trade Names Since Bates, 43 TEX. B.J. 321, 321 (1980).
174. "Now, we have no rule in Texas. Right at the moment we have no advertising
guidelines, so it's going strictly on a case by case basis." Transcript of Temporary Injunction
Hearing at 150-51, Houston Lawyer Referral Service v. Clevenger, No. 81-52951 (133rd
Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas Dec. 9, 1981) (statement of Judge Hittner).
175. The Texas Supreme Court ordered the State Bar to study the issue and the State Bar
Board of Directors recommended that a referendum be held. See, e.g., Shelton, Lawyer
Advertising, Second Chapter, 41 TEX. B.J. 9 (1978); Advertising Guidelines Referendum Set,
43 TEX. B.J. 221 (1980); The Advertising Guidelines.- To Be Or Not To Be?, 43 TEX. B.J. 318
(1980) [hereinafter cited as To Be Or Not To Be?]. The State Bar Act specifies the proce-
dures for referenda. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983).
176. See, e.g., Advertising Referendum Fails, 43 TEX. B.J. 689 (1980); Rule Changes Are
Preferred but Referendum Invalid, 41 TEX. B.J. 760 (1978). Section 8(b) of the State Bar Act
states in part that "no election shall be valid unless a minimum of 51 percent of the members
registered shall have voted at the election at which the rules, regulations and amendments
are adopted." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
177. The State Bar Act contains the grant by the Texas Legislature of the power to pro-
mulgate disciplinary rules governing the professional conduct of attorneys. Id § 8(a). Sec-
tion 2 specifies that this legislation "is in aid of the judicial department's powers under the
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the confusion and uncertainty regarding advertising and solicitation. 178
That order repealed DR 2-101 through DR 2-105 and reorganized the sub-
stitute provisions into DR 2-101 through DR 2-104.179
The former Texas Code DR 2-103(D) is almost identical to its Model
Code counterpart; both authorize an attorney to cooperate with a bar
sponsored lawyer referral service as long as there is no interference with
the lawyer's independent professional judgment. The new Texas discipli-
nary rules were promulgated after the Discussion Draft and Final Draft of
proposed modifications to the ABA Model Code became available, and
after the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral and Information
Service had voted in early 1982 to eliminate the requirement that lawyer
referral services be bar sponsored. Nonetheless, the new Texas Code DR
2-103(E) specifies that a lawyer may cooperate only with a lawyer referral
service that is sponsored, operated, or approved by a bar association. 180
Because this change occurred so recently the Texas Code will probably
retain the rule for some time to come even though the new ABA Model
Rules eliminate the bar sponsorship requirement.' 18
The revised Final Draft and the new ABA Model Rules limit sponsor-
ship of lawyer referral services to not-for-profit entities. 182 The Texas rules
contain no such express restriction. The language of the relevant discipli-
nary rules are open to the interpretation that an appropriate bar associa-
tion could approve a for-profit lawyer referral service. This construction is
inconsistent with and logically precluded by two opinions of the Texas
State Bar Ethics Committee that mandate that lawyer referral services op-
erate in the public interest rather than to enhance the employment of a
group of attorneys.183
constitution to regulate the practice of law and not to the exclusion of those powers." Id
§ 2. The inherent power of courts to discipline attorneys never seems to have been ques-
tioned. L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.03
(1982); L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 33-36 (1971).
178. Order of the Supreme Court of Texas (July 21, 1982), reprinted in 45 TEX. B.J. (Sept.
1982).
179. Id.
180. "A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person ... that recommends. . . the use of
his services . . . .However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal services
activities of. . .(3) a lawyer referral service operated sponsored, or approved by a bar associ-
ation representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association
exists." TEXAS CODE DR 2-103(E)(3) (as amended 1982) (emphasis added).
181. The 1978 Statement of Standards and Practices for a lawyer referral service also
requires bar sponsorship of lawyer referral services. 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 2.1.
As stated in the resolution of the Texas Lawyer Referral Service Committee announcing
compliance with the 1978 STATEMENT: "[On] May 2, 1981, the Board of Directors of the
State Bar of Texas directed its Lawyer Referral Service Committee to implement as rapidly
as possible, applicable provisions of the ABA's 1978 Statement of Standards and Practices,
which are pertinent to the operation of a state-wide Lawyer Referral Service ...." State
Bar of Tex. Lawyer Referral Serv. Comm. Resolution on Lawyer Referral Services 1 (Oct.
13, 1982); see Huffman, Lawyer Referral Service, State Bar Committee Annual Reports, 46
TEX. B.J. 865 (1983).
182. ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2.
183. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97; State Bar of Tex. Comm. on Interpretation of
the Canons of Ethics, Formal Op. 205 (1960), reprinted in 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 292 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Tex. Formal Op. 205].
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Considerable confusion also exists concerning the question of fees. The
Model Code specifically authorizes payment of fees to lawyer referral serv-
ices under DR 2-103(C); 1 84 the proposed Final Draft is much more ambig-
uous on that point, however, having eliminated from the Discussion Draft
commentary authorizing such fees. The Final Draft's rule 7.2(c) states that
"a lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending
the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of
advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule."', 85 In con-
trast, the former Texas Code DR 2-103(C) clearly and expressly authorizes
the paying of fees to lawyer referral services.' 8 6 Moreover, the amendment
to DR 2-103(C) proposed by the state bar and subjected to a referendum in
April 1980 also contained language about paying fees. 187 The Texas Law-
yer Referral Service (TLRS) operated by the State Bar of Texas tradition-
ally charges fees to attorneys. 188 Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court,
in issuing new disciplinary rules in 1982 concerning advertising and solici-
tation, ignored the TLRS practice as well as the State Bar's proposal and
eliminated the language authorizing fee payment while retaining the pro-
hibition against a lawyer giving anything of value to a person or organiza-
tion for recommending his employment to a client.'8 9 Thus both the Final
Draft rule 7.2 and the new Texas Code DR 2-103(C) omit language ex-
pressly authorizing the payment of fees to a lawyer referral service by a
lawyer. Under normal rules of statutory construction' 90 the result of the
elimination of that express provision by the Texas Supreme Court is that
Texas lawyers are prohibited from paying such fees, unless those fees are
considered costs for advertising in the public media.
184. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
185. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2(c). The discussion draft provided by way of com-
ment that: "A lawyer should be allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this rule, for
example, media charges or the cost of participating in a lawyer referral service." Discus-
SION DRAFT rule 9.2 comment.
186. A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend employ-
ment ... except that he may request referrals from a lawyer referral service
operated, sponsored or approved by a bar association representative of the
general bar of the geographical area in which it is located and maypay its fees
incident thereto.
TEXAS CODE DR 2-103(C) (Vernon 1973) (repealed 1982) (emphasis added).
187. The proposed Texas DR 2-103(C) tracked the language of the former Texas DR 2-
103(C). See Application of the State Bar of Texas for Referendum (Dec. 15-16, 1978), re-
printed in To Be Or Not To Be, supra note 175, at 320.
188. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
189. TEXAS CODE DR 2-103(C) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), which states:
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organi-
zation to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward for
having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client; ex-
cept that a lawyer may advertise in the public media within the limits of DR
2-101, so long as the advertising communication does not take place in person
or by telephone.
190. IA C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.13, at 238 (4th ed.);
accord Luse v. City of Dallas, 131 S.W.2d 1079, 1084 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ
refd) (portions "of the original act that are omitted from the new legislation are to be con-
sidered annulled," even though not repugnant to or inconsistent in their provisions with the
new enactment).
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Nowhere does the Texas Supreme Court explain its rationale for omit-
ting the reference to fees for lawyer referral services. One explanation for
the omission is simple inadvertence, since the court reworded DR 2-103(C)
so extensively. It is difficult to believe, however, that after expending so
much effort in amending the disciplinary rules, the Texas Supreme Court
was careless about the terms of its order. The supreme court may have
considered language about fees superfluous since lawyers are expressly au-
thorized to cooperate with bar sponsored referral services, and all such
services, including the State Bar's own lawyer referral service, impose a
fee. 191 Additionally, the Final Draft containing proposed modifications to
the Model Code is similarly silent on the attorney's right to pay fees, and
the Texas Supreme Court, in possible anticipation of its adoption by the
ABA, might have purposely chosen language more compatible with the
Final Draft. Ironically, subsequent to the Texas Supreme Court's order of
July 1982, rule 7.2 of the Final Draft was revised to expressly authorize the
payment of usual charges of a "not-for-profit lawyer referral service;" the
ABA ultimately adopted the revised version in its new Model Rules. 192
A key distinction between the Texas Code's former and current provi-
sions and the Model Code and its recent proposed modifications is that
whenever the Texas Code uses the term "bar association" in reference to
lawyer referral services that term is modified by the phrase "representative
of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists."
As noted, prior to 1975 the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity contained similar language. 93 Currently, approximately eighteen state
codes of professional responsibility modify the term "bar association" with
the requirement that it be representative of the general bar of the geo-
graphical area in which the association exists. 194 This requirement further
circumscribes the kind of organization that can sponsor a lawyer referral
association. Therefore the Texas Code is more restrictive than the Model
Code, the Final Draft, and the new ABA Model Rules.
The definitions section of the Texas Code sheds little light on the mean-
ing of the phrase "representative of the general bar of the geographical
area in which the association exists." The Texas Standing Committee on
Ethics made a weak attempt at illuminating the concept in 1975. In inter-
preting the phrase, the committee declined to lay down any hard and fast
rules as to geographical boundaries, number of members, or percentages of
191. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
192. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2(c); ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2(c).
193. See supra note 154.
194. These states include Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Missouri's Code is a little
ambiguous on this point. Missouri Code DR 2-103(C) states that a lawyer may request
referral from a lawyer referral service sponsored by a "bar association." Supreme Court
Rule 4, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-103(C)(1), reprinted in MISSOURI RULES
OF COURT (14th ed. 1983). Missouri Code DR 2-103(D) states that a lawyer may be recom-
mended by a lawyer referral service sponsored by a "bar association representative of the
general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists." Id. DR 2-
103(D)(l)(d).
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the general bar. 195 The committee did offer some general guidelines. The
appropriate bar (1) should not operate to increase the employment of any
particular group of attorneys, (2) may be based on city, county, or metro-
politan boundary lines, (3) would be larger than a small, limited group of
lawyers, and (4) would be open to lawyers in all fields of practice and not
just to attorneys practicing a certain specialty.196 The committee cites an
earlier 1960 formal opinion that, in addressing the issue of the propriety of
organizing a bar association without state bar approval, asserts that "if the
entire purpose of organizing a local group is to operate the referral plan
above referred to, in the manner stated, then such a bar group has been
organized for an improper purpose."' 197 Consequently, a proper bar asso-
ciation should be more than just a lawyer referral service.
The application of this definition would tend to require that only one
lawyer referral service operate in a given area. 198 This interpretation is
consistent with the factual situation in Texas, where the lawyer referral
service sponsored by the State Bar of Texas does not operate where there
are local lawyer referral services. 199 This interpretation is, however, con-
trary to the practice in many other states.200 Moreover, the prohibition
against sponsorship by specialty bar associations espoused in Texas Ethics
Committee Opinion 371 contributes to the seemingly ineluctable drift to-
ward one lawyer referral service per geographical area, a result that aggra-
vates antitrust concerns. This interpretation can be challenged inasmuch
as the definitions section of the Texas Code in existence at the time that
opinion was rendered, which still exists in the same form, specifies that a
bar association representative of the general bar embraces a bar associa-
tion of specialists. 20  Accordingly, a specialty bar arguably should be al-
lowed to sponsor a lawyer referral service notwithstanding this opinion.
This proposition does not mean, however, that the specialty bar could limit
its referrals to its specialty area or that it could prohibit nonspecialists from
participating in the service; these are questions separate from that of
whether the specialty bar could establish a lawyer referral service that op-
erates in a more representative fashion according to the strictures of Texas
Formal Opinion 371.
D. Tax Rulings
Obviously, operation of a lawyer referral service requires money. The
level of funding for such services is a concern of the ABA Standing Com-
195. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97.
196. Id.
197. Tex. Formal Op. 205, supra note 183.
198. Indeed, the introductory synopsis to the opinion states: "It is improper for a group
of attorneys to organize a bar association and establish a referral service for its members
only, particularly when an existing referral plan is already operating in the area . I..." d
199. See State Bar Reply, supra note 64, at 1044; supra note 79 and accompanying text.
200. See Podgers, State LRS may expand into local area, BAR LEADER, May-June 198 1,
at 4.
201. TEXAS CODE, Definitions.
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mittee on Lawyer Referral Service.202 Lawyer referral services use various
means to finance their operations. Three prevalent sources of funds are
(1) the registration fees or dues paid by participating attorneys, (2) for-
warding fees paid by attorneys to the service calculated as a percentage of
the fees lawyers charge clients referred to them by the lawyer referral serv-
ice, and (3) the fixed initial consultation fee, which is partially or totally
returned to the lawyer referral service.
The registration fee is perhaps the least controversial source and is sanc-
tioned by the ABA Committee on Ethics 20 3 and the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Lawyer Referral and Information Service. 2°4 Approximately
forty state and local bar associations require percentage payments from
participating attorneys as a condition of referral service membership.
205
Though the ABA endorses the percentage forwarding fees, 20 6 the practice
is receiving increased scrutiny.20 7 In August 1979 the Internal Revenue
Service ruled in a case involving forwarding fees received by the San Di-
ego Bar Association that such income is taxable as unrelated business in-
come.20 8 The association received ten percent of all fees after the initial
consultation fee collected by the participating attorneys that exceeded $100
but were less than $5000. The money was used to defray the expenses
incurred in operating the referral service. 209 Nonetheless, the IRS rea-
soned that the forwarding fees were not directly related to the referral serv-
ice's purpose of making legal services available to individuals who do not
have or know a lawyer in their immediate community.210 The impact of
202. Report of the Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral Service, reprinted in 102
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 653 (1977).
203. ABA Formal Op. 291, supra note 25; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 227 (1941).
204. See 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 8.1; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note
99, § 8.1; HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 29.
205. Winter, Fee sharing, client contacts raise LRS ethical concerns, BAR LEADER, May-
June 1982, at 5.
206. HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 30 ("[Slome services charge a forwarding fee, ranging
from 10% to 25%, of the fee collected by the attorney."); 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98,
§ 8.1; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 99, § 8.1; ABA Formal Op. 291, supra note
25.
207. See Winter, supra note 205, at 5-6.
208. Private Ltr. Rul. 7952002; Podgers, IRS ruling called threat to LRSprograms, BAR
LEADER, July-Aug. 1980, at 2. The IRS concluded that the income of the bar association
from the lawyer referral annual registration fees and the initial consultation fees is income
substantially related to the association's exempt purpose of ensuring that the community
receives competent legal services, regardless of the ability of the individuals to pay. Private
Ltr. Rul. 7952002. That bar association was exempt under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which provides for the exemption from federal income tax of business leagues not
operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. 1d; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1976). Note that under
§ 6110()(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, private rulings "may not be used or cited as
precedent." I.R.C. § 61106)(3) (1976).
209. Private Ltr. Rul. 7952002; cf Podgers, supra note 208, at 2 (portion of funds were
used on bar association services other than lawyer referral).
210. See Private Ltr. Rul. 7952002:
[Any relationship that develops between the participating attorney and the
client subsequent to the initial consultation is a business relationship for the
private benefit of the attorney and the client. [The bar association] is not in-
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this ruling, if applied to the finances of all lawyer referral programs, would
be substantial. Lawyer referral services can ill-afford to lose money at a
time when the almost mandatory use of computers 21 I and increased adver-
tising212 are driving office overhead skyward.
As a partial solution to the problem, the State of California enacted a
law exempting bar associations from paying state taxes on forwarding fees
that lawyers pay to lawyer referral services.213 The law grants the exemp-
tion only to referral services complying with the California lawyer referral
service standards. 214 Additional cause for hope can be gleaned from a
recent Tax Court case, Kentucky Bar Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner. 21 5
An organization may qualify for exemption under sections 501(a) and
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if it is operated exclusively for one
or more of the exempt purposes enumerated in section 501(c)(3). 216 The
Kentucky Bar Association filed an application for recognition of the ex-
emption under section 501(c)(3). The Internal Revenue Service issued a
final adverse determination and denied the petitioner's exempt status on
the ground that the petitioner was not operated exclusively for exempt pur-
poses within the meaning of section 501(c)(3). The issue before the court
narrowed to whether any of several activities, one of which was the lawyer
referral service, served a nonexempt purpose so as to forfeit the requested
exemption. The court stated that where activities further both exempt and
nonexempt purposes the exemption will not be denied if the nonexempt
volved with this continuing attorney-client relationship. And, this continuing
relationship does not contribute importantly to the exempt purpose of [the bar
association], as the referral and initial consultation do.
The relationship of the forwarding fee to the association's exempt referral purpose is even
more attenuated when some of the money is used to finance other bar programs as was the
case in San Diego. Podgers, supra note 208, at 2 (statements by Edward Huntington, then
vice president of the San Diego bar).
211. See, e.g., Podgers, Denver LRS computerfrees up 'human time', BAR LEADER, Nov.-
Dec. 1980, at 8.
212. Podgers, California bar helps locals with LRS ads, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at
10.
213. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23734d (West Supp. 1983); Podgers, Law takes bar off
LRS state tax hook, BAR LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 8; see also Podgers, Law brings stricter
LRS enforcement ofstandards, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 5 (law only exempts serv-
ices that comply with California Bar standards).
214. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23734d (West Supp. 1983).
215. 78 T.C. 921 (1982).
216. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1983). A corporation or foundation is exempt from
taxation if it is organized and operated:
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of ath-
letic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (ex-
cept as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
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purposes are insubstantial. 217 In connection with the lawyer referral serv-
ice the IRS argued that promoting, protecting, and enhancing the legal
profession served a substantial nonexempt purpose. The court disagreed
and described the objectives and operation of the referral service. They
were typical of most services, except that the recitation omitted any
description of payment of contingent fees or percentage forwarding fees,
though attorneys did pay registration fees and initial consultation fees. In
summary, said the court, the operation "serves a genuinely charitable pur-
pose. '2 18 The court held "any nonexempt purpose served by the referral
service and any occasional economic benefit flowing to individual attor-
neys through a referral incidental to the broad charitable purpose
served. ' 219 The Tax Court relied in part on the Eighth Circuit opinion in
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States,220 which held that the inciden-
tal benefit flowing on occasion to a participating attorney did not vitiate
the genuinely charitable nature of the referral service or the bar associa-
tion.221 The opinion in that case gave no clue, however, as to whether
percentage fees were paid by participating attorneys. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals did acknowledge the registration fees and the initial con-
sultation fees, but also noted that the association made no profit from the
referral service and that expenses exceeded fees collected. 222
E Application of Lawyer Referral Rules and Standards
The somewhat bewildering array of paradoxical regulations and guide-
lines concerning lawyer referral services operates to limit the effectiveness
of those regulations in furthering the goal of matching prospective clients
with able attorneys. Weak enforcement of the existing regulations may be
an even greater impediment. In Texas, bar sponsorship clearly must exist
before an attorney may cooperate with a lawyer referral service, though
the imprecise definition of bar association could lead even a conscientious
public-service-oriented attorney to violate a disciplinary rule. State bar
217. 78 T.C. at 923 (citing Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945);
Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1951); Ohio Teamsters Trust Fund v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 189, 196 (1981); Professional Standards Review v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
240 (1980)).
218. 78 T.C. at 925.
219. Id at 926.
220. 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967).
221. Id. at 435. The court stated:
Here, again, there well may be incidental benefit flowing on occasion to a
lawyer on the referral panel. This, however, is but a minimal consequence of
broad public service performed in what is essentially an eleemosynary en-
deavor. By this means, persons with real or imaginary legal problems who
otherwise, for one reason or another, would not seek or obtain legal help find
assistance and answers. It is hardly a great untapped source of profitable legal
business. We think the government overemphasizes the incidental economic
benefits and unjustifiably would taint with an accusation of commercialism
legal activity which is dedicated to the public good.
Id.
222. Id. at 434.
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disciplinary machinery typically lacks adequate investigative resources. 223
Any such alleged violation would be addressed not through charges
against the lawyer referral service itself, but through grievance charges
against the attorney for violating a disciplinary rule. Since grievance com-
mittees deal with one attorney at a time, their procedures are inherently
inadequate to police the multi-lawyer organization. The well-publicized
ineffectiveness of the Texas grievance mechanism 224 adds to the fearless-
ness exhibited by those who would flout the disciplinary rules or proceed
with reckless disregard. The deficiencies include a tradition of both huge
backlogs and disorganization, though some recent efforts to aid the situa-
tion have been initiated.225 Although the State Bar of Texas Standing
Committee on Lawyer Referral is aware of the unsettled world of lawyer
referral services and has grappled with some of the issues, no solutions
have been found.226 The Texas State Bar, like so many others, proceeds
cautiously and is reluctant to enforce its bar sponsorship requirement be-
cause of antitrust concerns.227 Similarly, the president of the New Mexico
Bar Association recently expressed fear that by enforcing ethical prohibi-
tions against attorneys who participate in private referral services his bar
association would be exposed to suit under an antitrust theory. 228 In this
atmosphere of unrestrained permissiveness a variety of lawyer referral
services have sprouted, some private and some organized and functioning
in ways seemingly inconsistent with existing rules and standards for lawyer
referral services. A critical examination of these entities may aid in assess-
ing the effectiveness of guidelines in fulfilling the purposes of lawyer
referral.
223. ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.3 comment.
224. See Perry, Flaws in Texas' system to punish lawyers cited, Hous. Post, Mar. 6, 1983,
at IA, col. 2 ("The Texas Sunset Advisory Commission urged reform in 1978, and even
officials of the American Bar Association now say Texas' system for policing lawyers per-
petuates misconduct by its ineffectiveness."); see also Winter, Texas bar heating up discipline
kettle again, BAR LEADER, July-Aug. 1983, at 10 (problems in Texas grievance system);
Experts urge revamping of state legalgrievance system, Hous. Post, Mar. 6, 1983, at 2A, col. I(recommendations for change); Grievance office alters handling of complaints, Hous. Post,
Mar. 6, 1983, at 2A, col. 2 (changes in handling of complaints).
225. See Burleson, Loss of Local Control- Centralization of Grievance Prosecution, 46
TEX. B.J. 1386 (1983); Chavez & Fleming, We Can Afford the Changes, But We Can't Afford
Avoiding Change, 46 TEX. B.J. 1388 (1983); Lochridge, Improvement of Disciplinary Proce-
dures, 46 TEX. B.J. 859 (1983); Grievance office alters handling of complaints, supra note 224,
at 2A, col. 2. On May 25, 1983, the State Bar of Texas Board of Directors adopted a pro-
posed amendment to the state bar rules that would substantially alter disciplinary proce-
dures in the state. Some of the innovations include: (1) a procedure whereby a trial court
may temporarily suspend a license of an attorney pending the trial of a disciplinary lawsuit;(2) authorization for the appointment of a custodian who will function like a receiver in
instances when a lawyer simply leaves unfinished client business; (3) a requirement that
disbarred and/or suspended lawyers immediately notify their clients of their loss of the right
to practice; and (4) the power of the courts and grievance committees to include curative as
well as punitive matters in their judgments. See Lochridge, supra; Zunker, Proposed Article
X of the State Bar Rules.- An Analysis and Commentary, 46 TEX. B.J. 1275 (1983).
226. See infra note 258.
227. Conference with Jerry Zunker, General Counsel, State Bar of Texas (May 10, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Zunker Conference].
228. See Quade, Referral Burn, 69 A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1983).
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1. Small Firms and the Use of Trade Names. One may classify as a
group small firms and solo practitioners who have adopted a trade name
and advertised it in the Yellow Pages telephone directory and elsewhere
under the heading of lawyer referral services. The use of a trade name
obfuscates the fact that the referral organization is in reality an advertising
device for a small firm or a solo practitioner rather than a true referral
service. Many states, including Texas, follow the Model Code and pro-
hibit the use of trade names.229 The right to prohibit trade names is sup-
ported by the United States Supreme Court decision in Friedman v.
Rogers,230 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Texas statute that prohibited the practice of optometry under a trade
name. An important element in Friedman was factual data indicating that
consumers had been misled. A trade name that remains constant, said the
Court, could hide changes in staff upon whose skill the public trusted and
depended.231 Similarly, by using different trade names for shops under
common ownership, an optometrist could convey the misleading impres-
sion that the shops compete with each other.2 32 Friedman distinguished
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona233 and did not prohibit or limit advertising
the types of information, namely prices and routine services, protected in
that case. 234 Trade names, according to the Court, are a form of commer-
cial speech with no intrinsic meaning and thus any restrictions have "only
the most incidental effect on the content of the commercial speech. ''235
Friedman merely required that commercial information about optometri-
cal services appear in such a form as is necessary to prevent deception. 236
This holding is consistent with Bates, which found the use of the phrase
"legal clinic" coupled with price and service data not inherently
misleading.237
The Final Draft and the new ABA Model Rules permit the use of trade
names by law firms so long as they are not misleading.238 The use of trade
names by many small firm referral services is probably misleading because
those services are designed primarily to benefit the attorneys who run them
rather than the public. Opinions 205 and 371 of the Texas Committee on
229. TEXAS CODE DR 2-102(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) ("A lawyer in private practice
shall not practice under a trade name . ); accord MODEL CODE DR 2-102(B).
230. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
231. Id. at 13.
232. Id
233. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
234. 440 U.S. at 12.
235. Id at 15-16.
236. Id at 16. The Bates Court had noted that "[tihe appropriate response to fraud is a
sanction addressed to that problem alone, not a sanction that unduly burdens a legitimate
activity." Bates, 433 U.S. at 375 n.31; see also FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217-
18 (1933) (before prohibiting use of a trade name under Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits unfair methods of competition, FTC must determine that de-
ceptive and misleading use of name cannot be remedied by any means short of
proscription).
237. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
238. See REVISED FINAL DRAFT Terminology, rule 7.5 comment; ABA MODEL RULES
Terminology, rule 7.5 comment.
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Ethics clearly prohibit the operation of a lawyer referral service strictly for
the benefit of its members.2 39 The new ABA Model Rules impose the
same limitation by requiring lawyer referral services to be not-for-profit.
Finally, it is highly unlikely that small firm members collectively masquer-
ading under a trade name as a lawyer referral service could objectively
assess the competence of the participating attorneys to whom matters are
referred, since they would be screening themselves; thus, the goals of law-
yer referral, if met at all under such circumstances, are met by fortuity.
2. Specialty Bar Referral Services. Another group of arguably taboo
private referral services includes those operated by the specialty bars such
as a criminal lawyers association. On the one hand, such a referral service
might limit itself to criminal matters where, because of the collective spe-
cial knowledge of criminal law, it could do a superior job of screening
attorneys who wished to participate and classifying the criminal nature of
the problems with which prospective clients need assistance. On the other
hand, the narrow perspective and isolation of a specialty bar association is
seen as a threat to public interest policies. 240 For example, a greater incen-
tive and opportunity exists for specialty bar members to respond to in-
creased competition by using eligibility criteria and experience panel
criteria to exclude new attorneys or to refer only the less lucrative cases to
newcomers. The typical bar sponsored lawyer referral service is not auto-
matically open to every licensed lawyer either;24' however, the diversity of
the general bar membership sponsoring the service makes it quite improb-
able that general bar members would agree on extreme exclusionary poli-
cies. The mix of competing views tends to force compromise among
members.
By defining bar associations to include specialty bars, most state codes of
professional responsibility seem, nonetheless, to sanction specialty referral
services, at least indirectly. Arguably, however, in those states that require
that the bar association sponsoring a lawyer referral service be representa-
tive of the general bar, specialty bars do not represent the general bar and
therefore, though they are bar associations for other purposes, may not
sponsor lawyer referral services.
Texas Ethical Opinion 371 expressly prohibits such specialty bar lawyer
referral services even though under the definitions section of the Texas
Code the term "bar association" includes specialty bars.242 The opinion
also prohibits referral services from referring cases in just one subject area
of the law and requires that the lawyer referral service be open to all li-
censed attorneys in the geographical area. 243 In contrast, the amendments
239. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97; Tex. Formal Op. 205, supra note 183.
240. Franck, AndNonefor.411, BAR LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 19, 30.
241. See 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 5.2; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note
99, §§ 3.4, 6.3.
242. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97.
243. Id.; cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1139(1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA Informal Op. 1139]. The ABA opinion directly confronts
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to the 1982 ABA proposed Standards for lawyer referral services mandate
experience and specialty panels under section 5.2 and point out that clients
should be referred only to attorneys with the training, experience, and mo-
tivation necessary to deal with the referred matter.24" Distinguishing be-
tween attorneys on the basis of competence would be in the public interest
if the bar association making such distinctions is bona fide and establishes
the service primarily as a public service. Specialized referral services could
coexist with traditional lawyer referral services because they could refer
potential clients to each other. For example, given a criminal specialty
bar's greater expertise, the regular lawyer referral service could refer crimi-
nal matters to that referral service. These benefits may be diminished to
the extent that more than one specialty bar in a subject matter exists in the
same area. Such a situation might give rise to suspicion of profit motives
and certainly would tarnish claims of superior expertise.
Some states limit the associations that may sponsor or operate a lawyer
referral service to those representative of the general bar of the geographi-
cal area in which the association exists. Texas has such a limitation and
yet simultaneously defines a bar association as a specialty bar. For this
reason the Texas Bar general counsel asserts that the ethics opinion
prohibiting specialty lawyer referral services is simply wrong, and conse-
quently, specialty bars can be representative of the general bar of the geo-
graphical area. 245  How a specialized bar association would be
representative is unclear. Would a specialty bar have to be open to non-
criminal law specialists, or would it have to be open to all criminal law
the question of whether a trial lawyers group could establish a lawyer referral service. The
committee asserted that a strong, general bar association, truly representative of the geo-
graphical area would better sustain and provide the best service because of the stature and
reputation of that type of bar, its greater ability to secure cooperation from all segments of
the bar, its sensitivity to the interest of the overall community, its capacity to publicize the
service effectively due to greater financial resources, and its greater impartiality. ABA Infor-
mal Op. 1139, supra, at 4. The committee also felt that confusion would result in large
metropolitan areas if specialty referral services were allowed since such areas could have
more than one specialty service covering the same subject matter. Id Nonetheless, the
committee concluded:
We believe however that a specialist bar association may qualify to have a
lawyer referral service if such organization has been recognized as a qualified
specialist group in a particular field of law. . . by the authority having juris-
diction. . . and the membership of such group can be said to be truly repre-
sentative of the general bar of the area by accepting all applications for
membership from the general as well as the specialized bar of the area.
We see nothing wrong however with an organization such as the ones you
have indicated establishing a lawyer referral service if it . . . does not in any
way tend to aggrandize any particular members or any special group of the
bar but is aimed at the basic philosophy of making a broad-based, well-run
lawyers referral service more generally available to the public . ...
Id at 5.
244. AMENDMENTS TO 1982 STANDARDS, supra note 99, § 5.2 comment (quoted supra
note 127). The comment explains how this admonition operates by noting that experience
may render an attorney "competent to handle a criminal misdemeanor case and ... incom-
petent to handle a criminal felony." Id. A specialty criminal service referral entity would
be in the best position to make this kind of fine distinction.
245. Zunker Conference, supra note 227.
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specialists in the geographical area? Even a decision on this issue would
not prevent another specialty bar from meeting the same test. As a result,
the specter of two or three specialty bars exists unless one takes the posi-
tion regarding specialty bar lawyer referral services that the Texas State
Bar Ethics Committee takes with respect to lawyer referral services in gen-
eral: "It is improper for a group of attorneys to organize a bar association
and establish a referral service for its members only, particularly when an
existing referral plan is already operating in the area . . ",246 Such a rule
is anticompetitive and tends toward monopolization, but it may well be
essential to maintaining the necessary credibility so important to a referral
service operating in the public interest.
3. Charitable Groups. The limited referrals made by nonprofit groups
designed to assist persons with specific problems typify another group of
private referral services. For example, a rape crisis center or center for
battered wives may refer victims of abuse to volunteering attorneys. Simi-
larly, legal aid offices operated or financed by governmental agencies may
refer fee generating cases to private attorneys. 24 7 Such activities are au-
thorized even though the referral operation is not bar sponsored. Discipli-
nary Rule 2-103(D) of the Model Code authorizes a lawyer to cooperate
with and "be recommended" by a legal aid office "[o]perated or sponsored
by a bona fide nonprofit community organization. ' 248 The Final Draft
and the new ABA Model Rules are less clear on the subject, but do not
seem to change this rule. The comment to rule 7.2 of each specifies that
the restriction against a lawyer's paying others to recommend him does not
preclude some other person or organization from advertising or referring a
lawyer.249 Examples of other such groups include legal aid agencies, pre-
paid legal services, and not-for-profit lawyer referral programs. 250 Lay op-
erated lawyer referral services pose a danger to the public, however,
246. Tex. Formal Op. 205, supra note 183.
247. A good example is the Gulf Coast Legal Foundation, the arm of the Legal Services
Corporation in Houston. That agency actively solicits private attorneys who would be will-
ing to accept its referrals of social security disability cases which are fee generating and rate
a "55% chance of winning." Letter from attorney Jeffrey J. Skarda, Gulf Coast Legal Foun-
dation, to private attorneys (July 29, 1983).
248. MODEL CODE DR 2-103(D):
A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or
his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with,
one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his serv-
ices or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm if there is no interference with the exercise of independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community organi-
zation.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
249. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2 comment; ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2 comment.
250. See ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2 comment; cf. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT rule 7.2
comment (does not restrict lawyer participation to "not-for-profit" lawyer referral services).
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because lay persons may be unable to judge the ability of an attorney to
give competent legal service. The threat may be severe enough to justify
state prohibitions or, at least, stringent guidelines.251 One series of
Supreme Court decisions, however, would allow referral services operated
by lay organizations such as the NAACP and the ACLU that assert polit-
ical rights and the freedom to associate under the first amendment as well
as labor unions that provide legal services for members. 252
4. Suspect Bar Associations. Another type of private lawyer referral
service is operated by a suspect bar association.25 3 The sponsoring bar
association typically consists of one person or just a handful of attorneys.
A one-person association seems inherently misleading and fraudulent, and
therefore vulnerable to challenge. Similarly, an association comprised of
few members with no association program or regular meetings clearly mis-
leads reasonable persons by deceptively implying that it is a bona fide as-
sociation. Conceivably, the titles of services operated by such groups may
be deemed deceptive trade names subject to prohibition by the state.254
The problems of classification increase as the number of members of the
alleged bar association grows, from one member to eleven members, for
instance, or when the small group adds a highly sporadic education pro-
gram. An attorney asked to participate in a lawyer referral service oper-
ated by such a bar association faces a real quandary. The Model Code and
the Texas Code prohibit the attorney from cooperating with a lawyer refer-
ral program that is not properly bar sponsored, but offers limited guidance
on how to evaluate the legitimacy of a particular alleged bar associa-
tion.255 In Texas, as well as some other states, the attorney would have to
ask if the bar association is representative enough of the general bar.
Would this be determined by membership, geographical distribution, ra-
cial distribution, specialty distribution, or some other feature, or a combi-
nation thereof? Would the legitimacy of the bar association hinge on the
legitimacy of the educational or other programs or the number of
programs?
The former ABA Model Code of Responsibility, as worded from 1969
through 1974, solved the dilemma by establishing numerical criteria.
Under that Code a bar association appropriate for lawyer referral sponsor-
ship had to be open to any lawyer in good standing in the geographical
251. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979).
252. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963).
253. In Texas bar associations may be formed at will; no stamp of approval is needed
from any group. See Tex. Formal Op. 205, supra note 183 ("Ethically, then, any group of
lawyers is free to organize any bar association, and the organization of a bar association
cannot be unethical per se.").
254. See supra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
255. See TEXAS CODE DR 2-103(E) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); MODEL CODE DR 2-
103(C)-(D). The lack of precision can foster conflicts. See Podgers, Houston LRS dispute
centers on new bar, BAR LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 16.
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area, but also had to have a membership "at least equal to the lesser of
three hundred members or twenty percent of the lawyers licensed to prac-
tice in the geographical area. ' 256 The Model Code after 1974, the Final
Draft, and the new ABA Model Rules all eschew this approach. The
Texas Code avoided numerical specificity as well; the Ethics Committee
preferred to define bar associations in terms of purpose while acknowledg-
ing that a small group of lawyers is not generally acceptable. 257 One ap-
proach proposed in Texas would have the State Bar Ethics Committee
certify a list of valid lawyer referral services that function in a fashion
compatible with the disciplinary rules.258 In so doing the committee
would, of course, have to evaluate the legitimacy of any sponsoring bar
association. Once established, the list would serve as an easy reference for
attorneys who want to participate in lawyer referral services.
5. Restricted Legitimate Bar Associations. A related problem arises
when bar association membership is restricted by gender or ethnic origin.
Such bar associations are generally legitimate in terms of number of mem-
bers and diversity of programs. Often the membership is representative of
the geographical area in the sense that the association membership in-
cludes lawyers with a wide range of experience and competence in most of
the major subject matter areas. Whether or not a lawyer who participates
in a lawyer referral service operated by such a bar association violates a
disciplinary rule depends generally on how the service functions. Thus, if
the restricted bar association established a nonprofit entity that operated in
conformity with the ABA standards for lawyer referrals, a lawyer could
certainly participate. Attorneys who are not members of the bar associa-
256. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(C) (1974).
257. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97; Tex. Formal Op. 205, supra note 183.
258. At a meeting of the State Bar of Texas Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral a
majority rejected the suggestion that the State Bar of Texas establish a certified list of ap-
proved lawyer referral services. Interview with attorney Norma Trusch, member of State
Bar of Texas Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral (Aug. 20, 1983); cf. supra note 97
(discussion of California approach). A similar idea was articulated in House Bill 1426 ap-
proved by the Texas House of Representatives during the 1983 legislative session. Under
the proposal the State Bar of Texas standing Committee on Professional Ethics was required
upon "request by any interested person or group" to "render an opinion binding to all ex-
cept the Supreme Court as to whether an operating or proposed lawyer referral service is
legal and proper as prescribed by the Disciplinary Rules .. " Tex. H.B. 1426, § l(c), 68th
Leg. (1983). Additionally, the committee was required to require as essential components of
any lawyer referral service bar association sponsorship, not-for-profit status, a purpose of
benefiting the public, the referral of every type of legal problem, openness to attorneys in
every field, and the maintenance by each participating attorney of at least $100,000 malprac-
tice insurance. Id § l(c)(l). Concern was expressed, however, over the fact that the Ethics
Committee was composed of nine volunteer lawyers and therefore could not handle the
expected number of inquiries, and money for additional committee support staff was sorely
lacking. Many bar officials also felt that any bill that sought to amend the State Bar Act
should be opposed because it would invite other proposals for amendment that would not be
initiated by the State Bar. For these reasons the primary drafters of the bill worked out a
compromise on the Senate version that restructured the bill in order to eliminate the need
for amending the State Bar Act. See Tex. C.S.S.B. 1173, 68th Leg. (1983). The session
terminated before a conference committee was convened to resolve the differences between
the House and Senate versions.
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tion would be eligible to participate, and referrals would not be based on
race or sex. Dues charged to participating attorneys as well as criteria for
experience panels could and probably would vary, but would not seriously
distinguish the restricted bar's lawyer referral service from one sponsored
by a bar association whose membership is not restricted.
The more problematic question is whether an ethnic or gender specific
bar association could operate a lawyer referral service and restrict referrals
to its members or to members of its ethnic or gender group. This issue is
more than hypothetical, as demonstrated by a Chicago-based female bar
association with nearly seven hundred members that started a referral
service catering to persons seeking female attorneys.259 The standards of
the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral and Information Serv-
ice (LRIS) prohibit referrals based on race, sex, age, religion, or national
origin.260 The Committee's standards do encourage the establishment of
subpanels to facilitate referral based on geographical convenience and to
accommodate non-English language requirements. 26' The effect of imple-
menting these panels, particularly in cities that are segregated to a large
extent, could be little different from referral services referring clients to
attorneys of one race or one language. The key distinction is that an im-
mutable characteristic is not determinative of participation under the
LRIS Committee's standards; an attorney could change his geographical
location or acquire a facility with a particular language. This practice dif-
fers in principle from referrals to attorneys of one race or one ethnic back-
ground or one gender.
On the other hand, some clients may prefer an attorney of a similar
gender or ethnic background. A rape victim may want a female attorney
to handle her case for damages against her attacker because she feels a
woman attorney could sympathize more and she would be less embar-
rassed discussing the case. A man going through a divorce may want a
woman attorney because he believes that the judge may be more sympa-
thetic to him with a woman by his side. 262 A black client might distrust a
white attorney in a sensitive civil rights or employment discrimination
matter. A Ku Klux Klansman might prefer a white attorney to pursue his
right to demonstrate. A Hispanic may believe that a Hispanic attorney
could best understand the origins of his domestic dispute and therefore
represent him better than someone who merely speaks Spanish. The law
certainly does not prohibit individuals from following these personal views
in selecting an attorney. Do the disciplinary rules prohibit the facilitation
of those choices?
ABA Formal Opinion 291 allows a bar association to "use its reasonable
259. Quade, Men show interest in women's bar's LRS, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at
33.
260. 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 7.2; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 99,
§ 7.2.
261. 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 5.3; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 99,§§ 1.1(a), 5.3.
262. See Quade, supra note 259, at 33.
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discretion in deciding whether to confine the referral panel to bar associa-
tion members only," as long as other principles discussed in the opinion
are observed. 263 These principles include requirements that the members
of the panel be competent and that the plan not operate for the benefit of
any particular group of lawyers.264 Thus under certain circumstances a
restricted bar association is authorized to restrict its referrals to its mem-
bers. The new ABA Model Rules do not address this issue directly; rule
7.2 simply limits a lawyer's participation to not-for-profit referral services.
Accordingly, a not-for-profit restricted bar association referral service is
permissible. In Texas, however, membership in a referral service may not
be limited to members of the bar association itself.265 This restriction
would preclude limiting referrals to the women's bar association members.
The requirement under Texas Ethics Opinion 371 that all lawyers in good
standing be eligible to apply also precludes limiting referrals to one race or
one gender.
Efforts to sustain the right to make restrictive referrals causes resort to
constitutional arguments. Such arguments rely on cases reinforcing the
freedom to associate and exchange political expression as well as the con-
sumer's right to receive commercial information. 266 Consistent with this
theme, many private referral plans consider themselves advertising cooper-
atives through which groups of small firms or solo practitioners can share
the high cost of advertising campaigns.267 Minority lawyers therefore
claim that as long as they do not mislead or deceive the public as to the
qualifications or source of the attorneys to whom clients are referred, they
should be allowed to advertise collectively through a referral service in
exercise of their constitutional right to free speech. While race, sex, age,
and other immutable characteristics are irrelevant to an attorney's compe-
tence and anathema to many as criteria for selecting counsel, such factors
are nevertheless often important to the quality of the interaction between
client and attorney.
Restricted referrals may violate title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.268
Under title VII an employment agency may not "refuse to refer for em-
263. ABA Formal Op. 291, supra note 25.
264. Id.
265. Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97 ("[A lawyer referral service] must be open to
lawyers generally .... "). The 1978 Statement is clearly in accord with the Texas view:
"Participation [in a lawyer referral service] should not be restricted to members of the spon-
soring bar association ...... 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 3.4.
266. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). A number of
Supreme Court decisions have accorded great weight to the interest of the intended recipient
of speech. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945). Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), was the vehicle for the
Court's most emphatic expression on the subject: "If there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted . I d at 757.
267. Podgers, supra note 11, at 3.
268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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ployment . . . any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . ... 269 The law covers employment agencies regardless
of size and includes "any person regularly undertaking with or without
compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for em-
ployees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of
such a person. 270 Inasmuch as an employment agency is necessarily de-
fined in terms of employers and employees, a referral service or agency
that merely brokers or acts as an intermediary for independent contracts is
not an employment agency under title VII. Since lawyers must exercise
independent judgment and typically are independent contractors, a lawyer
referral service would ordinarily not be an employment agency. Such
services may become employment agencies by making restricted referrals
to companies and law firms seeking female and minority applicants for
attorney-employee positions.
6. Unabashed Commercial Services. Perhaps the most troublesome pri-
vate lawyer referral services are those set up as commercial enterprises.
Lawyers as well as lay persons have organized such services, which func-
tion as local concerns, statewide enterprises, and even national services. A
group of private investigators allegedly formed one such entity. Reput-
edly, one prerequisite for becoming a participating attorney was the em-
ployment of the investigators on referred cases. This criterion is certainly
irrelevant to competence as a lawyer. To the extent that the term "lawyer
referral service" connotes some form of objective assessment of the partici-
pating attorneys' skills, the service run by these investigators is misleading
and therefore not in the public interest. While all commercial endeavors
in lawyer referral do not necessarily lack critical assessment of legal com-
petence, the risk is certainly greater in a profit enterprise that attorneys will
be accepted who lack the necessary competence but who do have the
financial capacity to pay the fee for participation, which is often as high as
$500.
In services of this kind the number of attorneys who can participate is
artificially limited so that the operators can ensure that the participating
attorneys receive a high number of referrals. This restriction is an impor-
tant factor in attracting attorneys and justifying the high charges to the
attorneys. The high fees received allow the elimination of any fee from the
potential client and of the receipt by the sponsor of any forwarding fee.
This of course avoids any problem concerning fee splitting with
nonlawyers. 27!
Perhaps the best known of such entities was the National Lawyer Refer-
269. Id § 2000e-2(b).
270. Id. § 2000e(c).
271. See MODEL CODE DR 3-102; ABA MODEL RULES rule 5.4; cf. MODEL CODE DR 5-
107(B) (contemplating possibility of attorney's being an employee by providing that a "law-
yer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal serv-
ices for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal
services"); ABA MODEL RULES rule 5.4(c) (essentially same language as DR 5-107(B)).
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ral Service (NLRS). The service was limited to eleven subject matter
panels with twenty lawyers per panel to assure rapid rotation. By dividing
a metropolis such as Houston into six areas, the program planned to sign
up no more than 1320 attorneys in that city. Each attorney would pay
NLRS $500 annually for the privilege of membership. The attorneys were
to be selected on a referral basis; that is, attorneys contacted would be
asked to refer other attorneys to NLRS, and NLRS would then rely upon
the judgment of the referring attorney. Though the service was based in
California, out-of-state clients could enter the system by calling a toll-free
number. The caller would then be told that an attorney would contact him
once the nature of the problem was determined. NLRS would designate
an attorney in each city to answer questions about NLRS. Additionally,
NLRS planned to initiate a scholarship program in each state that would
award a scholarship to one law student in each area. 272
The NLRS would violate any state code of professional responsibility
requiring bar sponsorship as a prerequisite for lawyer participation and, of
course, would violate the new ABA Model Rules that restrict a lawyer's
ability to pay for recommendations to not-for-profit referral services as
well. Even apart from these concerns, however, NLRS may have been
misleading. First, the number of attorneys was limited not out of concern
for quality but to ensure significant financial returns to those attorneys
who did sign up. A caller in a particular geographical area would have a
choice on any given legal problem of only twenty attorneys, whose creden-
tials were never formally screened. The structure of the operation there-
fore vitiated the value of the high number of attorneys scheduled to
participate. Additionally, although the advertisement in the Yellow Pages
suggested that there would be "absolutely no cost," 2 7 3 the attorneys could
charge whatever initial consultation fee they chose. NLRS ultimately
folded, apparently without refunding money owed to many lawyers who
never realized the advertised benefits.274 One attorney who realized some
early benefits maintains that such private referral services are a "dynamite
idea" if properly regulated. 275
III. ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
The regulatory scheme creates confusion as to how lawyer referral serv-
ices ought to finance themselves and whether bar sponsored lawyer refer-
ral services can or should stifle competition from nonbar sponsored
272. Letter from James Hibbeler, President of the National Legal Referral Service, to
John Werner of the Houston Lawyer Referral Service, Inc. (Mar. 31, 1982).
273. National Legal Referral Service Advertisement, GREATER HOUSTON TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY YELLOW PAGES 139 (June 1982) ("Let the attorney referral service help at abso-
lutely no cost to you.").
274. See Quade, supra note 222, at 719.
275. Id In Houston the right of NLRS to do business in Texas was challenged. The
legality of that challenge and the methods available to combat services which allegedly lure




referral services. The prospects for survival of the bar sponsored lawyer
referral services hinge, therefore, on the extent to which several essential
features of such services can be maintained. Those features are perhaps
most gravely threatened by the antitrust laws. The federal antitrust laws
are designed to prevent interference with competition in interstate and for-
eign commerce. The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act is to preserve
free and unfettered competition 76 and to protect consumer interests.2 77
Section 1 of the Act prohibits contracts and conspiracies to restrain inter-
state trade and commerce. 278 Section 2 prohibits monopolies of trade or
commerce including attempts to monopolize trade or commerce. 279 Mo-
nopoly denotes the power to control prices or exclude competition 280 and
includes conspiracies to acquire or maintain the power to exclude competi-
tors from any part of trade or commerce.28'
The concern with application of the antitrust laws to lawyer referral
services282 is part of a continuing struggle over whether professionals
should be allowed to regulate themselves. 283 A professional in the strictest
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
277. See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966).
278. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ..... 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
279. Section 2 provides that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mono-
police . . . trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
felony. ... Id § 2.
280. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
281. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946).
282. In addition to §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act, other provisions may also be applica-
ble to lawyer referral activities. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides: "No corporation
engaged in commerce shall [merge with another], where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ...." Id § 45. The Federal
Trade Commission Act is technically not an antitrust statute, but it reaches conduct forbid-
den by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as activities similar but outside of their reach.
See Boomer, Chamberlain, Horn, Weart & Winston, Advertising Restrictions on Licensed
Occupations. An Antitrust Approach, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 729, 744 (1977). In proscribing un-
fair methods of competition, such as advertising restrictions, the FTC Act does not require
concerted activity, in contrast to the Sherman Act. Private parties, however, do not enjoy a
private right of action under the FTC Act, and the authority of the FTC in certain areas is
being vigorously challenged. See Sbaratta, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal Trade Commission's
Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV. 833 (1977); Tartt, President's Page, 46
TEX. B.J. 1361 (1983). An in-depth analysis of the FTC Act is beyond the scope of this
Article. Similarly, space limitations do not permit an exploration of state antitrust statutes
used to challenge some of the restrictions on the operation of lawyer referral services. For
the most part those state statutes parallel the Sherman and FTC Acts. Therefore, the analy-
sis would be essentially the same. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE
ANTITRUST LAWS (1973-1974).
283. Since 1975 challenges to professional self-regulation programs have been made
under the antitrust laws, often successfully. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1982); American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1980), afl'd per curiam, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); see also Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust
Suit Against American Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538 (1978). See generally L. AN-
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sense is someone who applies advanced training in a complex, systematic
discipline to meet the needs of individual members of the general pub-
lic. 284 This narrow definition distinguishes the physician and lawyer as
well as perhaps the military officer and theologian from others who also
work for a living.285 Theoretically, lay persons who lack this intensive spe-
cialized training cannot fully comprehend the practices and judgments of
the professional and lack the time to monitor those practices. Because lay
persons cannot effectively evaluate professionals, each profession, so goes
the theory, ought to monitor and conduct peer review of its own members
to ensure that each professional is functioning in a manner beneficial to
the public. The hoped-for results of self-regulation by professionals are
rising quality and declining cost of services offered by professionals who
are imbued with the exclusive objective of advancing the public interest.
Many believe that, by and large, professionals have failed to discharge
DREWS, supra note 3, at 6 (Justice Department's 1976 suit against ABA alleging conspiracy
to prohibit advertising); Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 570 (1975) (applicability of antitrust laws to "learned professions"); Leibenluft
& Pullard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions. Developing a Framework/or Assessing
Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927 (1981) (effect of antitrust laws on professional
activities). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is especially active, spawning frequent
discussion by commentators on the legal profession. See Bierig, Whatever Happened to Pro-
fessional Self-Regulation?, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 18; Comras, Are We Heading
Toward Federal Regulation of the Legal Profession, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 19-21;
Slonim, FTC Future Discussed as Lawyer Probe Renews, 66 A.B.A. J. 1056 (1980); The FTC
Returns. Bar Not Rejoicing, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 2 (reporting on voluntary FTC
questionnaire for circulation to the bar associations of 50 states and the District of Columbia
as part of probe of possible constrictions of flow of affordable legal services). The FTC
activity even inspired legislative proposals in Congress to curb the authority of that agency.
See H.R. 918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H138 (1983) (proposing moratorium on
activity of FTC with respect to certain professions and professional associations until Con-
gress expressly authorizes such activity); S. 1984, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
S 15672 (1981) (amending Federal Trade Commission Act to protect legislative and regula-
tory authority of state legislatures). The State Bar of Texas has been particularly hostile to
FTC efforts to investigate and regulate lawyers. In 1982 it established a 21-person standing
committee on federal laws and regulations affecting the bar. The committee's chief activity
has been to appear before congressional committees to oppose FTC authority to regulate
professionals. Orrin Johnson, then president of the State Bar, is reported to have observed
that "the instrusion [sic] of the Federal Trade Commission violated the historic relationship
between state and federal governments. . . . [T]hat members of the bar were regulated by
the judicial branch of the government of Texas and were therefore a part of the very fabric
of the judicial system of Texas." Wilson, Federal Laws and Regulations Affecting the Bar, 46
TEX. B.J. 857, 858 (1983); see also Tartt, supra note 282, at 1361. The State Bar solicited
support of the 1983 ABA convention in Atlanta for its efforts to strip the FTC legislatively of
its power to patrol lawyers' actions. See Lawyers Seek a Loophole, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1,
1983, at 11; FTC Chairman Vows to Fight on Lawyer Regulation, Hous. Post, Aug. 1, 1983, at
10A, col. 1.
284. See Bierig, supra note 283, at 19.
285. See M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968). Bloom's purpose is "to show
how the American middle class is victimized by the American legal profession." Id at 9.
"[Wihile law is supposed to be a device to serve society, a civilized way of helping the wheels
go round without too much friction, it is pretty hard to find a group less concerned with
serving society and more concerned with serving themselves than the lawyers." Id at 15
(quoting former Yale law professor Fred Rodell); see also Behrman, The Erosion of the Pro-
fessional Image, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 29, 30; Podgers, The Lawyer's Image-A
Problem that Won't Go Away, BAR LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 11; How Bars Are Trying to
Polish Public Image, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 31.
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their professional responsibility to police themselves as well as they might
have, and consequently, the image of professionals has suffered, and justi-
fiably so. 286 Where self-regulation was once automatically accepted, it is
now viewed somewhat more critically. Limits on self-regulation have been
proposed by persons invoking the antitrust laws. While some debate con-
tinues as to whether the same standards ought to apply to professionals
and professions as apply to traditional business ventures under antitrust
laws,287 generally the standards are the same. If a particular practice does
not violate the antitrust laws per se, the sole inquiry tends to be whether
the practice, in this case self-regulatory activity, is "one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition. ' 288 Generally, if the prac-
tice impedes competition, it is illegal whether or not it serves the public
interest. 289 In antitrust analysis considerations apart from competitive sig-
nificance are largely irrelevant. For example, total bans on advertising
and disseminating information are anticompetitive and therefore unlawful.
In contrast, restraints on misleading and false promotional practices are
procompetitive because they enhance the accuracy of information used by
consumers to make choices. Standards of competence or quality, then, are
unlawful if they discriminate against individuals or products for anticom-
petitive purposes or for reasons unrelated to their ostensible objectives. In
the context of lawyer referral services one would, for example, look to the
objects and purposes of the experience panel criteria used by bar spon-
sored lawyer referral services and ask whether those criteria reflect or
measure high performance, and if so, whether they help consumers make
informed choices, thereby encouraging competition.
A. The Restraint of Bar Sponsorship
The insistence that attorneys cooperate or participate only in bar spon-
sored lawyer referral services necessarily limits competition because it pre-
cludes lawyer participation in those services that are not bar sponsored.
Attorney participation is essential to any lawyer referral service. In those
states where bar association is defined as one "representative of the general
bar of the geographical area in which the association exists," 290 the compe-
tition is further limited as not every bar association is authorized to spon-
286. See Podgers, supra note 285, at 1 I-13.
287. Behrman, supra note 285, at 29.
288. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
289. There are of course exceptions to this rule. Communicating a viewpoint to a legisla-
ture or regulatory board is protected by the first amendment under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961). An activity may be lawful because it is part of a federal regulatory scheme that
is incompatible with antitrust laws. National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 393 n.18 (1981). If the activity constitutes a state regulated insur-
ance business the McCarran-Ferguson Act may extend immunity to it from antitrust laws.
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979). In addition,
activities undertaken by the state or pursuant to state directive and under state supervision
may escape antitrust sanction under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See infra notes
343-51 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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sor a referral service. The Texas Ethics Committee has stated that
allowing competing groups of attorneys within the same general geograph-
ical area to advertise and solicit business through the guise of lawyer refer-
ral services could convey to the public an implication that the principal
purpose of such employment is the private benefit of the group being ad-
vertised rather than the benefit to the public that accrues by facilitating
public access to legal services. 29' One bar tends to preclude efforts by the
other bars since often only one bar is sufficiently representative.292
The anticompetitive potential of the bar sponsorship requirement shows
more clearly where specialty bars such as criminal bar associations are al-
lowed to sponsor referral services. If specialty bars operate or sponsor
services, the restraint on competition may be increased because the spon-
sors of the service that establish the rules for attorneys applying to partici-
pate are direct competitors of the newcomers who would like to
participate. As competition for new clients heightens, the incentives to
toughen the standards under the guise of protecting the public increase. 293
In a much broader and less specialized bar association, however, the an-
ticompetitive incentive is diffused. The monopolistic tendencies of the bar
sponsorship requirement are not inconsistent with the long tradition of
professionals who decide to form associations, agree on fee schedules,
agree not to solicit business or advertise, agree not to engage in competitive
bidding, and in general agree that it is somehow unprofessional to engage
in the kind of competitive activities typical of other businesses.
At one time the professions argued that as learned professions they were
never intended to be regulated by the federal antitrust laws since they were
regulated by the state, and more fundamentally, that they were not engag-
ing in trade or commerce. 294 The Supreme Court firmly rejected those
propositions as bases for the exemption of activities of professionals from
federal antitrust sanctions. In the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar295 the Court held that lawyers were involved in trade and commerce
and stated that "[iln the modern world it cannot be denied that the activi-
ties of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that
anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on com-
291. See Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97.
292. See, e.g., Podgers, supra note 255, at 15 (strenuous opposition of large Houston bar
association to establishment of referral service in same geographical area by alleged bar
association with only 39 members).
293. But see supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text (discussion of specialty bar
associations).
294. The often asserted learned profession exemption from the Sherman Act is derived
from Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922), where the Supreme Court created an exemption for
major league baseball. Justice Holmes declared in a dictum that "a firm of lawyers sending
out a member to argue a case . . . does not engage in such commerce because the law-
yer ...goes to another State." id. at 209. Similarly, doctors follow a profession and not a
trade. FTC v. Raladom Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
295. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The statements quoted supra note 294 were characterized as
mere "passing references." Id at 786 n.15.
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merce." 296 Thus the Court held that those activities were fully subject to
scrutiny under the antitrust laws and that the Virginia State Bar's adoption
of a schedule of suggested fees for various legal services did in fact violate
the antitrust laws. 297 Nevertheless, the Court inserted a footnote to its
Goldfarb opinion suggesting that it might still give greater latitude to re-
strictive rules adopted by professionals than it would to rules adopted by
other commercial actors.298 How wide this latitude might be remains in
some doubt, 299 though the door left open is indeed a narrow one.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States300 the
Court held that the Society's rule prohibiting engineers from engaging in
competitive bidding violated the Sherman Act by restraining price compe-
tition among engineers.30' The Society did not contest the contention that
the ban on competitive bidding restrained price competition. The Society
did argue, however, that such a rule was reasonable and necessary because
price competition among engineers would be contrary to the public interest
and that such competition would place pressures on engineers to design
inefficient and less expensive structures, which would decrease the quality
and safety of the structures. The Court responded by noting that the con-
gressional policy favoring open competition did not allow the courts to
inquire whether that competition was good for an industry. 30 2 The Sher-
man Act, said the Court, mandates competition and outlaws arrangements
that restrain it; the Act "reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately com-
petition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and serv-
ices."'30 3 The Court also clarified to some extent the footnote in Goldfarb
by pointing out that the Court would be willing to inquire whether rules
limiting competition in other markets might have a different effect in mar-
kets for professional services. 3°4
296. Id. at 788.
297. Id at 792-93.
298. Id. at 788 n.17. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of pro-
fessions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas.
The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view
on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id
299. Further elaboration may accompany the Supreme Court's pending review of Hyde
v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
1271 (1983). In this case a board certified anesthesiologist charged that § I of the Sherman
Act was violated by the exclusive contract for anesthesia service between a hospital and a
professional medical corporation. The hospital district argued that the traditional and more
stringent per se rule of liability should be rejected due to the "professional nature of the
services." Id at 293. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Id.
300. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
301. Id at 696-97.
302. Id. at 695.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 696.
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Bar sponsorship requirements will no doubt generate similar arguments
that the public might be better served by bar sponsored referral plans. Ar-
thur Lewis, past chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer
Referral Service, has indicated that "[blar sponsorship 'is like the Good
Housekeeping seal.' "305 He suggested that not only does bar sponsorship
lend credibility to lawyer referral services in the eyes of the public, but also
that it will ensure a high caliber of service. Bar sponsorship is impliedly
synonymous with high standards for participating attorneys, the existence
of malpractice insurance, and precise screening of potential clients. Cer-
tainly, instances of abuse by private referral entities exist. Nevertheless,
one group of lawyers, such as a lawyer referral service governing board
comprised of bar association members, is not necessarily better in all in-
stances at referring potential clients to lawyers than is another group of
lawyers of the same size with similar resources simply because the latter
group is not bar sponsored. Obviously, a referral in the public interest is
less certain where a handful of attorneys poses as an association. 306 Such a
service might even be fraudulent and vulnerable to challenge under state
laws forbidding deceptive trade practices.307 Nevertheless, unless pro-
tected by some exemption, there is a real danger that bar sponsorship re-
quirements violate the antitrust laws.
B. The Per Se Illegality of Fees
Antitrust issues also arise concerning fees received by lawyer referral
services. The fixed initial consultation fee is perhaps the most important
fee because it serves two functions. To the extent that all or part of the
initial consultation fee is refunded, it is a financing device; however, it is
even more important as an essential method of inducing prospective cli-
ents to contact attorneys. The importance of the low initial fee as an in-
ducement to prospective clients is often reiterated.30 8
305. Podgers, supra note 12, at 2 1;accord Carlin supra note 70, at 677 ("The institutional
advertising of LRS under bar association sponsorship can register a more trusted image
306. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA),
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); Debakey v. Staggs,
605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980), writ refdn.r.e per curiam,
612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981); see also Elia, The DTPA-The All Encompassing Buyer Remedy
in Texas, 43 TEX. B.J. 745 (1980). Misleading representations may also lead to disciplinary
actions against the attorney. See TEXAS CODE DR 2-101(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983);
MODEL CODE DR 2-101(A); ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.1. In short, the possibility still exists
that a nonbar sponsored service could be interested in public service. For example, a group
that calls itself the Lawyers' Registry Corporation proposes that its nationwide lawyer refer-
ral service would charge nothing to potential clients and that attorneys wanting to partici-
pate would have to meet stringent guidelines for competence. See Vilkin, supra note 11, at
2, col. 1, at 36, col. 1.
308. See Carlin, supra note 70, at 670. HANDBOOK, supra note 7 states:
Since fear of being overcharged is one of the principal things which deter
laymen from seeking legal advice, the fixed fee has always been considered
one of the most important elements in the referral plan. One carefully con-
ducted study for the Survey of the Legal Profession showed that a large per-
centage of laymen who were interviewed were firmly of the opinion that a
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Notwithstanding its utility, the initial consultation fee operates as an
overt mechanism for fixing the price of the services rendered during the
initial visit between a referred client and the participating attorney, and,
therefore, is similar to the fee schedules in Goldfarb held to be a "classic
illustration of price fixing."' 309 A key distinction is that Goldfarb dealt with
minimum fee limits while the initial consultation fee is a maximum fee
ceiling. In June 1982 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of maximum
fee agreements in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 310 and held
that such agreements are per se unlawful as antitrust violations under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. This decision marked the first time that the
Court expressly extended the per se rules to horizontal maximum price
fixing; it also broke away from prior rules that suggested that certain activ-
ities should be subject to the rule of reason when engaged in by learned
professions. 3 I The Maricopa case involved two nonprofit corporate foun-
dations 312 composed of licensed medical doctors. To provide a competi-
tive alternative to existing insurance plans, each foundation established
through majority vote a schedule of maximum fees that participating doc-
tors agreed to accept as payment in full for services performed for patients
insured under plans approved by the foundation. Though the schedules
were revised periodically, member doctors were always free to charge
higher fees to uninsured patients and to charge any patient less than the
maximum.
In assessing the contention of the foundations that the per se rule313 did
not govern their case, the Court recounted several cases as evidence of its
unwavering enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing.314 The
consultation with a lawyer in connection with even the simplest legal matter
would cost $50; a substantial percentage said that the fee would amount to
more than $100.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
309. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975).
310. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
311. See generally Harrison, Price Fixing, the Professions andAncillary Restraints.: Coping
With Maricopa County, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 (1982) (discussion of Maricopa and previ-
ous case history).
312. The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care, a nonprofit Arizona corporation was
composed of approximately 1750 doctors, representing about 70% of the practitioners in
Maricopa County. The Pima Foundation for Medical Care had roughly 400 members.
313. Most claims of unlawful restraints under § I of the Sherman Act are analyzed under
the "rule of reason" test for liability, which requires the court to decide whether under all
the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposed an unreasonable restraint on
competition. The rule allows restraints when the anticompetitive effects are surpassed by
their beneficial commercial results, such as increased availability of goods to consumers
through greater efficiency and production. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing &
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 781-82 (1966). The high cost of judging the business
practices led to the recognition of per se rules, a conclusive presumption that certain catego-
ries of restraints, such as a price fixing agreement, are unreasonable and prohibited by the
Sherman Act. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44; see also F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 438-43 (1970).
314. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 345-47. The Supreme Court first cited United States v. Tren-
ton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), where the Court held that "[tihe aim of every price-fixing
agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix
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Court was unpersuaded by the argument that the lack of judicial antitrust
experience in the health care industry foreclosed the application of the per
se rule. The Court specifically noted that the claim that price restraints
will make it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical
profession from any other provider of goods and services. 315 Relying on
its decision in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. ,316 the Court em-
phasized that with respect to price-fixing agreements the Sherman Act
"'establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.' "317 Sim-
ilarly, the Court rejected the assertion that the per se rule be rejustified for
every industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust
litigation.318
The foundations in Maricopa also argued that the procompetitive as-
pects of the fee schedules should insulate them from prosecution because
the fee schedules reduced medical fees and concomitant insurance premi-
ums, thereby enhancing competition in the health insurance industry.
319
The Supreme Court rejected the argument as a misunderstanding of the
per se concept since the "anticompetitive potential inherent in all price
fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive
justifications are offered for some."'320 Thus, even the possibility that a
price ceiling "saved patients and insurers millions of dollars" 32 1 was not
enough to convince the Court to allow a rule of reason approach. 322
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix
arbitrary and unreasonable prices." Id. at 397. Also cited was the Court's statement in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940):
[F]or over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under
the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils
which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be inter-
posed as a defense.
Id. at 218. Further, the Court in Socony- Vacuum held:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlaw-
ful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no
position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabi-
lized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market
forces.
Id. at 221-22. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951),
was cited for the proposition that "such [maximum price fixing] agreements, no less than
those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability
to sell in accordance with their own judgment." Id at 213. Finally, the Court cited Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968): "Maximum and minimum price fixing may
have different consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by
substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that
market."
315. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349, 350 n.22, 352 n.25.
316. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
317. 457 U.S. at 346 (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222).
318. 457 U.S. at 346.
319. To the extent that fixed initial consultation fees ensure the operation of lawyer refer-
ral services that are an alternative source of legal services, then the fee indirectly enhances
competition.
320. 457 U.S. at 351.
321. Id. at 342.
322. See supra note 313 (discussion of rule of reason).
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Despite the Supreme Court's emphatic adherence to the per se rule,
Maricopa does contain indications that not all maximum fee restrictions
will be disallowed automatically. The Maricopa Court seems to give great
consideration to the argument in support of the fee schedule as a means of
lowering insurance and medical costs. This approach reveals a willingness
on the part of the Court to take a hard look at the facts before applying the
per se label. Such an examination, almost by definition, represents a dilu-
tion, however minor, of the rigid approach implied by the per se stan-
dard.323 Accordingly, when confronted with a challenge to the fixed
consultation fee employed by lawyer referral services courts might expose
themselves to the underlying justifications for the arrangement, including
the argument that the fixed fee is a necessary inducement to reluctant po-
tential clients and an important factor in expanding the legal services mar-
ket. Surprisingly, the Maricopa Court even offered an alternative and less
restrictive method of obtaining many of the same economies as the Mari-
copa County plan.324 In the Court's view the function of the foundations
in collecting information and determining what maximum prices would be
appropriate should be performed by an insurer. While the resulting pro-
cess might take more time, the economic effect should be the same.325 The
Court's conclusion that the maximum fee setting by the doctors extended
beyond that which was reasonably necessary 326 was asserted without any
concrete comparative evidence on whether that method was more or less
efficient than having an insurer perform the same function by contacting
each doctor separately. The Court conceded that the prior agreement
might in fact be more efficient than its suggested alternative. 327 The con-
cern of the Court seems to center less on comparative efficiency and more
on the greater bargaining power the combined physicians would have over
the insurers, 328 and inferentially, the potential of such a group to use the
leverage to raise prices. If the foundations were left out of this picture, the
doctors would not have a single horizontal entity bargaining for them, and
their former leverage and monopolistic potential would be diminished.
The alternative suggested by the Court leaves open the possibility that
maximum price fixing could be afforded rule of reason treatment if the
alternatives were less obvious. The facts surrounding the typical initial
consultation fees for legal services are not closely analogous to the Court's
suggested alternative. Typically, no third party insurer is available. A
third entity, namely, the sponsoring bar association, is involved with the
individual attorney competitors, however. That association is more closely
323. Variations of the per se standard have been discerned. See Sullivan & Wiley, Re-
cent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage and
Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 333 (1979-1980). The authors de-
scribe approaches that they identify as "self-executing per se" and "analytically enhanced
per se." Id
324. 457 U.S. at 353 n.28.
325. Id
326. Id. at 351-55.
327. Id at 353.
328. Id at 354 & n.29.
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analogous to the Maricopa foundations because the association is operated
by competitor attorneys who are in some sense agents for the attorney
members of the association. Typically, each participating attorney in the
referral service, as a condition for receiving referrals, must agree to the fee
limit set by the bar association's referral service. This situation is similar
to that condemned in Maricopa, where the Court noted that "[ulnder the
foundation plan, each doctor must look at the maximum-fee schedule fixed
by his competitors and vote for or against approval of the plan (and, if the
plan is approved by a majority vote, he must continue or revoke his foun-
dation membership.)" 32 9 Thus, though evidence of flexibility in Maricopa
exists, the circumstances inherent in the utilization of fixed initial consulta-
tion fees may not allow lawyer referral services to take advantage of that
flexibility.
The Court's suggestion of an alternative and its reiteration that the foun-
dation's practices were not necessary implies that the ancillary restraints
doctrine is still viable. The doctrine, established as early as 1893 in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. ,330 stands for the proposition that re-
straints that are ancillary to a legitimate primary purpose, necessary, and
no more restrictive than required, would escape the sweeping prohibition
of the Sherman Act.33' The advent of the rule of reason seemed to render
the ancillary restraint doctrine superfluous. The Supreme Court, however,
recently acknowledged the doctrine in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,332 where the doctrine was applied to buttress a rule
of reason analysis of price fixing. In that case Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
and the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP) defended against charges that their practice of issuing blanket
licenses for musical compositions was improper. These licenses granted
licensees the right to use the compositions of all those artists affiliated with
the respective agency. The impetus for such licenses derives from the high
transaction costs necessary for licensing individual compositions and the
prevalent unauthorized use of these compositions. Though the Second
Circuit held that these license arrangements were per se unlawful price
fixing,333 the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the rule of reason stan-
dard should be used.334 The Court noted that the particular form of enter-
prise, including the joint endeavor and the concomitant price fixing, was
not per se unlawful if necessary to "market the product at all."' 335 Broad-
cast Music does not set forth guidelines on when otherwise per se viola-
tions would survive challenges if ancillary in nature. Certainly, in
Maricopa all the discussion of ancillary restraints did not insulate the phy-
329. Id at 354 n.28.
330. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modifted, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
331. 85 F. at 282-83. See generally Bork, supra note 313, at 796-801; Harrison, supra note
311, at 932.
332. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
333. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Artists & Publishers,
562 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1977).
334. 441 U.S. at 24.
335. Id. at 23.
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sician's price fixing from the per se rule. Nonetheless, to the extent Mari-
copa can be read as preserving the ancillary restraints doctrine, arguably
the existence of a standard initial consultation fee is necessary to market
the product of lawyer referrals, which is the lawyer referrals themselves.
Without the initial incentive in the form of a financial discount, potential
clients who are referred may not actually follow through on contacting the
attorney.
The rationale in Maricopa provides yet another potential basis for dis-
tinguishing the standard initial consultation fee. In refusing to embrace
the contention that professionals are to be treated differently from non-
professionals, the Court nevertheless indicated that where price fixing
agreements are premised on public service or ethical norms, a different
outcome may be required.336 The medical foundations in Maricopa could
not avoid the per se rule because they could not distinguish themselves
from any other provider of goods and services. They had simply set a
price restraint that made it easier for customers to pay the doctors' fees.
The fact that the initial legal consultation fee ceilings make it easier for
users of lawyer referral services to afford legal services is therefore clearly
an insufficient public benefit to remove the fixed fee from the holding of
Maricopa.
On the other hand, if the overall lawyer referral service is considered, its
raison d'etre is to serve that portion of the public that is unsure of its legal
rights and wary of what it presumes are high-priced attorneys. As dis-
cussed above, the Eighth Circuit held a typical lawyer referral service to be
operated exclusively for charitable purposes for purposes of federal estate
tax deductions. 337 In that decision the court realized that "there well may
be incidental benefit flowing on occasion to a lawyer on the referral
panel. '338 The court ruled, however, that this benefit "is but a minimal
consequence of broad public service performed in what is essentially an
eleemosynary endeavor. ' 339 Therefore, the public service exception to the
per se rule against price-fixing agreements formulated by the Court in
Maricopa may be applicable to the ancillary but essential initial consulta-
tion fee feature of the public-service-oriented lawyer referral service. The
interpretation is weakened, however, by the Maricopa Court's apparent
insistence that the alleged restraint not only serve the public, but enhance
service as well.340
336. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348. The Court reaffirmed its position:
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 n.17 (1975), we stated that
the "public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in any other context, be treated differently."
Id; see supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
337. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 435 (8th Cir. 1967).
338. Id; see supra note 220-21 and accompanying text.
339. 374 F.2d at 435; accord Kentucky Bar Found. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921, 925
(1982).
340. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349. The Court noted: "The price-fixing agreements in this
case, however, are not premised on public service or ethical norms. The respondents do not
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The Court's slight deference to the distinctness of professions permits an
argument that lawyer referral services do not violate the Sherman Act if
fixed initial consultation fees somehow improve and enhance the profes-
sional services provided to the public. Successfully demonstrating quality
improvement looms as a difficult task. The quality of service is enhanced
indirectly by fees that keep the lawyer referral service functioning and by
the typical bar sponsored lawyer referral service's use of only those lawyers
who meet certain minimum standards of professional competence. This
screening of counsel function is certainly a public service, but it is en-
hanced by fixed initial consultation fees only to the extent that such fees
assist in defraying the cost of necessary background investigations. This
quality enhancement exception is, at best, a slender reed. Sturdier prophy-
lactics stem not from Maricopa itself, but from larger antitrust themes.
The most important of these is the state action immunity doctrine.
C State Action Immunity Standards
The Supreme Court first considered antitrust immunity for state action
in 1904 in Olsen v. Smith.341 In that case the Supreme Court decided the
validity of Texas pilotage laws that created a monopoly in favor of pilots
licensed by the state. In upholding the regulations, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it would be improper to deny "the power of the State to
exercise its authority over a subject concerning which it has plenary power
until Congress has seen fit to act in the premises. ' 342 This decision marked
the beginning of antitrust immunity premised upon principles of
federalism.
1. The Case Law. Not until forty years after Olsen did the Supreme
Court have another occasion to consider the immunity issue. In Parker v.
Brown 343 a California raisin producer sought to enjoin the California De-
partment of Agriculture from enforcing the California Agriculture Prorate
Act, the express purpose of which was the restriction of competition among
argue, as did the defendants in. Goldfarb and Professional Engineers that the quality of the
professional service that their members provide is enhanced by the price restraint." Id
341. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
342. Id. at 345.
343. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker state action immunity doctrine has been exhaus-
tively analyzed with almost all commentators urging narrow construction. See Martyn,
Lawyer Advertising The Unique Relationship Between First Amendment and Antitrust Protec-
tions, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 184 n.93 (1976) (list of articles); Note, The Organized Bar and
Prepaid Legal Service-An Antitrust Analysis, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1011, 1053 n.238 (list of
articles); see also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 2B (Supp. 1982); Areeda,
Antitrust Immunity for "'State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981); Ken-
nedy, Of Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under
the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 31 (1979); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974); Smith, Antitrust Im-
munity For State Action: A Functional Approach, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 263 (1979); Comment,
The State Action Doctrine and State Antitrust Laws-Thirty Five Years of Struggle, 30 MER-
CER L. REV. 1039 (1979); Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited- The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977). Similarly, many cases have
addressed the issue. See Martyn, supra, at 184 n.93.
1152 [Vol. 37
LAWYER REFERRAL SER VICES
growers and the maintenance of prices. A raisin marketing program was
instituted under the authority of the California Agriculture Prorate Act.
The program committee's duty was to control the marketing of the Califor-
nia raisin crop primarily by restraints upon competition by producers in
the sale of their crops to buyers. The buyers eventually sold and shipped
ninety-five percent of the crop in interstate commerce. Over fifty percent
of worldwide raisin production and almost all of the raisins consumed in
the United States were grown in California. One producer brought suit
against the California Director of Agriculture to enjoin enforcement of the
prorate program. The Court assumed that the California program would
violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and conducted by private
persons. Based on legislative history, the Court found no intention on the
part of Congress in 1890 to pass an antitrust statute that would apply to
state regulations.3 "4 The Court went on to hold that the prorate program
constituted state action and thus did not violate the Sherman Act.345
Parker, which is considered the seminal case on this issue, represents a
broad antitrust immunity position on state action.346 In Parker the Court
did not consider the proximate relationship of the program officials to the
state or the degree of state control and monitoring of the program. The
Court expressly discounted the effect of the program on interstate com-
merce. 347 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have evolved a
strict standard of review for antitrust immunity claims and a presumption
against immunity.348
Thirty years after Parker the Supreme Court had occasion to reexamine
the scope of the state action immunity doctrine in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
344. 317 U.S. at 350-52.
345. Id. at 352.
346. The state action immunity doctrine has also been described as the "state action
exemption" and "the state action defense." "The term exemption is commonly used as an
abbreviated expression for Parker's holding that the Sherman Act was not intended by Con-
gress to prohibit the anticompetitive restraints imposed by California in that case." City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978). Professor Handler
prefers the term "preemption," which can occur when there is conflict between inconsistent
state and federal legislation. With his preemption analysis the presumption is that pursuant
to the tenth amendment state law effectively governs and is not displaced by federal enact-
ment. See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown Slate Action Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1976). Other commentators offer various other approaches. See
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 238, at 731-37 (1977) (balancing test
that includes consideration of fairness); Donnem, FederalAntitrust Law Versus Anticompeti-
tive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 967 (1970) (limit Parker to situations
where state has legitimate local reason for limiting competition, where policy is mandated
by statute, and where limitation of competition is narrowly drawn); Posner, The Proper Rela-
tionship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693,
703, 709-10, 714-26 (1974) (limit state action exemption to public utility type regulations and
require state supervision); Slater, supra note 357 (balancing test).
347. 317 U.S. at 368.
348. See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text (discussing Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)); infra notes 357-417 and accompanying text (discussing Com-
munity Communications Corp. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976)).
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Bar.349 There a unanimous Supreme Court held that minimum fee sched-
ules published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and enforced by the
Virginia State Bar 350 violated the Sherman Act and did not qualify as state
action deserving of antitrust immunity.35' The district court and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had exempted the state bar from the anti-
trust laws on the ground that the state bar was an agency of the state and
thus its action constituted state action.
Simply because the conduct in question was that of a state agency did
not by itself give rise to antitrust immunity, according to the Goldfarb
Court.352 While Parker had focused on the reasons for the state action
doctrine, Goldfarb focused on the nature of the state action. The Parker
Court found that the prorate program constituted state action simply be-
cause it derived its authority from the command of the state acting as sov-
ereign. The Goldfarb Court disagreed that such a tenuous connection
between the activity and the sovereign was enough for immunity purposes.
The Court asserted that "[tlhe threshold inquiry in determining if an an-
ticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not
meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign. ' 35 3 In Goldfarb the bar associations could not show that their
actions were compelled by direction of the state acting as a sovereign, so
the actions carried no immunity.354 The Court emphasized that while the
state supreme court promulgated the ethical codes, "they do not direct
either respondent to supply [the fee schedules], or require the type of price
floor which arose from the respondents' activities. '355 Thus while the state
bar association was a "state agency for some limited purposes," according
to the Court, this status did not automatically confer antitrust immunity.356
In summary, the Court held that mere authorization, prompting, or tacit
approval by the state of the activity in question was not sufficient to invoke
the immunity doctrine, and the fact that the defendant is a state agency or
a member of a learned profession did not control the immunity issue. The
conduct challenged must be compelled by the state acting as a sovereign.
The next Supreme Court decision on this issue, Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co. ,357 concerned the immunity claim of a private electric utility company.
349. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
350. Id. at 789-90. The county bar was a voluntary private organization without the
power to enforce the minimum fee schedules it published. The state bar, however, was a
state agency because it was an administrative agency of the Virginia Supreme Court. The
state bar published opinions indicating that attorneys who charged less than the recom-
mended fees could be found guilty of misconduct and disciplined were challenged as price
fixing in violation of the Sherman Act; both the state and county bar claimed immunity
under Parker.
351. Id. at 790.
352. Id. at 791.
353. Id. at 790.
354. The Court noted that "[r]espondents have pointed to no Virginia statute requiring
their activities; state law simply does not refer to [the setting of] fees . Id
355. Id.
356. Id. at 791.
357. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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The company maintained a program of giving free light bulbs to its cus-
tomers. The cost of the program was included in its tariff request to the
Michigan Public Service Commission, and the program could not be ter-
minated until the Commission approved a new tariff. The Court denied
state action immunity to the company despite pervasive state agency regu-
lation of its operations, focusing on the degree to which the state partici-
pated in the decision that produced the anticompetitive program.
While acknowledging that imposing antitrust liability on a private party
who merely obeyed a state law would be unacceptable, 358 the Court has-
tened to note that it had "already decided that state authorization, ap-
proval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive conduct confers no
antitrust immunity. ' 35 9 A plurality of the Court embraced a per se rule
that conferred no immunity unless the action was taken by state offi-
cials.360 The majority, however, recognized a balancing test in which the
degree of state involvement in the decision that produced the offensive ac-
tivities is compared to the degree of private involvement in that decision.
For the majority, the question presented was whether "the private party
exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude that
he should be held responsible for the consequences of his decision."'36'
Applying this analysis, the Court observed that the light bulb program was
the product of a decision in which both the utility and state agency partici-
pated, and that while the utility could neither institute nor terminate the
program without approval by a state agency, the decision whether to use
such a program was primarily that of the utility.362 The Court concluded
that the utility's participation in the decision to maintain the program was
so significant as to require conformity with the federal antitrust laws. 363
The Cantor Court also discussed the immunity doctrine in terms of the
necessity of the requested exemption. A plurality of the Court felt that if
an exemption is unnecessary to make a state regulatory system work then
there should be no antitrust exemption. Applying this standard to the light
bulb distribution program, these Justices found that an exemption was un-
necessary for Michigan to effectively regulate the public utility's distribu-
tion of electricity. 364 The Court reasoned that the Sherman Act should not
be undermined by granting "a host of state regulatory agencies broad
power to grant exemptions from an important federal law for reasons
wholly unrelated . . . to any necessary significant state interest. '365
The Cantor opinion is problematic in several respects. First, the Court
provides no criteria for determining under the balancing test the point at
which liability attaches because of the doctrine of private involvement in
358. Id. at 592.
359. Id. at 592-93 (footnotes omitted).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 593.
362. Id. at 593-94.
363. Id. at 594.
364. Id. at 598.
365. Id. at 603.
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the decisionmaking process. Second, the requirement that an antitrust ex-
emption must be deemed necessary to make a state regulatory scheme
work seems to suggest that even if the conduct in question were directed by
the state itself, the activity could still violate the Sherman Act upon a find-
ing by a federal court that the state action was unnecessary. The plurality
opinion, however, contains so many differing viewpoints that its preceden-
tial value is debatable.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 366 two lawyers sued the State Bar of
Arizona, claiming that a disciplinary rule promulgated by the Arizona
Supreme Court forbidding lawyer advertising violated the Sherman Act
and the first amendment. The appellants had advertised their services in a
local newspaper in direct contravention of the disciplinary rule. The presi-
dent of the state bar filed a complaint with the local disciplinary board,
which found against the attorneys. The Supreme Court held that the ad-
vertising restrictions did not violate the Sherman Act.367
The Court dealt with the antitrust issue primarily by distinguishing the
situations in Goldfarb and Cantor. In Goldfarb the Court reasoned that
the Virginia Supreme Court did not require the anticompetitive minimum
fee schedules, whereas in Bates the rule against advertising was an affirma-
tive command of the Arizona Supreme Court.368 In distinguishing Cantor,
the Bates Court possibly added two new standards by which the presence
of state action should be determined. First, the Court found that the state's
policy of regulating attorneys was clearly and affirmatively expressed in its
code of professional responsibility.369 Second, the Court emphasized that
the activity in question was subject to periodic reexamination and close
supervision by the state itself.370 Both of these elements in Bates, active
supervision and periodic reexamination by the state, were lacking in
Cantor.
The Bates Court also alluded briefly to a real party in interest test. The
Court reasoned that the real party in interest was the Arizona Supreme
Court, which had adopted the rules and which bore the ultimate responsi-
bility for enforcing those rules.371 The Court used this approach as an
alternative ground for finding Cantor and Goldfarb inapplicable. The
Bates holding provides strong precedent for holding bar sponsorship re-
quirements immune from antitrust laws where the bar is a unified bar.
First, at issue in Bates was a disciplinary rule with the force of a statute.
Second, the defendant was related to the state in the first degree as an
agency of the state supreme court just as, for example, the State Bar of
Texas is an agency of the Texas Supreme Court. Third, the state policy
was not only affirmatively expressed, but was also part of an extensive and
pervasive regulatory scheme in which the state had an obviously important
366. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
367. Id. at 359-63.
368. Id. at 361-62.
369. Id. at 359-60.
370. Id. at 362.
371. Id.
1156 [Vol. 37
LAWYER REFERRAL SER VICES
interest. The same can be said of a bar sponsorship requirement set forth
expressly in the disciplinary rules adopted by a state supreme court.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 372 the plaintiffs, cit-
ies authorized by the state to own and operate electric utilities, sued Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. (LP&L), a privately owned utility, alleging
various antitrust violations. LP&L, which competed with the plaintiffs
outside the boundaries of the cities, counterclaimed with its own antitrust
allegations. 373 The cities sought the dismissal of the counterclaim on the
ground that the antitrust laws were inapplicable to cities and municipali-
ties as subdivisions of the state.374
The Lafayette Court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' main contention
that all governmental agencies were exempt from the antitrust laws. The
Court noted that Goldfarb required an agency's act to be an act of govern-
ment directed by the state as sovereign, while Bates required the activity to
be part of an affirmatively articulated regulatory scheme, actively super-
vised by the state itself.375 The Court next turned to the nature of the
relationship between the state and its city subdivisions. The Court empha-
sized the fact that each state has numerous incorporated municipalities,
each with less than statewide jurisdiction, and suggested that cities could
be expected to advance parochial interests. Under such circumstances cit-
ies could adopt policies at variance with that of the state.376 The Court
concluded that "the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct
engaged in as an act of government by the state as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regula-
tion or monopoly public service. '377 A determination of immunity re-
quires that it appear "from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of
action complained of."'378 Lafayette thus adds an element of legislative in-
tent to the immunity inquiry.379 Unless this inquiry is narrowly construed,
Lafayette may potentially authorize broad grants of immunity. Further-
more, analyses based on legislative intent are typically speculative at
372. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
373. For example, LP&L alleged that the cities required prospective LP&L customers to
purchase electricity from the cities as a condition for continued water and gas service.
374. 435 U.S. at 392.
375. Id. at 410.
376. Id at 414.
377. Id at 413.
378. Id at 415.
379. Accord Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 n.15
(1982) ("Parker affords an exemption from federal antitrust laws, based upon Congress' in-
tentions respecting the scope of those laws." (emphasis in original)). Although the Boulder
case received much notoriety, see Spiegel, Local Governments and the Terror ofAntitrust, 69
A.B.A. J. 163 (1983), it logically extends the broad language in Lafayette that state subdivi-
sions are not generally treated as "state" equivalents. In holding that the city of Boulder's
cable regulation ordinance was not immune, the Court asserted that the state's home rule
amendment guaranteeing local autonomy is not a clear articulation of state policy contem-
plating anticompetition. "The requirement of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression'
is not satisfied when the State's position is 'one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal
actions challenged as anticompetitive.'" 455 U.S. at 55.
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best.380
The fact situation in Princeton Community Phone Book Inc. v. Bate38'
closely resembled that in Bates. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
found that state action immunity should apply, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. In Princeton the challenged activity was the issuance by
the defendant, the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, of an opin-
ion stating that members of the New Jersey Bar were prohibited from pay-
ing a phone book company to list their names, addresses, and telephone
numbers in classified sections of the book. The publisher argued that
under Goldfarb the Advisory Committee's conduct was not exempt be-
cause it was enforcing its own interpretation of the ethics rule that prohib-
ited paid advertising by lawyers in New Jersey. The Princeton court
acknowledged that the committee was interpreting an unclear command
and enforcing its own interpretation. The court, however, found that al-
though "the relationship between the Committee's activity and the com-
mand of the state [was] not as close as [the] relationship in Bates, the
relationship between the Committee as an entity and the State Supreme
Court [was] closer . . . than in Bates. ' 382 The Third Circuit found an in-
verse relationship between the defendant's relationship with the state and
the clarity that the authorization to engage in the challenged activity must
possess. 383
In Princeton the court found that the defendant shared a close relation-
ship with the state and concluded that the necessary element of compul-
sion by the state acting as sovereign did exist. 384 While Princeton is
notable for its inverse relationship language, the court also found that the
New Jersey rules contemplated an anticompetitive effect, 385 one of the La-
fayette factors, and that the state had an important regulatory interest in
the subject matter of the antitrust controversy, 386 a factor in both Cantor
and Bates.
Calfornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum Inc. 387
portends to be one of the leading cases in this area. In Midcal the Supreme
Court seems to have settled upon some standards against which state ac-
380. See Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid- Construing the Sounds of Congressional
and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982). Professor Tribe observes that "it seems
axiomatic that the words of a statute-and not the legislators' intent as such-must be cru-
cial elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation." Id. at 517
(emphasis in original). He further asserted that "[i]f legislative intent is of problematic rele-
vance, legislative inaction-whatever intent it might signal-is afortiori a forbidden source
of law." 1d.
381. 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
382. 582 F.2d at 718-19.
383. Id. at 719. As the court stated: "The weaker the relationship between the state and
the defendant, the more clearly the state must command the precise action taken by the
defendant for the defendant to enjoy the state action exemption . . . .[where the relation-
ship is close, however,] the state need only authorize action in a particular area." Id
384. Id
385. Id. at 717.
386. Id at 719.
387. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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tion immunity claims can be measured. If true, this result is a welcome
change from past court decisions in which slightly modified language ap-
peared each time a different set of facts presented itself. In Midcal a Cali-
fornia statute required wine producers to file fair trade contracts with the
state. In these contracts the producer established prices for those brands
that the producer sold and required dealers to sell at those prices. Selling
to retailers below the established prices subjected the dealer to fines, li-
cense suspension, or license revocation. The Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control charged Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a wholesale dealer,
with selling wine below prices set by the Ernest and Julio Gallo Winery
and with selling wine for which no fair trade contract was filed. Midcal
sought an injunction against the enforcement of the price-fixing program
on the grounds that it violated the Sherman Act.
Parker v. Brown and Midcal both involved state-created price mainte-
nance programs for the benefit of the state producers of raisins and wine,
respectively. A critical difference between the two programs recognized by
the Midcal Court, however, was the degree of state control, participation,
and supervision at the grass roots level of the program's implementation.
Given the customary illegality of resale price maintenance, the program in
Mideal failed because it sought to create private pricesetting power not
directly supervised by the state. In Parker, on the other hand, the program
was administered by California state officials and output was restricted to
no more than the officials themselves approved. 388
The Midcal Court read Goldfarb and Cantor as requiring that the state,
acting as sovereign, compel the anticompetitive conduct for the effectua-
tion of its policy goals, and that the state provide oversight of the regulated
activity.389 Bates further supported the conclusion in Midcal because that
decision stated that immunity would be granted when the state clearly ar-
ticulates a policy of restraining competition and subjects the operation of
the anticompetitive policy to careful reexamination. 390 The Supreme
Court in Midcal then adopted three criteria for determining the presence
of state action: (1) the state must have acted in its sovereign capacity;
(2) the anticompetitive conduct must be a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed policy of the state; and (3) the actual conduct must be
subject to pointed reexamination or active supervision by the state.39' The
Court held that the California wine pricing system failed to meet this last
requirement. The Court concluded:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices es-
tablished by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor
reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market
conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the
388. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943).
389. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104; Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
390. Mideal, 445 U.S. at 104-05.




The Court believed that the national interest in competition should not be
"thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. '393
The Midcal decision is important in at least two respects. First, it articu-
lates more clearly than had previous opinions one simple question with
which all the prior cases seem to have been concerned, that is, just how
involved was the state in the conduct of which complaint is made? Sec-
ond, whether by design or by accident, the Midcal Court appears to have
weeded out from among the many prior opinions those criteria deserving
of critical importance in the state action immunity doctrine.
2. The Exemption of Fixed Fees. The administration of initial consulta-
tion fees by a state bar authorized lawyer referral service would not seem
to justify state action immunity under the standards adumbrated thus far.
Midcal, Bates, and other cases established as prerequisites for exemption
the existence of a clearly articulated policy. This policy, in the words of
the Goldfarb Court, must be promulgated by an action of the sovereign. 394
The most unambiguous statement of policy would be a state statute setting
forth the actual dollar amount of the initial consultation fees. No such
statutes have been found.395 References to fees can be found in the disci-
plinary rules adopted by various states. Those references do not specifi-
cally mention initial consultation fees. A clearly articulated policy on
initial consultation fees is therefore lacking, rendering vulnerable a key
feature of lawyer referral services. Future adoption of guidelines concern-
ing initial consultation fees by the legislature or a state supreme court
would suffice to grant antitrust immunity. Such guidelines should be pre-
cise to the point of actually setting out the dollar amount and should man-
date periodic state review of such fees. 396
A state bar association is not the sovereign and therefore may not confer
immunity on itself by establishing an initial consultation fee policy. Many
state bars are, however, accorded agency status by statute or by delegation
from a state's supreme court. The state bar involved in Goldfarb was spe-
cifically authorized to "'act as an administrative agency of the [Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals] for the purpose of investigating and reporting
the violations of such rules and regulations adopted by the
Court. . . .' 397 Nonetheless, despite the clear agency status, the Court in
Goldfarb stressed that anticompetitive actions must be compelled by the
392. Id. at 105-06.
393. Id at 106.
394. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
395. Proposed H.B. 1426, which passed the Texas House of Representatives in 1983, con-
tained a specific dollar figure. Tex. H.B. 1426, § l(c)(2)(ii), 68th Leg. (1983); see supra note
258.
396. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
397. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776 n.2 (1975) (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-49 (1972)).
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direction of the state acting as sovereign. 398 Thus, even though it is an
agency, a state bar could provide only a shield for fixed initial consultation
fees if a directive by the supreme court or legislature compelled it to estab-
lish such fees. Such a directive would probably have to order the bar to
establish a fixed ceiling on initial consultation fees.
Under Princeton the directive need not be quite as specific. The
Princeton court established an inverse relationship between the precision
of state directives and sovereign status. The further away from sovereign
status is the alleged antitrust violator, the more precise the state guidelines
should be.399 If the state bar is the sole agent of a state supreme court and
has that court's authorization to act in the particular area of lawyer referral
service fees, then the criteria set forth by the Princeton court are apparently
satisfied. 400 Currently, lawyer referral services operated by state bar as-
sociations establish their own initial consultation fees. While the typical
disciplinary code permits an attorney to pay fees incident to participa-
tion401 and therefore implicitly authorizes the setting of those fees by the
service sponsor, neither the Model Code nor the new ABA Model Rules
mention the fees paid by the client to the attorney.
Voluntary local bar associations are often the entities that establish the
initial consultation fees. The Houston Lawyer Referral Service, Inc. is
sponsored by the Houston Bar Association, which is the largest voluntary
bar association in that city. Such local bar groups are not state agencies,
and hence lack authorization from the sovereign to establish initial consul-
tation fees and are not under state supervision. Accordingly, initial con-
sultation fee ceilings established by a local bar association, absent
compelling state legislation requiring that such fees be established, are
outside state action immunity protection.
3. The Exemption of the Bar Sponsorship Requirement. Since the sanc-
tioning of lawyer advertising by Bates, many veterans of the lawyer refer-
ral movement share a sense of foreboding. According to one lawyer
referral service official, lawyer referral services fear the possible impact on
them of lawyer advertising. 4°2 The liberalization of advertising, along
with new competition from clinics and prepaid legal services, makes ex-
pansion of lawyer referral services more difficult. Diehard lawyer referral
service officials certainly believe that the services, particularly those that
398. 421 U.S. at 790-91. The Court noted:
[I]t cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court
rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent ...
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does
not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices
for the benefit of its members.
Id. (emphasis added).
399. Princeton, 582 F.2d at 719.
400. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
401. See, e.g., TEXAS CODE DR 2-103(E) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
402. See Podgers, supra note 12; see also Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Freedom of
Speech-Advertising, 46 CIN. L. REv. 1029, 1035 (1977) (Bates . . .may portend the demise
of lawyer referral services ....").
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are bar sponsored, are essential to making available to the public a high
caliber and safe source of legal service. One director of a lawyer referral
service said, "'[Pleople assume in calling a bar association that it implies
control (over lawyer conduct), honesty and integrity.' "403 While not uni-
versal, the feeling that pervades many of the comments is that lawyer re-
ferral services ought to exist whether or not other entities provide the same
benefits.404
Unfortunately, at least one study shows that when compared to prepaid
legal service plans and legal clinics, lawyer referral services are the least
effective in expanding the market.40 5 Spurred by paranoia, some services
have vigorously searched for ways to enhance their competitive position by
increasing advertising 40 6 and also by seeking enforcement of the bar spon-
sorship requirement to stem what is deemed illicit competition. As noted
above, many bar associations are reluctant to enforce that rule.40 7 Accord-
ingly, the disciplinary rule requiring bar sponsorship of lawyer referral
services408 is a small impediment to sham services. The question arises,
therefore, whether the bar sponsorship requirement is exempt from anti-
trust laws and whether antitrust constraints should prevent state or local
bar associations from enforcing the bar sponsorship restrictions.
Like the initial consultation fee, the bar sponsorship requirement is not
immune from antitrust challenges unless it meets the standards for state
action immunity. Under Midcal an articulated state policy must require
that lawyer referral services be bar sponsored. 40 9 Operationally, this pol-
icy should be set by statute or by judicial pronouncement from a state's
supreme court. In Bates the adoption of the challenged rule by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court was critical to a finding of immunity. Most state
supreme courts have adopted disciplinary rules requiring that attorneys
cooperate only with referral services sponsored by bar associations. 410
These mandatory requirements prohibit attorneys in those jurisdictions
from cooperating with nonbar sponsored services. Thus, one of the funda-
mental conditions for state action immunity is satisfied in many states be-
cause an express, clear policy articulates that lawyer referral services be
bar sponsored.
403. Podgers, supra note 12, at 24.
404. But see id at 27 (remarks of one lawyer referral service director that " '[i]t may be
that we've served our purpose and it's time for us to die' ....").
405. Note, An Assessment ofAlternative Strategiesfor Increasing Access to Legal Services,
90 YALE L. 122, 153 (1980).
406. Podgers, supra note 12, at 25. A survey of 23 local and state bar associations re-
vealed that all advertise, while some attempt new advertising strategies. "'We're going to
have to be more competitive' . . . says. . . the Dallas Bar Association's LRS director." Id
A 1974 study comparing two cities of similar size showed that the service that advertised
referred over 1000% more individuals than the other. Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising a Good
Beginning but Not Enough, 62 A.B.A.J. 735, 736 (1976).
407. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
408. See, e.g., supra note 180.
409. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
410. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
1162 [Vol. 37
LAWYER REFERRAL SER VICES
a. UniffedBars. A rule against private lawyer referral services promul-
gated by a state bar association would have very little chance of protection
unless the association were integrated or unified by statute as an agency of
a state supreme court. A unified bar is one to which all lawyers are re-
quired to belong. Often such bars are agencies of the states, as is the case
with the State Bar of Texas.41
The State Bar of Texas was created by statute in 1939, and is an admin-
istrative agency of the judicial department of the state.412 The Texas
Supreme Court is recognized by statute as the arm of government empow-
ered to prescribe the rules regulating the practice of law in Texas.4 13 The
only legislative restriction regarding the rulemaking authority of the Texas
Supreme Court requires the approval of the regulated group before the
rule changes or dues increases can become effective. 414 The supreme court
is, therefore, the branch of government with the ultimate power to pre-
scribe rules for the practice of law in Texas, and the Texas State Bar is by
statute an administrative agency of that body. Nevertheless, even though
the State Bar of Texas is a state agency, under Goldfarb no automatic im-
munity would be implied;415 a compelling sovereign directive is still re-
quired. While no such directive exists for maximum initial consultation
fees, the clear bar sponsorship requirement embodied in Texas Code DR
2-103(E) suffices. 4 1 6
A related and more difficult question involves those policies resulting
from interpretations of the bar sponsorship requirement. Opinions 205
and 371 of the Texas Bar Committee on Ethics augment Texas Code DR
2-103 with additional restrictive provisions related to lawyer referral serv-
ices.417 State Bar enforcement of the disciplinary rules enacted by the
Texas Supreme Court is certainly action compelled by the state acting as
sovereign as required by Parker and Goldfarb in that section 12 of the
State Bar Act places every Texas attorney under the disciplinary jurisdic-
tion of the Texas Supreme Court and its administrative agent, the State
Bar of Texas.418 The grievance committee members are selected by the
State Bar;419 a Grievance Oversight Committee appointed by the supreme
court reviews and supervises the grievance process periodically. 420 Addi-
411. "Every person who after the effective date of this Act becomes licensed to practice
law in this state shall enroll in the State Bar by registering his or her name with the clerk of
the Supreme Court within 10 days of his or her admission to practice." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 320a-1, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
412. "The State Bar of Texas established under the laws of this state is continued as a
public corporation and an administrative agency of the judicial department of government."
Id § 2. See generally Daniel, Creating the State Bar of Texas 1923-1940, 45 TEX. B.J. 454
(1982).
413. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, §§ 2, 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
414. See supra note 176.
415. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
416. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
417. See Tex. Formal Op. 371,supra note 97; Tex. Formal Op. 205,supra note 183;supra
note 183 and accompanying text.
418. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-I, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
419. Id.
420. Id. § 14.
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tionally, the Texas Supreme Court appoints the members of the Profes-
sional Ethics Committee, which is directed to express its opinion on the
propriety of professional conduct.42' That committee is also charged with
recommending "amendments or clarifications of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, if it considers them advisable. '422
The decision in Bates appears especially relevant here. In Bates a state
bar association and a disciplinary rule were the sources of the anticompeti-
tive activity. As was the case in Bates, the Texas policy of regulating attor-
neys who participate in lawyer referral services is clearly and affirmatively
expressed in a code of professional responsibility. The activity of the State
Bar of Texas in the disciplinary area is also subject to periodic reexamina-
tion and close supervision by the Texas Supreme Court. The presence of
these elements in Bates was found to be controlling on the immunity is-
sue. 423 In addition, the anticompetitive effect of new Texas Code DR 2-
103(E) must have been contemplated at the time it was adopted in 1982,
given the general bar sensitivity to antitrust issues during that period, and
thus the conduct of the State Bar in enforcing it is clearly pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service,
both considered important in Lafayette.424
A bar association ethical opinion may be deemed a compelled product
of a sovereign enactment of a disciplinary code. The validity of an ethical
opinion depends on how closely it follows the disciplinary rules adopted
by the respective state supreme court. In Goldfarb the ethical opinion
quoted lacked support in the Virginia Code because the disciplinary rules
did not mention minimum fees, though Virginia DR 2-103(B) did indicate
that "the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal service"
was one factor in determining whether a fee was clearly excessive.425
Where the ethical opinion clarifies ambiguities, the antitrust effect may be
different. An opinion could by interpretation lessen the anticompetitive
effect of a disciplinary rule. Such an opinion should be sustained. In con-
trast, an opinion defining an ambiguous but not inherently anticompetitive
rule in an anticompetitive fashion should be treated like a restriction un-
supported by a disciplinary code since the restraint flows from the opinion
and not the code. Using this approach, one could argue that the prohibi-
tion against specialty bar associations sponsoring lawyer referral services
in Texas Opinion 371426 should not be sustained since the Texas Code is
421. Id § 18.
422. Id Interestingly, prior to April 1, 1979, any amendments to the State Bar of Califor-
nia's Minimum Standards for a Lawyer Referral Service in California had to be approved
by the California Supreme Court. Wing Interview, supra note 90. This change undoubtedly
facilitates modifications in the standards. It will also make it more difficult for California to
take advantage of the state action immunity doctrine if any amendments that have not been
adopted by the California Supreme Court are challenged on antitrust grounds. The likeli-
hood of such a challenge is lessened by the fact that California does not prohibit attorneys
from participating with private referral services.
423. Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
424. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413.
425. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790 n.19.
426. See Tex. Formal Op. 371, supra note 97.
1164 [Vol. 37
LAWYER REFERRAL SER VICES
ambiguous on this point. That portion of the opinion could be viewed as
an unauthorized expansion of the disciplinary rule.
Under Princeton the degree to which an interpretation by an ethics com-
mittee operates as a shield for anticompetitive behavior depends on the
extent to which the committee was directed to act in an area and the prox-
imity of its relationship to the supreme court of the state in which the com-
mittee functions. Princeton holds that the state directive must become
more precise as the relationship between the state and the defendant weak-
ens. The Texas Supreme Court did not select the committees that au-
thored Texas Opinions 205 and 371 since that court's power to appoint the
members of the Ethics Committee only took effect as of June 11, 1979.427
This fact weakens the validity of the additional restrictions on lawyer re-
ferral services set forth in Texas Ethics Committee Opinion 371.
b. Local Voluntary Bar Associations. Local bars, which are not the
sovereign or even an agency of the sovereign, would not receive antitrust
immunity by establishing a policy allegedly prohibiting private lawyer re-
ferral services. A state statute adopting the ABA Model Code and all fu-
ture amendments or policies of a local volunteer bar association by
reference would not be sufficient since this would delegate the power to
create anticompetitive regulations to a private organization. The Midcal
decision criticized such delegation, indicating that the state may not retain
antitrust immunity for activities delegated to private parties.428 Local bar
associations do not control state disciplinary machinery and are not di-
rected to take action against private lawyer referral services. Nonetheless,
the desire to see that rules requiring bar sponsorship are enforced may
prompt action by a local bar association. The range of action that might
be taken includes but is not limited to (1) reporting attorneys who partici-
pate in private lawyer referral services to state bar disciplinary committees,
(2) seeking court injunctions against sham or private lawyer referral serv-
ices, (3) admonishing the state bar to compile a list of proper lawyer refer-
ral services or to take other action, (4) lobbying both the state bar and the
state legislature to support a bill drafted by the local bar association that
would make unlawful private lawyer referral services, and (5) attempting
to discourage publishers from accepting and printing advertisements from
private or sham lawyer referral services. In assessing the validity of each
option, it is assumed that a clear disciplinary rule promulgated by the state
supreme court prohibits lawyers from cooperating with nonbar sponsored
referral services.
The key inquiries seem to be whether the local bar effort is a required
part of the sovereign's effort to enforce the disciplinary rule. The reporting
of attorneys who have openly violated a disciplinary rule is an obligation
of an attorney under Model Code DR 1-103(A) and the new ABA Model
427. Order of the Texas Supreme Court (June 19, 1979), reprinted in TEX. YOUNG LAW-
YERS ASS'N, TEXAS LAWYER PROFESSIONAL ETHICS § 1-11 (1979).
428. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
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rule 8.3. Though individual lawyers are obligated to report misconduct,
associations are not so mandated. Certainly, reporting by associations
complements the effort by the state; however, complementing the state pol-
icy is not synonymous with being a necessary part of the enforcement
scheme. 429 Thus unless some exemption or defense other than the state
action immunity doctrine applies, such reporting would constitute private
anticompetitive action prohibited by the antitrust laws. Similarly, efforts
to enjoin alleged improper lawyer referral services through the courts may
be authorized under acts such as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act 430 or pursuant to judicial interpretation. 431 Nonetheless, these efforts
are still simply complementary efforts rather than absolutely necessary
components of a state mandated scheme.
If, therefore, the first four optional courses of action are to find shelter
from antitrust challenges, they must find it under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. 432 That doctrine, set forth in a pair of United States Supreme
429. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791 ("Respondents' [bar associations] arguments, at most,
constitute the contention that their activities complemented the objective of the ethical
codes. In our view that is not state action for Sherman Act purposes. [Riather, anticompeti-
tive activities must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.").
430. See Swanson, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act: Ap-
plication to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 763 (1977); see supra note 319 (dis-
cussion of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)). A suit
under this act would not be without problems. First, only consumers can maintain a DTPA
case. See Delaney Realty Inc. v. Ozuna, 593 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso),
writ re/'dn.r.e. per curiam, 600 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1980). A local bar association would not be
a consumer of a lawyer referral service under the DTPA, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.§ 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), unless it attempted to secure a lawyer through such a
service. The issue of damages might be a problem as well. Under the DTPA, id § 15.50, a
consumer may not maintain an action or receive an injunction unless the prohibited acts
result in actual damages. Actual damages are those recoverable at common law. See Jim
Walter Homes v. Mora, 622 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ). If a referral is made to an attorney who performs work for the client in a manner up
to standards of the profession, the client has not been damaged. Even where damage is
shown the incentive for the consumer has been diluted by a 1979 amendment which elimi-
nated the award of treble damages for deceptive practices committed "unknowingly," and
placed limits on the award of treble damages for "knowing" violations of the Act. See
DTPA, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
431. See, e.g., Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968). In Touchy
practicing attorneys and an organization composed entirely of attorneys brought suit to en-join a nonprofit corporation from continuing certain practices, including the maintenance of
a lawyer referral service. The court acknowledged that the Canons of Ethics, the predeces-
sor to the current Texas Code, did not apply to nonlawyers. Id at 694. It also asserted,
however, that the interest of the public would be better served by recognition of the "right of
private attorneys to institute an action, upon proper and sufficient allegations, to enjoin the
unauthorized practice of law or conduct of non-lawyers which is demeaning to the legal
profession and harmful to the plaintiffs." Id
432. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS ch. XI(E) (1975 &
3d Supp. 1981); Fischel, Antitrust Liabilitfor Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits ofthe Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 86 (1977); see also
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (collective activity by union and
mine operators to influence Secretary of Labor to take certain action that would effectively
eliminate competition from small mines held lawful irrespective of anticompetitive pur-
pose); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
(collective activity by railroads to secure veto of legislation favorable to competing truckers
held lawful even if it created trade restraint monopoly); Federal Prescription Serv. v. Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (professional society of pharma-
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Court cases, immunizes and protects private efforts to obtain anticompeti-
tive state legislative, judicial, and administrative action. The Noerr-Pen-
nington shield is only valid where the act of a public officer is necessary to
complete the anticompetitive action. The doctrine therefore protects the
bringing of court suits. The reporting of disciplinary violations to the state
agency authorized to adjudicate such breaches is also protected from the
sanctions of the antitrust laws; efforts to lobby the state bar and the legisla-
ture for restrictions on private lawyer referral services are similarly pro-
tected. Protected actions, however, may lose the shield if those actions are
mere shams.433
The fifth course of action seems patently anticompetitive and unpro-
tected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. An effort to discourage a pub-
lisher from accepting and printing paid advertisements for private referral
services is anticompetitive and requires no state action. Accordingly, the
effort is simply an unprotected private action no matter how well inten-
tioned it is or how well it complements an action that the state might take.
Some commentators argue that a defense of fundamental fairness ought to
be permissible where the defendant in good faith reasonably assumed its
conduct immune from antitrust attack. 434 The limits of this doctrine are
not clear, 435 though the unfairness notion diminishes as the state command
obeyed or followed by the defendant becomes less precise. Attempting to
stop advertisements would not fall within the proposed fairness exception.
In short, continued implementation of a bar sponsorship requirement may
still be threatened by the antitrust laws. Challenges to the requirement as
cists' activity in attempting to persuade government agencies that dispensing of prescription
drugs through mails was harmful to public health held not subject to antitrust laws). But cf.
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983) (several cable
companies, with help of mayor and apparent approval of city council, collectively divided
up cable television market in Houston as part of process for applying for cable television
franchises, which had to be approved by city council; Noerr-Pennington doctrine not applied
to shield any of defendants); Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion of the Noerr-Pennington
Immunity, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 291 (1981).
433. See, e.g., Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981) (bring-
ing numerous meritless appeals and deliberate delay in prosecuting those appeals states anti-
trust cause of action); Ernest W. Harhn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980) (series
of baseless and frivolous lawsuits designed to prevent competitor from constructing pro-
posed shopping mall could constitute sham rendering action subject to antitrust sanction);
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1978)
(hospital staff communications to community physicians and state regulatory board, in-
tended to restrict operations of nearby clinic, were not protected by Noerr-Pennington ex-
emption where staff's statutory authority limited to internal disciplinary action), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 924 (1979); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 432 F.2d 755 (9th
Cir. 1970) (institution of state and federal proceedings to deter plaintiffs from access to
courts and agencies held unlawful), aft'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Technicon Medical Info. Syss.
v. Green Bay Packaging, 480 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (filing of a single lawsuit can fall
within sham exception to Noerr-Pennington doctrine); see also Crawford & Tschoepe, supra
note 32, at 292-93 (introducing "mere sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Hig-
ginbotham, The Noerr-Pennington Problem. A View From the Bench, 46 ANTITRUST L.J.
730, 732-36 (1978) (discussing sham exceptions).
434. See Smith, supra note 343, at 288.
435. Id. at 290.
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infringing upon the first amendment rights of consumers and lawyers also
seem inevitable and are discussed in the following section.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
State disciplinary rules that forbid the participation of attorneys in pri-
vate or commercial lawyer referral services arguably violate the first
amendment guarantee of free speech. 436 A threshold question of critical
significance is whether a prohibition against private referrals implicates or
infringes the first amendment at all, and if so what standard ought to be
applied. An argument can be made that lawyer referral services inherently
involve communication and expression. All such services function first by
communicating to prospective clients the availability of attorneys, then by
receiving inquiries from those clients who are attracted by the advertise-
ments, and finally by introducing the prospective client to the attorney
through communication. Any restriction, therefore, on an attorney's in-
volvement in or limitation on the public's access to lawyer referral services
raises the question of whether the restriction is a valid infringement of first
amendment rights.
An opposing argument contends that prohibitions against private lawyer
referral services are no more than business regulations permissible under
the rationality test of the fourteenth amendment.4 37 The state does not
"lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the pub-
lic where speech is a component of that activity. '438 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that freedom of speech is not abridged simply because the
prohibited conduct is "in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written or printed. '439 The bald assertion,
436. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The guarantees of the first
amendment have long been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and are therefore applicable to state action. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 811 (1975); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925). Whereas the action of a bar association must be compelled by the sovereign
to qualify for state action antitrust immunity, see supra notes 350-56 and accompanying text,
the test for whether a voluntary bar association activity invokes the constitutional protec-
tions of the fourteenth amendment is less severe though no less difficult to apply. The
"[c]ases make clear that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with
the State if it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination." Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). Mere receipt of service or benefit or being subject
to state regulation is insufficient; rather, all the facts and circumstances must be weighed in
each case to assess whether there has been significant state involvement, and therefore state
action existed. Id at 172-73; accord Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961). In the typical situation rules promulgated by voluntary bar associations and not
ratified by a state supreme court or state legislature are not state action.
437. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
438. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
439. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). Ex-
amples include: the exchange of information about securities, see SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969); corporate proxy
statements, see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); and the exchange of
price and production information among competitors, see American Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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however, that prohibitions against private lawyer referral services are sim-
ply business regulations merely begs the question; it invites a consideration
of the extent to which first amendment rights are impinged by the prohibi-
tion. This consideration forms the basis of the original question, which
asks whether a prohibition on an attorney's use of a private or commercial
referral service violates the first amendment.
Another argument supporting the prohibition of attorney involvement
in private or commercial referral services relies on those cases involving
public demonstration, labor picketing, and nonverbal expression, where
the Supreme Court distinguished pure speech from speech plus conduct,
holding that the latter is entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protec-
tion.440 The distinction is not entirely clear in the Court's decisions nor
has the Supreme Court yet addressed a referral case. The Supreme Court
decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, nl however, seems to
support a conduct approach. "In-person solicitation," held the Court, "by
a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component." 442 Accordingly, such a
transaction merits a reduced level of judicial scrutiny because of the exist-
ence of state regulation.443
The application of this lower standard to the private lawyer referral
service is ill advised, however, for several reasons. First, the typical opera-
tion of a lawyer referral service involves much less conduct and much
more expression than in-person solicitation. Second, none of the speech-
conduct cases have satisfactorily set forth a credible conceptual theory for
drawing the line between speech and conduct. Since almost every commu-
nication contains conduct, and since much nonverbal conduct can be ex-
pressive, 4 4 a distinction between speech and conduct may not generally
promote any consistent interpretation. Nonetheless, to the extent that law
referral activity is classified as speech plus conduct rather than pure
speech, significant constitutional protections remain. The Supreme Court
requires that state regulation further an "important or substantial govern-
mental interest ...unrelated to the suppression of free expression...
and . . . the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
[be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 445 The
justifications for prohibiting private lawyer referral services do not satisfy
this standard.
A third argument for finding the first amendment implicated in private
440. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968) (draft card burning); Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (demonstrating at jail); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,
563 (1965) (demonstrating at courthouse); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) (labor picketing).
441. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
442. Id at 457.
443. Id. at 459.
444. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
23 ("[AIll speech is necessarily 'speech plus.' "); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 599 n. 11 (1978) (citing cases).
445. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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lawyer referral situations is the possible negative impact that restrictions
on such services have on the guarantee of freedom of association. In Bell v.
Maryland44 6 Justice Goldberg stated in a concurring opinion that "it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any person
or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the basis
of personal prejudices including race." 447 Several cases have established
the parameters of this right in the context of persons seeking legal services.
In NA CP v. Button 448 the Supreme Court applied the traditional compel-
ling state interest test in upholding the NAACP's right to refer individuals
to attorneys. 4 9 The court construed such referrals as a form of political
expression protected by the first amendment.450 The Court held that the
state's valid interest in regulating barratry and solicitation was not compel-
ling enough to justify the broad prohibition against the NAACP refer-
rals.451 Subsequent cases expanded the Button holding to cover litigation
implicating political or constitutional interests. In Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia Bar452 a union set up a referral system in which a
union legal aid department contacted injured workers and recommended
lawyers from a preselected panel. The Court upheld this system as an
activity designed to assist members in asserting workers' compensation
claims.453 Similarly, the Court in United Transportation Union v. State Bar
of Michigan4 54 asserted that "collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. '45 5 The activities in Button and Railroad
Trainmen are today sanctioned by most disciplinary codes.456 These cases
can, of course, be distinguished on their facts from a situation involving a
private commercial lawyer referral service. The typical private lawyer re-
ferral service does not involve political speech, does not involve collective
446. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
447. Id at 313. Bell involved a challenge to the convictions of several Negro sit-in dem-
onstrators for criminal trespass when they refused to move after being asked to leave be-
cause of their race. In concurring in the Supreme Court's reversal of the convictions, Justice
Goldberg distinguished equal access to public accommodations from the protection ac-
corded private association. Id The limits of one's freedom to associate may be tested in the
case of Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
813, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1983), which is soon to be heard by the Supreme Court. Thus far the
King & Spaulding law firm, which refused to make Ms. Hishon a partner, has argued suc-
cessfully that title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply to its partnership decisions
because it is a voluntary association that is free to select for whatever reason the persons
with whom it will associate. See generally Tybor, "/at "Up or Out" Means to Women Law-
yers, 69 A.B.A. J. 756 (1983) (role of women lawyers and their acceptance in law firms).
448. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
449. See L. TRIBE, supra note 444, § 12-23.
450. 371 U.S. at 429-30.
451. Id at 439. Whether the Court was endorsing the right to litigate, advocate litiga-
tion, or associate for the purpose of litigation is unclear. Equally unclear is whether the
right is limited to situations in which persons are trying to protect constitutional rights.
452. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
453. Id. at 6.
454. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
455. Id at 585.
456. See MODEL CODE DR 2-103(D).
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action by lay persons to seek legal services for themselves, and facilitates
the lawyer's commercial employment. Nonetheless, the cases all involve
the referral of persons to attorneys, which is the primary activity of the
private lawyer referral service. Whether the high standard applied in But-
ton will be required in cases where private persons, either lay or lawyers,
associate to provide referrals is unclear. The Ohra/k Court emphasized
that the union legal service cases involved mutual assistance absent in the
solicitation context.457 The Court further held that a "lawyer's procure-
ment of remunerative employment" is within the "State's proper sphere of
economic and professional regulation" because such procurement is "only
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. 4 58 The Court surely
did not, however, intend that statement to apply to factual situations far
removed from the 0hra/ik situation. Private lawyer referral services, no
less than bar sponsored lawyer referral services, facilitate "meaningful ac-
cess to the courts. ' 459 Given the critical importance of the opportunity to
litigate, 460 limitations on services designed to facilitate that access should
be subject to at least a substantial interest standard. As emphasized in
United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association,461 statutes that impede
first amendment rights "cannot be sustained merely because they were en-
acted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legisla-
tive competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful
means of dealing with such an evil."'462 On the contrary, the courts are
obligated to scrutinize the record for some concrete evidence "of abuse, of
harm to clients, of actual disadvantage to the public. 463 Whether the
practices of private lawyer referral services would provide substantial evi-
dence of evils that would justify total prohibition is unknown.
The third argument that prohibitions against private referral services
implicate the first amendment is perhaps the most persuasive. A private
referral service is a method of collective advertising by the attorneys who
participate in it. Advertising has traditionally raised first amendment
questions.464 In many ways a private referral service is analogous to ad-
vertising by a law firm comprised of attorneys practicing in many different
subject areas.465 Both the law firm and the referral service permit the cli-
457. Ohralik, 436 U.S at 458-59.
458. Id. at 459.
459. United Transp., 401 U.S. at 585.
460. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees.: The Right to Protect
One's Rights (pt. I), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-73 (right to litigate promotes dignity, self-
respect, and sense of participation).
461. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
462. Id at 222.
463. Id. at 225.
464. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. 4TH 866 (1981) (current status of attorney solicita-
tion); Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2D 1055 (1955) (attorney discipline for advertising).
465. The financial and competitive advantages of the collective approach have been rec-
ognized even by bar sponsored referral services. See Podgers, Houston area bars studying
joint LRS, BAR LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 9. The article details the plans by three Hous-
ton bar associations to merge their referral activities. One bar leader reportedly cited as a
factor for the plan "that a combined LRS would stand out amid the extensive private lawyer
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ent, who does not known an attorney competent in the client's area of
need, to initiate a referral process by calling a central telephone number.
In both instances someone, who may or may not be a lawyer, will classify
the problem and refer the problem to a specific attorney. In the case of the
private lawyer referral service the referral most probably occurs by strict
rotation within a subject matter panel. In the private law firm the referral
is to a specialty department if the firm is large, or to an attorney specializ-
ing in a particular area if it is not. Additional considerations such as cur-
rent workload of particular attorneys and relative skill levels will probably
play a greater role in the law firm setting than in the private lawyer referral
program. Moreover, while on the one hand the entrance standards for at-
torney participation in the referral service could be as low as the simple
payment of a fee, on the other hand, the standards for participation in a
referral service could be as high as those applied to new associates by the
law firm, because both the law firm and the referral service desire repeat
business, which to some extent depends upon the quality of the work per-
formed by the various attorneys.
When participation in a lawyer referral service is viewed as a form of
commercial advertising, the legitimacy of regulations must be reviewed ac-
cording to the standards of Supreme Court cases in commercial speech. At
one time purely commercial speech was deemed to fall outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment.4 66 The soundness of the dichotomy inherent
in such a rule was repeatedly attacked 467 until the Supreme Court finally
abandoned the rule in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
Council.468 In that case the Court held that the first amendment forbids a
state from suppressing truthful commercial information in the form of
prices on lawfully sold prescription drugs. 469 Speech "which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction" 470 is entitled to first amendment
protections, in part because of the public's right to receive information. 471
The Court was careful to warn that states could regulate commercial
speech as to time, place, and manner, and prohibit false or misleading
commercial expressions. 472 The holding, stressed the Court, was limited to
pharmacists and expressed no opinion on other professions such as
medicine and law where historical and functional differences might re-
advertising in the Houston area, especially by 'those groups that are really not lawyer refer-
ral services but private groups looking for more business.' " id.
466. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("The Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."); accord Bread v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951).
467. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-21 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 401 & n.6 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
468. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
469. Id at 770.
470. Id at 762.
471. Id at 756-57.
472. Id at 771 ("Obviously, much commercial speech is not probably false, or even
wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing
effectively with the problem.").
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quire consideration of other factors. 473 The Supreme Court confronted the
regulation of lawyer advertising in the landmark Bates v. State Bar ofAri-
zona 474 decision. The Court there held that an Arizona Supreme Court
disciplinary rule that prohibited Arizona attorneys from advertising the
prices of routine services in print media infringed the first amendment
rights of lawyers.475 The right of attorneys to advertise was thus
established.
Disciplinary rules prohibiting the cooperation of lawyers with private or
commercial referral services do not directly prohibit speech or advertis-
ing.4 76 Arguably they only regulate the business of referring lawyers. The
scope of such rules, however, is not broad. Most bar disciplinary rules are
promulgated by state supreme courts having inherent authority over the
behavior of lawyers but no authority to promulgate rules prohibiting
nonlawyers from establishing any lawful business. Moreover, Virginia
Pharmacy and Bates imply that neither the right to regulate business nor
the interest in regulating attorneys477 is imbued with a concomitant un-
checked right to infringe the first amendment.
Even if a private lawyer referral service is a method of collective adver-
tising, false, deceptive, or misleading advertising is clearly subject to re-
straint.478 Inherently misleading material or advertisements proven to be
misleading may be restricted or prohibited entirely.479 Perhaps evidence
could be accumulated to justify a conclusion that private commercial law-
yer referral services, especially those with few participating attorneys, are
so deceptive that the use of the designation "referral service" by such enti-
ties could be prohibited.480 This approach was evident in Friedman v. Rog-
473. Id. at 773 n.25.
474. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
475. Id. at 384.
476. A more direct restraint on speech by referral services was contained in a bill ap-
proved by the Texas Senate Jurisprudence Committee. The bill conditioned the use of the
term lawyer referral service on complying with several conditions. See infra note 480 (text
of bill).
477. "The interest of the states in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have histori-
cally been 'officers of the court.' " Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792.
478. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
479. Id at 375; see also In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experi-
ence has proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose
appropriate restrictions.").
480. Compare C.S.S.B. 1173, which was introduced in the Texas Senate during the 1983
Texas legislative session. The bill that overwhelmingly passed the Senate Jurisprudence
Committee states:
LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICES. (a) An individual, firm, or profes-
sional corporation may not use the term "referral service" or words with a
similar meaning in advertising in connection with referring potential clients to
attorneys unless:
(1) the referral service is offered primarily for the benefit of the public;
(2) the referral service is provided by a governmental entity or by an or-
ganization that is exempt from federal taxation under Section 501, Internal
Revenue Code or any organization authorized to sponsor a lawyer referral
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ers,481 where the Supreme Court held that Texas could prohibit the use of
trade names by optometrists. The statute upheld in Friedman more di-
rectly limited expression than do rules prohibiting private lawyer referral
services. Friedman could be interpreted as indicating that a lesser restric-
tion on commercial speech such as a prohibition of lawyer referral services
ought to be allowed. Such a conclusion should be resisted in light of the
fact that the Friedman Court placed much significance on the actual expe-
rience in Texas with deceptive and misleading uses of trade names. 482 Ad-
ditionally, the lack of any intrinsic meaning or content in a trade name483
made the prohibition less of a speech infringement. The advertisement of
lawyer referral services, however, may inherently imply quality and thus
contain content. The whole idea of a referral service may be imbued with
the notion of quality regardless of whether the term is used in the adver-
tisement. While bar sponsorship of a lawyer referral service may be a
prestigious seal of warranted quality to some,484 the term "referral service"
in and of itself may suggest guarantees of quality, though to a lesser extent.
Unless explained, the term may connote referral to attorneys who are not
only licensed to perform legal services, but who are capable of doing so in
an especially skilled and efficient manner. Such implicit quality assertions
may be the subject of regulations designed to avoid deception.485
If such services are only potentially misleading, the restrictions on ad-
vertisement may be no broader than necessary to prevent the deception.486
Accordingly, "the Court in Bates suggested that the remedy in the first
instance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of
disclaimer or explanation." 487 Thus, any allegedly misleading feature of
service permitted by the disciplinary rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Texas;
(3) each attorney licensed in this state is eligible to participate in the refer-
ral service and to receive the referral of clients if the attorney complies with
reasonable participation requirements, which may include but are not limited
to:
(A) a requirement that the participating attorney charge no more than
twenty dollars for the initial consultation with a referred client, and
(B) a requirement that participating attorneys pay reasonable fees to the
service to defray administrative expenses; and
(4) the participation in the referral service by an attorney licensed in this
state would not violate disciplinary rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Texas.
(b) A person may sue to enjoin a violation of this article. The plaintiff is
entitled to an injunction on a showing that a violation has occurred.
Tex. C.S.S.B. 1173, § I, 68th Tex. Leg. (1983).
481. 440 U.S. 1 (1979); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (ban
on in-person solicitation due to possibility of fraud).
482. 440 U.S. at 13.
483. Id.
484. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
485. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
486. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
487. Id (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 375). The Bates Court limited its opinion in several
ways. Problems associated with in-person solicitation, Bates, 433 U.S. at 366, and electronic
media, id. at 384, were distinguished. The validity of reasonable state restrictions on time,
place, and manner were reaffirmed, and the state's right to suppress advertisements concern-
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an advertisement for a private lawyer referral service should be remedied
by the required inclusion of additional information such as a statement
that the service is not sponsored by any bar association. 488 Such an ap-
proach stops short of the absolute prohibition of private lawyer referral
services.
Where the communication is not misleading, as would be the case where
a private lawyer referral service accurately detailed in advertisements how
it was operated and financed and the number of participating attorneys,
the state still retains the authority to regulate if certain conditions are
met.489 The government interest in regulating the advertisement must be
substantial, the regulation must advance the governmental interest, and
the regulation must not be more extensive than necessary. 490 In the lawyer
referral context the state has an interest in (1) facilitating the public's ac-
cess to the judicial process, (2) eliminating deception, and (3) ensuring that
prospective clients are referred to attorneys on the basis of the attorney's
competence to handle the particular legal issue. Given the central role of
attorneys in the administration of justice and the maintenance of a democ-
racy,49' this interest is substantial, perhaps compelling.492 Requiring that
ing illegal transactions was acknowledged. Id Time, place, and manner restrictions must
be content neutral. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. The Bates Court also acknowl-
edged that it was not addressing problems related to quality. 433 U.S. at 366. Justice Powell
questioned the alleged absence of "quality implications" from the advertisements at issue in
Bates since "[tlhere are inherent questions of quality in almost any type of price advertising
by lawyers." Id at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
488. The State Bar of California has taken a similar approach. See supra note 90.
489. In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203.
490. The conditions are part of a four-part analysis the Supreme Court has developed for
commercial speech cases. See Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-
66 (1980).
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566; accord In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203 n.15; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 (1981); cf. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540 (1980) ("Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.").
491. See supra note 477; cf. Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (Court
upheld statute prohibiting entirely certain types of advertising by dentists). Writing for the
Semler Court, Chief Justice Hughes stated:
The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards
which will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but protec-
tion against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible to im-
position through alluring promises of physical relief. And the community is
concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against
practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its mem-
bers into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the
least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the profession is but
the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.
294 U.S. at 612.
492. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 ("We recognize that the States have a compelling
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lawyer referral services be bar sponsored advances this goal because law-
yer referral services operated by bona fide bar associations are operated
expressly for the public benefit rather than for the benefit of any small
group of persons. The new ABA Model Rules make the service goal para-
mount by requiring lawyer referral services to be not-for-profit. 493 Such
limitations advance the government interest indirectly by eliminating a
financial temptation that might motivate competing referral operators to
base operational decisions on their profit potential rather than on the ex-
tent to which the decision facilitates the public's access to competent legal
service.
Finally, one must ask whether this interference is more extensive than
necessary. The two primary evils associated with private referrals are that
prospective clients may be misled about the nature of the service and that
they may be referred to attorneys who have not been adequately screened
for competence. 494 The first evil can be dealt with without banning private
or commercial referrals. A regulation requiring that more information
about the service be provided would satisfy this requirement. Presumably,
information about the number of participating attorneys, how they are se-
lected, the process for referring to a particular attorney, and the fee
charged attorneys who do participate would eliminate most of the decep-
tive aspects of private and commercial referral services. The problem of
incompetence could be handled by two methods. First, the public could be
informed as to how attorneys are selected to participate in the service.
Services could compete on the basis of which service did the best job of
ensuring that the attorneys on its panels were competent. Other businesses
such as those in the automobile industry have certainly demonstrated that
better quality is compatible with increased sales. Second, direct legislation
could impose standards for the operation of lawyer referrals, whether pri-
vate or bar sponsored.495
This analysis suggests that blanket state prohibitions against private and
commercial lawyer referral services infringe attorneys' rights to advertise
collectively and the public's right to receive information about such serv-
interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that ... they have broad
power to establish standards for . . . regulating the practice of professions.
493. See ABA MODEL RULES rule 7.2.
494. Another criticism of private and commercial lawyer referral services is that they
would be less adept at classifying the nature of the legal problems of prospective clients.
The criticism is not warranted since (1) there is no reason commercial services run by a
group of lawyers would be less able to classify legal problems than a bar sponsored service,
(2) services operated by lay persons could employ attorneys or law students to do the screen-
ing, and (3) many service oriented bar sponsored services have nonlawyers screening incom-
ing calls, and even nonlawyer directors of such services. An example of a service using this
latter method is the Houston Lawyer Referral Service, Inc.. The ABA Standards for lawyer
referral services, however, admonish services to have client-applicants interviewed by a law-
yer "if possible." 1978 STATEMENT, supra note 98, § 7.4; 1982 PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra
note 99, § 7.4.
495. Increased frustration over the negative impact of private lawyer referral services
has, however, led to a decision by that Bar to draft a proposed amendment to California's
Business and Commerce Code that will require all lawyer referral services to comply with
the State Bar minimum standards for lawyer referral discussed supra note 90.
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ices. Absent a finding that such services are inherently misleading this
conclusion seems sound. Nonetheless, the very generalized nature of the
guidelines used by the Supreme Court in dealing with similar issues tends
to weaken confidence in any such conclusion before the courts address a
specific case in point. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Bates rec-
ognized this danger. 496 The divided nature of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in the area increases the difficulty of predicting how the Court
might treat a case containing allegations that a ban on commercial and
private lawyer referral services violates first amendment rights.497 These
unsettled circumstances reinforce the general confusion over guidelines for
lawyer referral services and support the observation that lawyer referral
services truly exist in a regulatory wasteland.
V. CONCLUSION
Facilitating the prospective client's search for a competent attorney is a
valuable function. The need for such facilitators will continue to exist be-
cause many consumers simply lack the ability to evaluate the information
thrust upon them as a result of the relaxation of restraints on lawyer adver-
tising. Bar associations have long spearheaded efforts to provide reliable
lawyer referral services to consumers of moderate means. Competition
from private and commercial lawyer referral services as well as an array of
conflicting legal policies, guidelines, and rules cast a shadow over the fu-
ture of bar sponsored lawyer referral services. In many ways the relatively
low profile of bar sponsored lawyer referral services works to their detri-
ment because, with the exception of special committee activity, the bar
associations, state supreme courts, and legislatures rarely focus on these
services. Such avoidance cannot be tolerated much longer for tax, anti-
trust, and constitutional problems threaten important sources of income
and key operational methods of many services. The bar associations, state
supreme courts, and legislatures need a heightened awareness of the im-
portance of lawyer referral services to the public. This awareness should
lead to a commitment to confront the issues in a coherent and comprehen-
sive manner. Some issues, as in the case of the initial consultation fee,
seem to lack only legislative commitment for resolution. Other issues will
496. Bates, 433 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part). The Court again acknowl-
edged the danger in In re R. M. J.:
We recognize, of course, that the generalizations summarized above [ie., the
principles in Bates] do not afford precise guidance to the Bar and the courts.
They do represent the general principles that may be distilled from our deci-
sions in this developing area of the law. As they are applied on a case-by-case
basis ... more specific guidance will be available.
455 U.S. at 204 n.16.
497. The Supreme Court has been divided to varying degrees on how the first amend-
ment ought to be applied to commercial speech cases in Bates (Burger, Powell, and Rehn-
quist, JJ., dissenting in part); Central Hudson (five separate opinions and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Virginia Pharmacy (two concurring opinions and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Con-
solidated Edison (two concurring opinions with Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting);
Metromedia (two concurring opinions with Burger, Stevens, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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require more complex analysis to delineate the parameters of permissible
behavior.
In confronting these problems the public interest should guide efforts to
strengthen traditional bar sponsored lawyer referral services without un-
necessarily stifling the attempts by those who, in good faith, want to ex-
pand the private avenues for public access to attorneys. Naturally,
safeguards against fraud and deception and guidelines for competence are
needed. The public's right to information, however, along with the other
issues discussed in this Article, should caution the bar against taking action
based on premature assumptions that bar associations are the only entities
that can or care to assess the quality of lawyer referral services.
